mirror of
https://github.com/sredevopsorg/deepseek-kubernetes-sandbox.git
synced 2026-11-03 01:13:24 +00:00
feat(gateway-api): GitHub SSO via oauth2-proxy in front of dsh-gateway (#13)
Add oauth2-proxy (GitHub provider, org-restricted) as a reverse proxy in front of the dsh-gateway, wired through the Traefik Gateway API. The gateway inherits the authenticated GitHub username via X-Forwarded-User (SSO). - gateway.py: opt-in AUTH_PROXY_HEADER trust, remote_user(), SSO bootstrap (auto-provision claim + mint/rotate token + session cookie), patch_token() - 50-gateway.yaml: AUTH_PROXY_HEADER=X-Forwarded-User, COOKIE_SECURE=true - gateway-api/dsh-demo: oauth2-proxy Deployment/Service + secret example, HTTPRoute backend -> oauth2-proxy:4180 - tests: 10 new SSO cases (106 passing) Placeholders (dsh-demo.example.com, your-github-org) are substituted at apply time. Co-authored-by: SREDevOpsAgents <agents@sredevops.org>
This commit is contained in:
committed by
GitHub
parent
2b47afa22b
commit
3f46279b39
@@ -118,7 +118,14 @@ spec:
|
||||
# 60-ingress.yaml with TLS); "false" keeps the plain-HTTP demo
|
||||
# usable via port-forward.
|
||||
- name: COOKIE_SECURE
|
||||
value: "false"
|
||||
value: "true"
|
||||
# Trusted reverse-proxy identity header for SSO. oauth2-proxy sets
|
||||
# X-Forwarded-User to the authenticated GitHub login on every request;
|
||||
# the gateway trusts it (and auto-provisions the user) only when this
|
||||
# is set. Remove/unset to disable SSO and fall back to bearer/session
|
||||
# auth only.
|
||||
- name: AUTH_PROXY_HEADER
|
||||
value: X-Forwarded-User
|
||||
# Reject proxied request bodies larger than this (413).
|
||||
- name: MAX_BODY_MB
|
||||
value: "32"
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -331,6 +331,11 @@ class Settings:
|
||||
# Connection retries while a Ready pod is still binding its port.
|
||||
upstream_attempts: int = 3
|
||||
upstream_retry_delay: float = 1.0
|
||||
# Optional identity header (e.g. "X-Forwarded-User") set by an authenticating
|
||||
# reverse proxy such as oauth2-proxy. When configured, requests carrying a
|
||||
# valid user in this header are treated as authenticated (SSO); unset (None)
|
||||
# disables SSO entirely and the header is never trusted.
|
||||
auth_proxy_header: str | None = None
|
||||
|
||||
@classmethod
|
||||
def from_env(cls) -> Settings:
|
||||
@@ -348,6 +353,7 @@ class Settings:
|
||||
max_body_bytes=_env_int("MAX_BODY_MB", 32) * 1024 * 1024,
|
||||
http_timeout=_env_float("HTTP_TIMEOUT", 300.0),
|
||||
sweep_interval=_env_float("SWEEP_INTERVAL", 15.0),
|
||||
auth_proxy_header=os.environ.get("AUTH_PROXY_HEADER") or None,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -496,6 +502,18 @@ class Kubernetes:
|
||||
{"spec": {"operatingMode": mode}},
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
async def patch_token(self, user: str, token_hash: str) -> None:
|
||||
await self._call(
|
||||
"crd",
|
||||
"patch_namespaced_custom_object",
|
||||
GROUP,
|
||||
VERSION,
|
||||
self.namespace,
|
||||
"sandboxclaims",
|
||||
claim_name(user),
|
||||
{"metadata": {"annotations": {TOKEN_ANNOTATION: token_hash}}},
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
# -- pods and logs -----------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
async def get_pod(self, name: str) -> dict | None:
|
||||
@@ -571,17 +589,67 @@ class Gateway:
|
||||
return token, user
|
||||
return None, None
|
||||
|
||||
def remote_user(self, headers) -> str | None:
|
||||
"""The user asserted by a trusted reverse proxy, when SSO is enabled.
|
||||
|
||||
Honored only when ``auth_proxy_header`` is configured, and only when the
|
||||
value is a valid dns-1123 label — a spoofed or malformed value is never
|
||||
trusted.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
name = self.settings.auth_proxy_header
|
||||
if not name:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
raw = (headers.get(name) or "").strip()
|
||||
return raw if valid_user(raw) else None
|
||||
|
||||
def _authorized(
|
||||
self,
|
||||
claim: dict,
|
||||
token: str | None,
|
||||
cookie_user: str | None,
|
||||
user: str,
|
||||
remote: str | None = None,
|
||||
) -> bool:
|
||||
if remote == user:
|
||||
return True # identity asserted by the authenticating proxy
|
||||
if cookie_user is not None and cookie_user != user:
|
||||
return False # a session for another user never authorizes this one
|
||||
return token_matches(claim, token)
|
||||
|
||||
async def _sso_session(
|
||||
self, remote: str, headers, cookies, response: Response
|
||||
) -> dict | None:
|
||||
"""Provision ``remote`` idempotently and mint/refresh a session token.
|
||||
|
||||
The authenticating proxy has already verified ``remote``, so it is
|
||||
trusted. A brand-new user is provisioned like ``signup`` (claim created,
|
||||
token minted, sandbox awaited); an existing user whose session cookie is
|
||||
missing or no longer matches gets a rotated token so a fresh cookie can
|
||||
be issued. A still-valid session is reused untouched.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
claim = await self.k8s.get_claim(remote)
|
||||
token, cookie_user = self.credentials(headers, cookies)
|
||||
if claim is not None and cookie_user == remote and token_matches(claim, token):
|
||||
return claim
|
||||
token = secrets.token_urlsafe(32)
|
||||
token_hash = hashlib.sha256(token.encode()).hexdigest()
|
||||
is_new = claim is None
|
||||
if is_new:
|
||||
try:
|
||||
await self.k8s.create_claim(remote, token_hash, self.settings.pool)
|
||||
except UserExists:
|
||||
# Lost a concurrent signup race: rotate the existing token.
|
||||
is_new = False
|
||||
await self.k8s.patch_token(remote, token_hash)
|
||||
else:
|
||||
await self._touch(remote)
|
||||
await self.wait_ready(remote, self.settings.wake_timeout)
|
||||
else:
|
||||
await self.k8s.patch_token(remote, token_hash)
|
||||
await self._touch(remote)
|
||||
self.set_session(response, remote, token)
|
||||
return await self.k8s.get_claim(remote) if is_new else claim
|
||||
|
||||
@staticmethod
|
||||
def _mutation_from_cookie(headers, method: str, cookie_user: str | None) -> bool:
|
||||
return (
|
||||
@@ -767,7 +835,14 @@ class Gateway:
|
||||
async def healthz(self, request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
|
||||
return JSONResponse({"status": "ok"})
|
||||
|
||||
async def landing(self, request: Request) -> HTMLResponse:
|
||||
async def landing(self, request: Request) -> Response:
|
||||
remote = self.remote_user(request.headers)
|
||||
if remote:
|
||||
response = RedirectResponse(f"/u/{remote}/", status_code=303)
|
||||
await self._sso_session(
|
||||
remote, request.headers, request.cookies, response
|
||||
)
|
||||
return response
|
||||
token, user = self.credentials(request.headers, request.cookies)
|
||||
session = ""
|
||||
if user and token:
|
||||
@@ -932,7 +1007,9 @@ against the JSON API. The browser session is an HttpOnly cookie.</p>
|
||||
if claim is None:
|
||||
return self._error(404, "not found")
|
||||
token, cookie_user = self.credentials(request.headers, request.cookies)
|
||||
if not self._authorized(claim, token, cookie_user, user):
|
||||
if not self._authorized(
|
||||
claim, token, cookie_user, user, self.remote_user(request.headers)
|
||||
):
|
||||
return self._error(401, "unauthorized")
|
||||
sandbox = await self._sandbox_of(claim)
|
||||
return JSONResponse(
|
||||
@@ -951,7 +1028,9 @@ against the JSON API. The browser session is an HttpOnly cookie.</p>
|
||||
if claim is None:
|
||||
return self._error(404, "not found")
|
||||
token, cookie_user = self.credentials(request.headers, request.cookies)
|
||||
if not self._authorized(claim, token, cookie_user, user):
|
||||
if not self._authorized(
|
||||
claim, token, cookie_user, user, self.remote_user(request.headers)
|
||||
):
|
||||
return self._error(401, "unauthorized")
|
||||
if self._mutation_from_cookie(request.headers, "DELETE", cookie_user):
|
||||
return self._error(403, "cross-origin request rejected")
|
||||
@@ -970,11 +1049,20 @@ against the JSON API. The browser session is an HttpOnly cookie.</p>
|
||||
user = request.path_params["user"]
|
||||
if not valid_user(user):
|
||||
return self._error(404, "unknown user")
|
||||
remote = self.remote_user(request.headers)
|
||||
claim = await self.k8s.get_claim(user)
|
||||
if claim is None:
|
||||
if remote == user:
|
||||
# SSO first hit straight at a deep link: let landing bootstrap.
|
||||
return RedirectResponse("/", status_code=303)
|
||||
return self._error(404, "unknown user")
|
||||
token, cookie_user = self.credentials(request.headers, request.cookies)
|
||||
if not self._authorized(claim, token, cookie_user, user):
|
||||
if remote == user and not (
|
||||
cookie_user == user and token_matches(claim, token)
|
||||
):
|
||||
# SSO user without a valid session cookie: bootstrap, then continue.
|
||||
return RedirectResponse("/", status_code=303)
|
||||
if not self._authorized(claim, token, cookie_user, user, remote):
|
||||
return self._error(401, "unauthorized")
|
||||
if self._mutation_from_cookie(request.headers, request.method, cookie_user):
|
||||
return self._error(403, "cross-origin request rejected")
|
||||
@@ -1143,7 +1231,9 @@ against the JSON API. The browser session is an HttpOnly cookie.</p>
|
||||
if claim is None:
|
||||
return await self._ws_reject(websocket, 4401)
|
||||
token, cookie_user = self.credentials(websocket.headers, websocket.cookies)
|
||||
if not self._authorized(claim, token, cookie_user, user):
|
||||
if not self._authorized(
|
||||
claim, token, cookie_user, user, self.remote_user(websocket.headers)
|
||||
):
|
||||
return await self._ws_reject(websocket, 4401)
|
||||
if cookie_user is not None and not same_origin(websocket.headers):
|
||||
return await self._ws_reject(websocket, 4401)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ class FakeK8s:
|
||||
self.created = []
|
||||
self.deleted = []
|
||||
self.patches = []
|
||||
self.token_patches = []
|
||||
self.conflict_on_create = False
|
||||
self.get_claim_error = None
|
||||
self.patch_error = None
|
||||
@@ -92,6 +93,17 @@ class FakeK8s:
|
||||
raise self.patch_error
|
||||
self.patches.append((name, mode))
|
||||
|
||||
async def patch_token(self, user, token_hash):
|
||||
if self.patch_error is not None:
|
||||
raise self.patch_error
|
||||
self.token_patches.append((user, token_hash))
|
||||
claim = self.claims.get(user)
|
||||
if claim is not None:
|
||||
annotations = claim.setdefault("metadata", {}).setdefault(
|
||||
"annotations", {}
|
||||
)
|
||||
annotations["aaas.example.com/token-sha256"] = token_hash
|
||||
|
||||
async def get_pod(self, name):
|
||||
return self.pods.get(name)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -431,6 +443,7 @@ def test_settings_from_env(monkeypatch):
|
||||
monkeypatch.setenv("COOKIE_MAX_AGE", "100")
|
||||
monkeypatch.setenv("MAX_BODY_MB", "2")
|
||||
monkeypatch.setenv("HTTP_TIMEOUT", "12.5")
|
||||
monkeypatch.setenv("AUTH_PROXY_HEADER", "X-Forwarded-User")
|
||||
settings = Settings.from_env()
|
||||
assert settings.namespace == "ns-x"
|
||||
assert settings.pool == "pool-x"
|
||||
@@ -443,6 +456,12 @@ def test_settings_from_env(monkeypatch):
|
||||
assert settings.cookie_max_age == 100
|
||||
assert settings.max_body_bytes == 2 * 1024 * 1024
|
||||
assert settings.http_timeout == 12.5
|
||||
assert settings.auth_proxy_header == "X-Forwarded-User"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_settings_auth_proxy_header_defaults_to_none(monkeypatch):
|
||||
monkeypatch.delenv("AUTH_PROXY_HEADER", raising=False)
|
||||
assert Settings.from_env().auth_proxy_header is None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# --- Kubernetes adapter ----------------------------------------------------
|
||||
@@ -1413,3 +1432,117 @@ async def test_sweeper_survives_transient_api_error(env):
|
||||
|
||||
# The per-user maintenance flag must be released even on failure.
|
||||
assert env.gateway.state.maintenance["alice"] is False
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# --- SSO (reverse-proxy identity) ------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def enable_sso(env, header="X-Forwarded-User"):
|
||||
"""Flip an env into SSO mode: the gateway trusts the named identity header."""
|
||||
env.settings = Settings(**{**env.settings.__dict__, "auth_proxy_header": header})
|
||||
env.gateway.settings = env.settings
|
||||
return env
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_remote_user_none_when_sso_disabled(env):
|
||||
assert env.gateway.remote_user({"X-Forwarded-User": "alice"}) is None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_remote_user_returns_valid_and_rejects_invalid(env):
|
||||
enable_sso(env)
|
||||
g = env.gateway
|
||||
assert g.remote_user({"X-Forwarded-User": "alice"}) == "alice"
|
||||
assert g.remote_user({"X-Forwarded-User": " bob "}) == "bob"
|
||||
assert g.remote_user({"X-Forwarded-User": "UPPER"}) is None
|
||||
assert g.remote_user({"X-Forwarded-User": "bad name"}) is None
|
||||
assert g.remote_user({"X-Forwarded-User": ""}) is None
|
||||
assert g.remote_user({}) is None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@pytest.mark.asyncio
|
||||
async def test_sso_landing_provisions_new_user_and_redirects(env, monkeypatch):
|
||||
enable_sso(env)
|
||||
|
||||
async def ready(user, timeout):
|
||||
return {"metadata": {"name": f"dsh-{user}-sbx"}}
|
||||
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(env.gateway, "wait_ready", ready)
|
||||
async with asgi_client(env) as client:
|
||||
response = await client.get("/", headers={"X-Forwarded-User": "alice"})
|
||||
assert response.status_code == 303
|
||||
assert response.headers["location"] == "/u/alice/"
|
||||
assert re_cookie_user(response.headers["set-cookie"]) == "alice"
|
||||
assert [c[0] for c in env.k8s.created] == ["alice"]
|
||||
assert env.k8s.token_patches == []
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@pytest.mark.asyncio
|
||||
async def test_sso_landing_reuses_valid_session_without_rotation(env):
|
||||
enable_sso(env)
|
||||
add_user(env.k8s)
|
||||
async with asgi_client(
|
||||
env, cookies={"dsh_gw_session": f"alice:{TOKEN}"}
|
||||
) as client:
|
||||
response = await client.get("/", headers={"X-Forwarded-User": "alice"})
|
||||
assert response.status_code == 303
|
||||
assert response.headers["location"] == "/u/alice/"
|
||||
assert env.k8s.created == []
|
||||
assert env.k8s.token_patches == []
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@pytest.mark.asyncio
|
||||
async def test_sso_landing_rotates_token_when_session_missing(env):
|
||||
enable_sso(env)
|
||||
add_user(env.k8s)
|
||||
async with asgi_client(env) as client:
|
||||
response = await client.get("/", headers={"X-Forwarded-User": "alice"})
|
||||
assert response.status_code == 303
|
||||
assert response.headers["location"] == "/u/alice/"
|
||||
assert re_cookie_user(response.headers["set-cookie"]) == "alice"
|
||||
assert [p[0] for p in env.k8s.token_patches] == ["alice"]
|
||||
assert env.k8s.created == []
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@pytest.mark.asyncio
|
||||
async def test_sso_get_user_authorizes_via_header(env):
|
||||
enable_sso(env)
|
||||
add_user(env.k8s)
|
||||
async with asgi_client(env) as client:
|
||||
response = await client.get(
|
||||
"/users/alice", headers={"X-Forwarded-User": "alice"}
|
||||
)
|
||||
assert response.status_code == 200
|
||||
assert response.json()["user"] == "alice"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@pytest.mark.asyncio
|
||||
async def test_sso_proxy_redirects_to_bootstrap_without_session(env):
|
||||
enable_sso(env)
|
||||
add_user(env.k8s)
|
||||
async with asgi_client(env) as client:
|
||||
response = await client.get(
|
||||
"/u/alice/", headers={"X-Forwarded-User": "alice"}
|
||||
)
|
||||
assert response.status_code == 303
|
||||
assert response.headers["location"] == "/"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@pytest.mark.asyncio
|
||||
async def test_sso_proxy_redirects_to_bootstrap_when_claim_missing(env):
|
||||
enable_sso(env)
|
||||
async with asgi_client(env) as client:
|
||||
response = await client.get(
|
||||
"/u/alice/", headers={"X-Forwarded-User": "alice"}
|
||||
)
|
||||
assert response.status_code == 303
|
||||
assert response.headers["location"] == "/"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@pytest.mark.asyncio
|
||||
async def test_spoofed_header_ignored_when_sso_disabled(env):
|
||||
add_user(env.k8s)
|
||||
async with asgi_client(env) as client:
|
||||
response = await client.get(
|
||||
"/u/alice/", headers={"X-Forwarded-User": "alice"}
|
||||
)
|
||||
assert response.status_code == 401
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user