Merge branch 'chore/changelog-dsh-v0.2.1-rc.5-r6' into fix/security-gateway-sessions

Signed-off-by: Nicolás Georger <info@sredevops.org>

.dsh/skills/dsh-agent-sandbox-platform/SKILL.md

@@ -104,8 +104,9 @@ Verified from the upstream server:
   `shutdown_after_seconds` defaults to 300 s (`null` disables it).
 - **Output:** servers before v1.0.8 return unbounded `execute_command` output.
   v1.0.8 adds `max_output_chars` (128-300,000, default 30,000) and truncation
-  metadata. Never pass the new argument to an older server; redirect verbose
+  metadata. The repository pins v1.0.8 (`AGENT_SANDBOX_VERSION`), so the
-  output and read a file instead.
+  documented deployment is bounded; never pass the new argument to an older
+  server, and on one redirect verbose output and read a file instead.
 
 Deployment, connection matrix and DSH row:
 [MCP deployment](references/mcp-deployment.md). Limits and cleanup:
@@ -125,13 +126,14 @@ Read `docs/examples.md` and the testing table in `AGENTS.md` before editing.
   alternatives, never a stack.
 - **New example:** follow `docs/examples.md`, add the index entry, keep scripts
   executable/idempotent/self-cleaning, run `make check`.
-- **Version bump:** edit `versions.env` only, update prerequisites, run
+- **Version bump:** use `make set-version`; never edit pins by hand. Update
-  `make check` and the e2e. Never mix a bump with an unrelated feature.
+  prerequisites, run `make check` and the e2e on a cluster. Never mix a bump
+  with an unrelated feature.
 - **MCP integration:** pin the build to the cluster's tag, least-privilege SA,
   ClusterIP + auth proxy, raised DSH timeout, no secrets in the repo.
-- **Optional hardening:** gVisor, `nodeSelector`, NetworkPolicy and extra
+- **Optional hardening:** gVisor, `nodeSelector`, NetworkPolicy, extra
-  provider keys stay opt-in; the sandbox policy lives under
+  provider keys and failed-Pod recovery stay opt-in; the sandbox policy lives
-  `manifests/optional/`. All four are documented in
+  under `manifests/optional/`. All of them are documented in
   `examples/dsh-agents-as-a-service/docs/optional-hardening.md`.
 - **Docs:** update the affected doc in the same change.
 

.dsh/skills/dsh-agent-sandbox-platform/references/mcp-server.md

@@ -74,6 +74,10 @@ DSH template.
 Never pass `max_output_chars` to a pre-v1.0.8 server. On older servers, redirect
 verbose output to a file and `download_file` it, or pipe through `tail`/`head`.
 
+The repository pins `AGENT_SANDBOX_VERSION=v1.0.8`, so the right-hand column is
+what the documented platform and a same-tag MCP build provide; keep the
+before-column for clusters still on v1.0.7.
+
 ## Safety and cleanup
 
 - No auth: anyone reaching `:8000` gets every tool and the service account's

.dsh/skills/dsh-agent-sandbox-platform/references/platform-runbook.md

@@ -28,8 +28,8 @@ a missing CRD is a prerequisite failure, not an application bug.
 | `SandboxWarmPool` | Pre-warmed spares from one template | `spec.replicas`, `sandboxTemplateRef` |
 | `SandboxClaim` | One tenant/user request; adopts a spare | `spec.warmPoolRef`, `additionalPodMetadata`, `status.sandbox.name` |
 | `Sandbox` | Adopted or directly created pod + Service + PVC | `spec.operatingMode`, `status.conditions`, `status.serviceFQDN`, `status.podIPs` |
-| `Pod` | The DSH Web process | `:3080`, PVC at `/home/node/.dsh` |
+| `Pod` | The DSH Web process | `:3080`, PVC at `/home/node/.dsh` and `/workspace` (`subPath: workspace`) |
-| `PersistentVolumeClaim` | Per-sandbox state | `dsh-home-<sandbox>` |
+| `PersistentVolumeClaim` | Per-sandbox DSH state + agent workspace | `dsh-home-<sandbox>` |
 | `Service` | Stable per-sandbox DNS | `<sandbox>`, `status.serviceFQDN` |
 
 Delete a claim to cascade-delete its sandbox and PVC (account deletion). Never
@@ -123,6 +123,25 @@ kubectl -n "$NS" patch sandboxwarmpool "$POOL" --type merge -p '{"spec":{"replic
   `0600`; the template uses `fsGroupChangePolicy: OnRootMismatch`. If a resumed
   sandbox crash-loops with a mode-660 error, suspend it, fix the file with a
   throwaway pod, patch the policy, then resume.
+- Agent files live at `/workspace`, the same PVC mounted with
+  `subPath: workspace`; it survives suspend/resume and dies with the PVC.
+- The templates set `HOME=/workspace` (the image default is `/home/node`). DSH's
+  directory picker lists `$HOME` when it opens and has no start-path setting, so
+  this is what makes the folder explorer start on the persisted workspace; `~`
+  and `$HOME`-relative tool caches/config also resolve there. `DSH_HOME` remains
+  `/home/node/.dsh`, so state and credentials stay out of the workspace. Pod env
+  is stamped at sandbox creation: a sandbox created before the override keeps
+  the old `HOME` until it is recreated (or its `podTemplate` is patched and the
+  sandbox resumed). Verify with
+  `kubectl -n "$NS" exec "$POD" -- printenv HOME`.
+- DSH confines bash with its own file sandbox (`bubblewrap`, else Landlock) and
+  fails closed with `SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE` when neither works. The image ships
+  `bubblewrap`, but it is unsetuid and needs an unprivileged user namespace that
+  this hardened pod (all capabilities dropped, RuntimeDefault seccomp) does not
+  grant; that plus no Landlock runner is why the template sets
+  `DSH_PERMISSION_MODE=danger-full-access` and treats the pod as the boundary.
+  Never "fix" it by granting `CAP_SYS_ADMIN` or `seccompProfile: Unconfined`
+  without an explicit decision.
 
 ## 8. Gateway layer
 

.dsh/skills/dsh-agent-sandbox-platform/references/troubleshooting.md

@@ -18,8 +18,11 @@ events, then compare desired vs observed state. Keep output bounded. Never
 | `ImagePullBackOff` | describe events | Wrong image/tag, private GHCR package, missing pull secret; on kind, load the image under the exact manifest ref. |
 | `CrashLoopBackOff`, probe 401 | logs, `describe` | Probe path is `/`; use `/favicon.svg`. |
 | Restart with mode-660 error | logs mention `.credentials.yaml` | kubelet fsGroup widened the file; suspend, `chmod 600` from a throwaway pod, patch `fsGroupChangePolicy: OnRootMismatch`, resume. |
+| Every bash command fails with `SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE` | DSH tool result names the requested mode and backends | DSH's own command sandbox has no usable runner: `bubblewrap` ships in the image but is unsetuid and needs an unprivileged user namespace this hardened pod does not grant, and no Landlock runner is available. The example template sets `DSH_PERMISSION_MODE=danger-full-access`; do not grant capabilities to restore it unless the operator explicitly accepts that downgrade. |
+| Folder picker opens on `/home/node`, not the workspace | `kubectl exec <pod> -- printenv HOME` | The sandbox predates the template's `HOME=/workspace` and pod env is stamped at creation. Recreate the sandbox (PVC survives) or patch its `podTemplate` with `HOME`, then resume. Workspace dotfiles (`.cache`, `.config`, `.npm`, `.agents`) are the expected trade-off of the override, not a fault. |
 | PVC `Pending` | `kubectl describe pvc`, StorageClass | No default provisioner, access mode, zone binding. |
 | Launch token not found | `kubectl logs <pod> --tail=2000 | grep 'dsh web:'` | Pod not ready yet, or logs rotated. Do not guess tokens; wait for readiness. |
+| Sandbox reports `Finished=True` | pod phase, `kubectl get events` | The backing Pod reached `Failed` (eviction, spot reclaim) and `failedPodPolicy` defaults to `Retain`. Delete the Pod to force a replacement, or set `Recreate` (v1.0.8+) on the Sandbox/template; the claim and PVCs survive either way. |
 | Hand-applied sandbox disappeared | claim annotations, gateway logs | Idle sweeper only manages claims with `aaas.example.com/managed-by=dsh-gateway`; if it was managed, recreate/resume. |
 | Gateway 401 | gateway logs, cookie flags | Missing/expired cookie, DSH handshake failed, or `COOKIE_SECURE=true` over HTTP. |
 | Gateway 502/503 | sandbox Ready, gateway logs | Wake timeout, stale DNS, token not yet in logs; check `WAKE_TIMEOUT` and RBAC `pods/log`. |

.env.sample

@@ -1,4 +1,6 @@
-# Copy to .env and fill in. Never commit a real key.
+# Reference environment names for local runs. Nothing sources this file
+# automatically: export the values or pass them with `docker run -e/--env-file`.
+# Copy it to .env if you prefer --env-file. Never commit a real key.
 #
 # The version values below are documentation only: versions.env is the single
 # source of truth, and scripts/check-versions.sh fails if they drift.
@@ -20,8 +22,11 @@ TOGETHER_API_KEY=
 CEREBRAS_API_KEY=
 AI_GATEWAY_API_KEY=
 HF_TOKEN=
-DSH_VERSION=dsh-v0.2.1-rc.3
+DSH_VERSION=dsh-v0.2.1-rc.5
-RELEASE_REVISION=r4
+# Full upstream commit SHA that DSH_VERSION resolves to; the main image build
+# fails if the clone's HEAD differs (guards against a moved tag).
+DSH_COMMIT=b830ec950faba0a46dda564be3e2d854afed94f1
+RELEASE_REVISION=r6
 PNPM_VERSION=11.28.5
 # Container port, and the host port published by "make run".
 DSH_PORT=3080
@@ -29,22 +34,7 @@ DSH_PORT=3080
 # public hostname). localhost and 127.0.0.1 are always trusted.
 DSH_TRUSTED_HOSTS=
 
-# --- agents-as-a-service example ---
+# The example gateway's runtime settings (NAMESPACE, POOL, IDLE_TIMEOUT,
-NAMESPACE=dsh-demo
+# WAKE_TIMEOUT, COOKIE_*, AUTH_PROXY_HEADER, ...) are documented in
-POOL=dsh-pool
+# examples/dsh-agents-as-a-service/gateway/README.md and set in
-# Seconds a sandbox may stay idle before the sweeper suspends it, and the max
+# examples/dsh-agents-as-a-service/manifests/50-gateway.yaml.
-# time a proxied request waits for a suspended sandbox to become Ready.
-IDLE_TIMEOUT=360
-WAKE_TIMEOUT=240
-DSH_CONTAINER=dsh-web
-DSH_LOG_TAIL_LINES=2000
-COOKIE_NAME=dsh_gw_session
-# Set to true only behind HTTPS; secure cookies are not sent over plain HTTP
-# (localhost counts as a secure context in browsers).
-COOKIE_SECURE=false
-COOKIE_MAX_AGE=604800
-MAX_BODY_MB=32
-HTTP_TIMEOUT=300
-# SSO is opt-in. Set this only when the gateway Service is reachable
-# exclusively through oauth2-proxy (see the example exposure docs).
-# AUTH_PROXY_HEADER=X-Forwarded-User

.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/bug_report.yml

@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ body:
     id: image-tag
     attributes:
       label: Image or release
-      description: The pinned tag or digest, for example dsh-v0.2.1-rc.3-r4.
+      description: The tag or digest you deployed (from the manifest or release metadata).
   - type: input
     id: cluster
     attributes:

.github/pull_request_template.md

@@ -19,8 +19,7 @@
 ## Checklist
 
 - [ ] make check passes (versions, example layout, manifest YAML)
-- [ ] make test passes (gateway unit tests)
+- [ ] make test / make lint pass when the change touches code (gateway unit tests, ruff, shellcheck; yamllint/actionlint where installed)
-- [ ] make lint passes (ruff, shellcheck; yamllint/actionlint where installed)
 - [ ] Docs updated for the change (root README, docs/, example README)
 - [ ] No secrets or usable credentials committed
 - [ ] CHANGELOG.md was not edited by hand (generated by git-cliff)

.github/workflows/_build-image.yaml

@@ -53,6 +53,8 @@ jobs:
     steps:
       - name: Checkout
         uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1
+        with:
+          persist-credentials: false
 
       - name: Prepare environment
         env:
@@ -60,14 +62,23 @@ jobs:
         run: |
           set -euo pipefail
           pair=$(printf '%s' "${{ matrix.platform }}" | tr '/' '-')
-          echo "PLATFORM_PAIR=$pair" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
+          # This reusable workflow runs once for the main image and once for the
-          echo "CACHE_SCOPE=$(printf '%s' "$IMAGE" | tr '/' '-')" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
+          # gateway in the same release run. Artifact names must include a
+          # unique token for the image: the repository path is a prefix of the
+          # gateway path, so a path-derived pattern would match both. Use a
+          # short hash of the full image name.
+          image_hash=$(printf '%s' "$IMAGE" | sha256sum | cut -c1-12)
+          {
+            echo "PLATFORM_PAIR=$pair"
+            echo "CACHE_SCOPE=$(printf '%s' "$IMAGE" | tr '/' '-')"
+            echo "ARTIFACT_PREFIX=$image_hash"
+          } >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
 
       - name: Set up Docker Buildx
         uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@f87e5991a6d7451dcb8d9637bfbc97413f497069 # v4.4.1
 
       - name: Login to GitHub Container Registry
-        uses: docker/login-action@dbcb813823bdd20940b903addbd779551569679f # v4.6.0
+        uses: docker/login-action@81c6f93d4bc991e510b342a00b419b3bb4efc5c6 # v4.7.0
         with:
           registry: ghcr.io
           username: ${{ github.actor }}
@@ -101,7 +112,7 @@ jobs:
       - name: Upload digest
         uses: actions/upload-artifact@cf430e030ddbb5b0abf93d22962f4752f3646cd9 # v7.0.2
         with:
-          name: digests-${{ env.PLATFORM_PAIR }}
+          name: digests-${{ env.ARTIFACT_PREFIX }}-${{ env.PLATFORM_PAIR }}
           path: /tmp/digests/*
           if-no-files-found: error
           retention-days: 1
@@ -112,18 +123,25 @@ jobs:
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     timeout-minutes: 30
     steps:
+      - name: Prepare environment
+        env:
+          IMAGE: ${{ inputs.image }}
+        run: |
+          set -euo pipefail
+          echo "ARTIFACT_PREFIX=$(printf '%s' "$IMAGE" | sha256sum | cut -c1-12)" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
+
       - name: Download digests
         uses: actions/download-artifact@9000827ccba6bdab643e8b6fd33ac0654aef8333 # v8.0.2
         with:
           path: /tmp/digests
-          pattern: digests-*
+          pattern: digests-${{ env.ARTIFACT_PREFIX }}-*
           merge-multiple: true
 
       - name: Set up Docker Buildx
         uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@f87e5991a6d7451dcb8d9637bfbc97413f497069 # v4.4.1
 
       - name: Login to GitHub Container Registry
-        uses: docker/login-action@dbcb813823bdd20940b903addbd779551569679f # v4.6.0
+        uses: docker/login-action@81c6f93d4bc991e510b342a00b419b3bb4efc5c6 # v4.7.0
         with:
           registry: ghcr.io
           username: ${{ github.actor }}

.github/workflows/build-gateway.yaml

@@ -12,11 +12,9 @@ on:
       - .github/workflows/build-gateway.yaml
       - .github/workflows/_build-image.yaml
 
+# Write scopes are granted to the build job only; every other job stays read-only.
 permissions:
   contents: read
-  packages: write
-  id-token: write
-  attestations: write
 
 concurrency:
   group: build-gateway-${{ github.ref }}

.github/workflows/build-main.yaml

@@ -13,11 +13,9 @@ on:
       - .github/workflows/build-main.yaml
       - .github/workflows/_build-image.yaml
 
+# Write scopes are granted to the build job only; every other job stays read-only.
 permissions:
   contents: read
-  packages: write
-  id-token: write
-  attestations: write
 
 concurrency:
   group: build-main-${{ github.ref }}
@@ -31,6 +29,7 @@ jobs:
     outputs:
       identity: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.identity }}
       dsh_version: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.dsh_version }}
+      dsh_commit: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.dsh_commit }}
       pnpm_version: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.pnpm_version }}
       release_revision: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.release_revision }}
       ghcr_image: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.ghcr_image }}
@@ -55,6 +54,7 @@ jobs:
           {
             echo "identity=$identity"
             echo "dsh_version=$DSH_VERSION"
+            echo "dsh_commit=$DSH_COMMIT"
             echo "pnpm_version=$PNPM_VERSION"
             echo "release_revision=$RELEASE_REVISION"
             echo "ghcr_image=$GHCR_IMAGE"
@@ -77,6 +77,7 @@ jobs:
       dockerfile: Dockerfile
       build-args: |
         DSH_VERSION=${{ needs.meta.outputs.dsh_version }}
+        DSH_COMMIT=${{ needs.meta.outputs.dsh_commit }}
         RELEASE_REVISION=${{ needs.meta.outputs.release_revision }}
         PNPM_VERSION=${{ needs.meta.outputs.pnpm_version }}
         VCS_REF=${{ github.sha }}

.github/workflows/ci-image.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
+# Build-only check for the main DSH Web image: linux/amd64, no registry login,
+# no push. It proves the Dockerfile still builds from the pinned versions.env and
+# that the resulting image can actually run DSH Web. The published multi-arch
+# build stays in build-main.yaml (merge to main) and release.yaml (tags).
+#
+# Like ci-python.yaml and ci-manifests.yaml this is path-filtered, so it is an
+# on-demand check rather than a required status check.
+name: CI image
+
+on:
+  pull_request:
+    paths:
+      - Dockerfile
+      - .dockerignore
+      - versions.env
+      - .github/workflows/ci-image.yaml
+  workflow_dispatch:
+
+permissions:
+  contents: read
+
+concurrency:
+  group: ci-image-${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.ref }}
+  cancel-in-progress: true
+
+jobs:
+  build-amd64:
+    name: build-amd64
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    timeout-minutes: 120
+    steps:
+      - name: Checkout
+        uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1
+        with:
+          persist-credentials: false
+
+      - name: Read versions.env
+        id: meta
+        shell: bash
+        run: |
+          set -euo pipefail
+          set -a
+          # shellcheck disable=SC1091
+          source versions.env
+          set +a
+          identity="$DSH_VERSION"
+          [ -z "${RELEASE_REVISION:-}" ] || identity="$DSH_VERSION-$RELEASE_REVISION"
+          {
+            echo "identity=$identity"
+            echo "dsh_version=$DSH_VERSION"
+            echo "dsh_commit=$DSH_COMMIT"
+            echo "pnpm_version=$PNPM_VERSION"
+            echo "release_revision=${RELEASE_REVISION:-}"
+          } >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
+
+      - name: Set up Docker Buildx
+        uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@f87e5991a6d7451dcb8d9637bfbc97413f497069 # v4.4.1
+
+      - name: Build linux/amd64 (load locally, never push)
+        uses: docker/build-push-action@c3c9e263c25d99ce0380d002d59b67737d91b0dc # v7.4.0
+        with:
+          context: .
+          file: Dockerfile
+          platforms: linux/amd64
+          push: false
+          load: true
+          tags: dsh-web:ci
+          build-args: |
+            DSH_VERSION=${{ steps.meta.outputs.dsh_version }}
+            DSH_COMMIT=${{ steps.meta.outputs.dsh_commit }}
+            RELEASE_REVISION=${{ steps.meta.outputs.release_revision }}
+            PNPM_VERSION=${{ steps.meta.outputs.pnpm_version }}
+            VCS_REF=${{ github.sha }}
+          labels: |
+            org.opencontainers.image.source=https://github.com/${{ github.repository }}
+            org.opencontainers.image.version=${{ steps.meta.outputs.identity }}
+            org.opencontainers.image.revision=${{ github.sha }}
+          cache-from: type=gha,scope=ci-image-linux-amd64
+          cache-to: type=gha,mode=max,scope=ci-image-linux-amd64
+
+      - name: Smoke test the image
+        env:
+          IDENTITY: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.identity }}
+          DSH_VERSION: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.dsh_version }}
+        run: |
+          set -euo pipefail
+          image=dsh-web:ci
+
+          # The packaged CLI runs and reports the version pinned in versions.env.
+          version="$(docker run --rm --entrypoint node "$image" /app/lib/bin.js --version)"
+          printf 'DSH CLI: %s\n' "$version"
+          grep -q "${DSH_VERSION#dsh-v}" <<<"$version"
+
+          # The container runs as the non-root node user and its writable
+          # directories exist and are owned by that user.
+          [ "$(docker run --rm --entrypoint id "$image" -u)" = "1000" ]
+          docker run --rm --entrypoint sh "$image" -c \
+            'test -d /workspace && test -d "$DSH_HOME" && [ "$(stat -c %u /workspace)" = 1000 ]'
+
+          # The command-sandbox runner this image is expected to ship.
+          docker run --rm --entrypoint bwrap "$image" --version
+
+          # Labels come from the build args rather than a hard-coded value.
+          label="$(docker inspect -f '{{ index .Config.Labels "org.opencontainers.image.version" }}' "$image")"
+          printf 'image version label: %s\n' "$label"
+          [ "$label" = "$IDENTITY" ]
+
+      - name: Serve DSH Web
+        run: |
+          set -euo pipefail
+          docker run -d --name dsh-ci -p 18080:3080 \
+            -e DSH_TRUSTED_HOSTS=127.0.0.1:18080 dsh-web:ci >/dev/null
+          trap 'docker rm -f dsh-ci >/dev/null 2>&1 || true' EXIT
+
+          # /favicon.svg is unauthenticated and served by the web layer, which is
+          # why the shipped probes use it too.
+          for second in $(seq 1 60); do
+            if curl -fsS -o /dev/null http://127.0.0.1:18080/favicon.svg; then
+              printf 'DSH Web served /favicon.svg after ~%ss\n' "$((second * 2))"
+              exit 0
+            fi
+            sleep 2
+          done
+
+          echo "::error::DSH Web did not serve /favicon.svg within 120s"
+          # Pod logs can hold the DSH launch token: never dump them verbatim.
+          docker logs dsh-ci 2>&1 | grep -v 'token=' | tail -50 || true
+          exit 1

.github/workflows/ci-manifests.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+# Manifest shape validation and server-side dry-run. Split from ci.yaml so this
+# job can use native on.pull_request.paths filtering and skip PRs that do not
+# touch manifests, scripts or versions.env. The job name is `manifests`; because
+# it is path-filtered it is an on-demand check, not a required branch-protection
+# check (see docs/gitflow.md).
+name: CI (manifests)
+
+on:
+  pull_request:
+    paths:
+      - examples/**/manifests/**
+      - scripts/check-manifests.py
+      - versions.env
+      - .github/workflows/ci-manifests.yaml
+  workflow_dispatch:
+
+permissions:
+  contents: read
+
+concurrency:
+  group: ci-manifests-${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.ref }}
+  cancel-in-progress: true
+
+jobs:
+  manifests:
+    name: manifests
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    timeout-minutes: 25
+    steps:
+      - name: Checkout
+        uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1
+        with:
+          persist-credentials: false
+      - name: Create kind cluster
+        uses: helm/kind-action@1544676c07bb3570fcb70166beaa07c4528fd4aa # v1.15.1
+        with:
+          version: v0.33.0
+          cluster_name: dsh-ci
+      - name: Read versions.env
+        run: |
+          set -euo pipefail
+          while IFS= read -r line; do
+            case "$line" in ''|'#'*) continue ;; esac
+            echo "$line" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
+          done < versions.env
+      - name: Install agent-sandbox and Gateway API CRDs
+        run: |
+          set -euo pipefail
+          # Download, verify the pinned digest from versions.env, then apply.
+          curl -fsSL --proto '=https' -o /tmp/agent-sandbox.yaml \
+            "https://github.com/kubernetes-sigs/agent-sandbox/releases/download/$AGENT_SANDBOX_VERSION/sandbox-with-extensions.yaml"
+          printf '%s  %s\n' "$AGENT_SANDBOX_MANIFEST_SHA256" /tmp/agent-sandbox.yaml | sha256sum -c -
+          kubectl apply -f /tmp/agent-sandbox.yaml
+          kubectl wait --for=condition=Established crd/sandboxtemplates.extensions.agents.x-k8s.io --timeout=180s
+          kubectl wait --for=condition=Established crd/sandboxwarmpools.extensions.agents.x-k8s.io --timeout=180s
+          kubectl wait --for=condition=Established crd/sandboxclaims.extensions.agents.x-k8s.io --timeout=180s
+          kubectl wait --for=condition=Established crd/sandboxes.agents.x-k8s.io --timeout=180s
+          curl -fsSL --proto '=https' -o /tmp/gateway-api.yaml \
+            "https://github.com/kubernetes-sigs/gateway-api/releases/download/$GATEWAY_API_VERSION/standard-install.yaml"
+          printf '%s  %s\n' "$GATEWAY_API_MANIFEST_SHA256" /tmp/gateway-api.yaml | sha256sum -c -
+          kubectl apply -f /tmp/gateway-api.yaml
+          kubectl wait --for=condition=Established crd/gateways.gateway.networking.k8s.io --timeout=180s
+          kubectl wait --for=condition=Established crd/httproutes.gateway.networking.k8s.io --timeout=180s
+      - name: Set up Python
+        uses: actions/setup-python@6d4fd22b20465ccc0f7354476588e8df7c9ca0e0 # v7.1.0
+        with:
+          python-version: "3.12"
+      - name: Install check dependencies
+        run: pip install "pyyaml==6.0.3"
+      - name: Validate manifest shape
+        run: python scripts/check-manifests.py
+      - name: Validate manifests (server dry-run)
+        run: |
+          set -euo pipefail
+          kubectl create namespace dsh-demo
+          shopt -s globstar nullglob
+          count=0
+          for file in examples/*/manifests/**/*.yaml; do
+            case "$file" in *.yaml.example) continue ;; esac
+            echo "== $file =="
+            kubectl apply --dry-run=server -f "$file"
+            count=$((count + 1))
+          done
+          if [ "$count" -eq 0 ]; then
+            echo "no manifests were validated" >&2
+            exit 1
+          fi
+          echo "validated $count manifests"

.github/workflows/ci-python.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+# Gateway unit tests and lint. Split from ci.yaml so this job can use native
+# on.pull_request.paths filtering and skip PRs that do not touch the gateway.
+# The job name is `python`; because it is path-filtered it is an on-demand check,
+# not a required branch-protection check (see docs/gitflow.md).
+name: CI (python)
+
+on:
+  pull_request:
+    paths:
+      - examples/dsh-agents-as-a-service/gateway/**
+      - .github/workflows/ci-python.yaml
+  workflow_dispatch:
+
+permissions:
+  contents: read
+
+concurrency:
+  group: ci-python-${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.ref }}
+  cancel-in-progress: true
+
+jobs:
+  python:
+    name: python
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    timeout-minutes: 20
+    defaults:
+      run:
+        working-directory: examples/dsh-agents-as-a-service/gateway
+    steps:
+      - name: Checkout
+        uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1
+        with:
+          persist-credentials: false
+      - name: Set up Python
+        uses: actions/setup-python@6d4fd22b20465ccc0f7354476588e8df7c9ca0e0 # v7.1.0
+        with:
+          python-version: "3.12"
+          cache: pip
+          cache-dependency-path: |
+            examples/dsh-agents-as-a-service/gateway/requirements.txt
+            examples/dsh-agents-as-a-service/gateway/requirements-dev.txt
+      - name: Install dependencies
+        run: |
+          set -euo pipefail
+          python -m pip install --upgrade pip
+          # Both files are fully hash-pinned (uv pip compile --generate-hashes);
+          # pip refuses to install anything not listed with a matching hash.
+          pip install --require-hashes -r requirements.txt -r requirements-dev.txt
+      - name: Lint
+        run: |
+          set -euo pipefail
+          python -m ruff check .
+          python -m ruff format --check .
+      - name: Unit tests with coverage
+        run: >-
+          python -m pytest -q
+          --cov=. --cov-report=xml:coverage.xml --cov-report=term
+          --junitxml=junit.xml
+      - name: Coverage summary
+        run: |
+          set -euo pipefail
+          {
+            echo "### Gateway test coverage"
+            python -m coverage report
+          } >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
+      - name: Upload test artefacts
+        if: always()
+        uses: actions/upload-artifact@cf430e030ddbb5b0abf93d22962f4752f3646cd9 # v7.0.2
+        with:
+          name: gateway-test-results
+          path: |
+            examples/dsh-agents-as-a-service/gateway/junit.xml
+            examples/dsh-agents-as-a-service/gateway/coverage.xml
+          if-no-files-found: warn
+          retention-days: 7

.github/workflows/ci.yaml

@@ -1,12 +1,11 @@
-# Continuous integration: lint, unit tests, manifest dry-run, gateway image
+# Continuous integration: lint and dependency review. Job names are the required
-# smoke test and dependency review. Job names are the required branch-protection
+# branch-protection checks documented in docs/gitflow.md. The gateway unit tests
-# checks documented in docs/gitflow.md.
+# and the manifest dry-run live in ci-python.yaml / ci-manifests.yaml so each can
+# use native on.pull_request.paths filtering and skip unrelated changes.
 name: CI
 
 on:
   pull_request:
-  push:
-    branches: [main]
   workflow_dispatch:
 
 permissions:
@@ -38,19 +37,29 @@ jobs:
       - name: Install actionlint
         env:
           ACTIONLINT_VERSION: v1.7.12
+          # SHA-256 of actionlint_1.7.12_linux_amd64.tar.gz, published in the
+          # release's actionlint_1.7.12_checksums.txt. Update it with the version.
+          ACTIONLINT_SHA256: 8aca8db96f1b94770f1b0d72b6dddcb1ebb8123cb3712530b08cc387b349a3d8
         run: |
           set -euo pipefail
           version="${ACTIONLINT_VERSION#v}"
-          curl -fsSL -o /tmp/actionlint.tar.gz             "https://github.com/rhysd/actionlint/releases/download/$ACTIONLINT_VERSION/actionlint_${version}_linux_amd64.tar.gz"
+          asset="actionlint_${version}_linux_amd64.tar.gz"
-          tar -xzf /tmp/actionlint.tar.gz -C /tmp actionlint
+          curl -fsSL --proto '=https' -o "/tmp/$asset" \
+            "https://github.com/rhysd/actionlint/releases/download/$ACTIONLINT_VERSION/$asset"
+          printf '%s  %s\n' "$ACTIONLINT_SHA256" "/tmp/$asset" | sha256sum -c -
+          tar -xzf "/tmp/$asset" -C /tmp actionlint
           install -m 0755 /tmp/actionlint /usr/local/bin/actionlint
           actionlint -version
       - name: Install hadolint
         env:
           HADOLINT_VERSION: v2.12.0
+          # SHA-256 of hadolint-Linux-x86_64, published next to the download.
+          HADOLINT_SHA256: 56de6d5e5ec427e17b74fa48d51271c7fc0d61244bf5c90e828aab8362d55010
         run: |
           set -euo pipefail
-          curl -fsSL -o /tmp/hadolint             "https://github.com/hadolint/hadolint/releases/download/$HADOLINT_VERSION/hadolint-Linux-x86_64"
+          curl -fsSL --proto '=https' -o /tmp/hadolint \
+            "https://github.com/hadolint/hadolint/releases/download/$HADOLINT_VERSION/hadolint-Linux-x86_64"
+          printf '%s  %s\n' "$HADOLINT_SHA256" /tmp/hadolint | sha256sum -c -
           install -m 0755 /tmp/hadolint /usr/local/bin/hadolint
           hadolint --version
       - name: Repository checks
@@ -58,7 +67,6 @@ jobs:
           set -euo pipefail
           ./scripts/check-versions.sh
           ./scripts/check-examples.sh
-          python scripts/check-manifests.py
       - name: Shellcheck
         run: shellcheck -x build.sh scripts/*.sh examples/*/scripts/*.sh
       - name: Actionlint
@@ -77,169 +85,6 @@ jobs:
             --offline --no-progress --verbose
             ./README.md ./CONTRIBUTING.md ./SECURITY.md ./AGENTS.md ./docs ./examples
 
-  python:
-    name: python
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    timeout-minutes: 20
-    defaults:
-      run:
-        working-directory: examples/dsh-agents-as-a-service/gateway
-    steps:
-      - name: Checkout
-        uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1
-        with:
-          persist-credentials: false
-      - name: Set up Python
-        uses: actions/setup-python@6d4fd22b20465ccc0f7354476588e8df7c9ca0e0 # v7.1.0
-        with:
-          python-version: "3.12"
-          cache: pip
-          cache-dependency-path: |
-            examples/dsh-agents-as-a-service/gateway/requirements.txt
-            examples/dsh-agents-as-a-service/gateway/requirements-dev.txt
-      - name: Install dependencies
-        run: |
-          set -euo pipefail
-          python -m pip install --upgrade pip
-          pip install -r requirements.txt -r requirements-dev.txt
-      - name: Lint
-        run: |
-          set -euo pipefail
-          python -m ruff check .
-          python -m ruff format --check .
-      - name: Unit tests with coverage
-        run: >-
-          python -m pytest -q
-          --cov=. --cov-report=xml:coverage.xml --cov-report=term
-          --junitxml=junit.xml
-      - name: Coverage summary
-        run: |
-          set -euo pipefail
-          {
-            echo "### Gateway test coverage"
-            python -m coverage report
-          } >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
-      - name: Upload test artefacts
-        if: always()
-        uses: actions/upload-artifact@cf430e030ddbb5b0abf93d22962f4752f3646cd9 # v7.0.2
-        with:
-          name: gateway-test-results
-          path: |
-            examples/dsh-agents-as-a-service/gateway/junit.xml
-            examples/dsh-agents-as-a-service/gateway/coverage.xml
-          if-no-files-found: warn
-          retention-days: 7
-
-  manifests:
-    name: manifests
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    timeout-minutes: 25
-    steps:
-      - name: Checkout
-        uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1
-        with:
-          persist-credentials: false
-      - name: Create kind cluster
-        uses: helm/kind-action@1544676c07bb3570fcb70166beaa07c4528fd4aa # v1.15.1
-        with:
-          version: v0.33.0
-          cluster_name: dsh-ci
-      - name: Read versions.env
-        run: |
-          set -euo pipefail
-          while IFS= read -r line; do
-            case "$line" in ''|'#'*) continue ;; esac
-            echo "$line" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
-          done < versions.env
-      - name: Install agent-sandbox and Gateway API CRDs
-        run: |
-          set -euo pipefail
-          kubectl apply -f "https://github.com/kubernetes-sigs/agent-sandbox/releases/download/$AGENT_SANDBOX_VERSION/sandbox-with-extensions.yaml"
-          kubectl wait --for=condition=Established crd/sandboxtemplates.extensions.agents.x-k8s.io --timeout=180s
-          kubectl wait --for=condition=Established crd/sandboxwarmpools.extensions.agents.x-k8s.io --timeout=180s
-          kubectl wait --for=condition=Established crd/sandboxclaims.extensions.agents.x-k8s.io --timeout=180s
-          kubectl wait --for=condition=Established crd/sandboxes.agents.x-k8s.io --timeout=180s
-          kubectl apply -f "https://github.com/kubernetes-sigs/gateway-api/releases/download/$GATEWAY_API_VERSION/standard-install.yaml"
-          kubectl wait --for=condition=Established crd/gateways.gateway.networking.k8s.io --timeout=180s
-          kubectl wait --for=condition=Established crd/httproutes.gateway.networking.k8s.io --timeout=180s
-      - name: Set up Python
-        uses: actions/setup-python@6d4fd22b20465ccc0f7354476588e8df7c9ca0e0 # v7.1.0
-        with:
-          python-version: "3.12"
-      - name: Install check dependencies
-        run: pip install "pyyaml==6.0.3"
-      - name: Validate manifest shape
-        run: python scripts/check-manifests.py
-      - name: Validate manifests (server dry-run)
-        run: |
-          set -euo pipefail
-          kubectl create namespace dsh-demo
-          shopt -s globstar nullglob
-          count=0
-          for file in examples/*/manifests/**/*.yaml; do
-            case "$file" in *.yaml.example) continue ;; esac
-            echo "== $file =="
-            kubectl apply --dry-run=server -f "$file"
-            count=$((count + 1))
-          done
-          if [ "$count" -eq 0 ]; then
-            echo "no manifests were validated" >&2
-            exit 1
-          fi
-          echo "validated $count manifests"
-
-  gateway-image:
-    name: gateway-image
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    timeout-minutes: 20
-    steps:
-      - name: Checkout
-        uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1
-        with:
-          persist-credentials: false
-      - name: Build gateway image
-        run: docker build -t dsh-aaas-gateway:ci examples/dsh-agents-as-a-service/gateway/
-      - name: Smoke-test /healthz without a cluster
-        run: |
-          set -euo pipefail
-          cat > /tmp/kubeconfig <<'EOF'
-          apiVersion: v1
-          kind: Config
-          clusters:
-            - name: dummy
-              cluster:
-                server: https://127.0.0.1:6443
-                insecure-skip-tls-verify: true
-          contexts:
-            - name: dummy
-              context:
-                cluster: dummy
-                user: dummy
-          users:
-            - name: dummy
-              user: {}
-          current-context: dummy
-          EOF
-          docker run -d --name gateway-smoke \
-            -p 18080:8080 \
-            -e NAMESPACE=dsh-demo \
-            -e POOL=dsh-pool \
-            -e KUBECONFIG=/tmp/kubeconfig \
-            -v /tmp/kubeconfig:/tmp/kubeconfig:ro \
-            dsh-aaas-gateway:ci
-          trap 'docker logs gateway-smoke || true; docker rm -f gateway-smoke || true' EXIT
-          code=""
-          for _ in $(seq 1 30); do
-            code=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' http://localhost:18080/healthz || true)
-            [ "$code" = "200" ] && break
-            sleep 1
-          done
-          if [ "$code" != "200" ]; then
-            echo "gateway /healthz returned '$code' instead of 200" >&2
-            exit 1
-          fi
-          echo "gateway image healthy: GET /healthz -> 200"
-
   dependency-review:
     name: dependency-review
     if: github.event_name == 'pull_request'

.github/workflows/codeql.yml

@@ -58,6 +58,8 @@ jobs:
     steps:
     - name: Checkout repository
       uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1
+      with:
+        persist-credentials: false
 
     # Add any setup steps before running the `github/codeql-action/init` action.
     # This includes steps like installing compilers or runtimes (`actions/setup-node`

.github/workflows/e2e-kind.yaml

@@ -40,7 +40,10 @@ jobs:
       - name: Install agent-sandbox
         run: |
           set -euo pipefail
-          kubectl apply -f "https://github.com/kubernetes-sigs/agent-sandbox/releases/download/$AGENT_SANDBOX_VERSION/sandbox-with-extensions.yaml"
+          curl -fsSL --proto '=https' -o /tmp/agent-sandbox.yaml \
+            "https://github.com/kubernetes-sigs/agent-sandbox/releases/download/$AGENT_SANDBOX_VERSION/sandbox-with-extensions.yaml"
+          printf '%s  %s\n' "$AGENT_SANDBOX_MANIFEST_SHA256" /tmp/agent-sandbox.yaml | sha256sum -c -
+          kubectl apply -f /tmp/agent-sandbox.yaml
           kubectl -n agent-sandbox-system rollout status deployment --timeout=180s
           kubectl wait --for=condition=Established crd/sandboxtemplates.extensions.agents.x-k8s.io --timeout=180s
           kubectl wait --for=condition=Established crd/sandboxwarmpools.extensions.agents.x-k8s.io --timeout=180s
@@ -66,7 +69,9 @@ jobs:
             echo "== events =="
             kubectl get events -n dsh-demo --sort-by=.lastTimestamp 2>&1 || true
             echo "== gateway logs =="
-            kubectl -n dsh-demo logs deploy/dsh-gateway --tail=200 2>&1 || true
+            # Redact any token material before this file becomes an artifact.
+            kubectl -n dsh-demo logs deploy/dsh-gateway --tail=200 2>&1 \
+              | sed -E 's/(token=)[^&"[:space:]]+/\1[REDACTED]/g' || true
           } > /tmp/e2e-cluster.txt
       - name: Upload cluster state
         if: always()

.github/workflows/release.yaml

@@ -16,17 +16,11 @@ on:
         description: Existing tag to release (must match versions.env)
         required: true
         type: string
-      publish_legacy_gateway_alias:
-        description: Also publish the legacy :gateway alias (one release only)
-        required: false
-        default: true
-        type: boolean
 
+# Read-only by default; the build and publish jobs add the write scopes they
+# need as job-level grants.
 permissions:
-  contents: write
+  contents: read
-  packages: write
-  id-token: write
-  attestations: write
 
 concurrency:
   group: release-${{ github.ref }}
@@ -40,11 +34,13 @@ jobs:
     outputs:
       identity: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.identity }}
       dsh_version: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.dsh_version }}
+      dsh_commit: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.dsh_commit }}
       pnpm_version: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.pnpm_version }}
       release_revision: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.release_revision }}
       ghcr_image: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.ghcr_image }}
       gateway_image: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.gateway_image }}
       tag: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.tag }}
+      run_tests: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.run_tests }}
     steps:
       - name: Checkout
         uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1
@@ -55,13 +51,17 @@ jobs:
       - name: Validate tag against versions.env
         id: meta
         shell: bash
+        env:
+          # Passed through the environment, never interpolated into the script:
+          # a tag name or dispatch input can contain shell metacharacters.
+          REQUESTED_TAG: ${{ inputs.tag || github.ref_name }}
         run: |
           set -euo pipefail
           set -a
           # shellcheck disable=SC1091
           source versions.env
           set +a
-          tag="${{ inputs.tag || github.ref_name }}"
+          tag="$REQUESTED_TAG"
           identity="$DSH_VERSION"
           [ -z "$RELEASE_REVISION" ] || identity="$DSH_VERSION-$RELEASE_REVISION"
           if [ "$tag" != "$identity" ]; then
@@ -82,22 +82,44 @@ jobs:
               echo "tag commit $commit is not on main or a release branch" >&2
               exit 1
             fi
+            # Tests already ran in PR CI when the tag is on main; only re-run
+            # them for release-branch tags (where ci.yaml does not trigger).
+            run_tests=true
+            if git rev-parse -q --verify origin/main >/dev/null && git merge-base --is-ancestor "$commit" origin/main; then
+              run_tests=false
+            fi
           else
             echo "tag '$tag' does not exist in this repository" >&2
             exit 1
           fi
-          if ! git ls-remote --tags --exit-code "$DSH_REPO" "$DSH_VERSION" >/dev/null; then
+          if ! upstream="$(git ls-remote --tags --exit-code "$DSH_REPO" \
+                "refs/tags/$DSH_VERSION^{}" "refs/tags/$DSH_VERSION")"; then
             echo "upstream ref '$DSH_VERSION' not found in $DSH_REPO" >&2
             exit 1
           fi
+          # Never release a ref that no longer resolves to the pinned commit: an
+          # annotated tag has a peeled ^{} line, a lightweight tag only the ref.
+          resolved="$(printf '%s\n' "$upstream" \
+            | awk -v t="refs/tags/$DSH_VERSION^{}" '$2 == t {print $1}' | head -n1)"
+          if [ -z "$resolved" ]; then
+            resolved="$(printf '%s\n' "$upstream" \
+              | awk -v t="refs/tags/$DSH_VERSION" '$2 == t {print $1}' | head -n1)"
+          fi
+          if [ "$resolved" != "$DSH_COMMIT" ]; then
+            echo "upstream $DSH_REPO@$DSH_VERSION resolved to '$resolved'," \
+              "versions.env pins DSH_COMMIT=$DSH_COMMIT" >&2
+            exit 1
+          fi
           {
             echo "identity=$identity"
             echo "dsh_version=$DSH_VERSION"
+            echo "dsh_commit=$DSH_COMMIT"
             echo "pnpm_version=$PNPM_VERSION"
             echo "release_revision=$RELEASE_REVISION"
             echo "ghcr_image=$GHCR_IMAGE"
             echo "gateway_image=$GATEWAY_IMAGE"
             echo "tag=$tag"
+            echo "run_tests=$run_tests"
           } >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
 
       - name: Verify repository pins
@@ -106,6 +128,9 @@ jobs:
   tests:
     name: Unit tests and lint
     needs: meta
+    # The test steps are guarded individually rather than the whole job so a
+    # main-branch tag (run_tests=false) still leaves this job "successful" and
+    # does not cascade-skip build-main/build-gateway.
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     timeout-minutes: 15
     defaults:
@@ -117,6 +142,7 @@ jobs:
         with:
           persist-credentials: false
       - name: Set up Python
+        if: needs.meta.outputs.run_tests == 'true'
         uses: actions/setup-python@6d4fd22b20465ccc0f7354476588e8df7c9ca0e0 # v7.1.0
         with:
           python-version: "3.12"
@@ -125,16 +151,19 @@ jobs:
             examples/dsh-agents-as-a-service/gateway/requirements.txt
             examples/dsh-agents-as-a-service/gateway/requirements-dev.txt
       - name: Install dependencies
+        if: needs.meta.outputs.run_tests == 'true'
         run: |
           set -euo pipefail
           python -m pip install --upgrade pip
-          pip install -r requirements.txt -r requirements-dev.txt
+          pip install --require-hashes -r requirements.txt -r requirements-dev.txt
       - name: Lint
+        if: needs.meta.outputs.run_tests == 'true'
         run: |
           set -euo pipefail
           python -m ruff check .
           python -m ruff format --check .
       - name: Unit tests
+        if: needs.meta.outputs.run_tests == 'true'
         run: python -m pytest -q
 
   build-main:
@@ -153,6 +182,7 @@ jobs:
       dockerfile: Dockerfile
       build-args: |
         DSH_VERSION=${{ needs.meta.outputs.dsh_version }}
+        DSH_COMMIT=${{ needs.meta.outputs.dsh_commit }}
         RELEASE_REVISION=${{ needs.meta.outputs.release_revision }}
         PNPM_VERSION=${{ needs.meta.outputs.pnpm_version }}
         VCS_REF=${{ github.sha }}
@@ -178,33 +208,14 @@ jobs:
         ${{ needs.meta.outputs.gateway_image }}:${{ needs.meta.outputs.identity }}
         ${{ needs.meta.outputs.gateway_image }}:latest
 
-  legacy-gateway-alias:
-    name: Publish legacy :gateway alias (temporary)
-    needs: [meta, build-gateway]
-    if: github.event_name != 'workflow_dispatch' || inputs.publish_legacy_gateway_alias
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    timeout-minutes: 15
-    steps:
-      - name: Login to GitHub Container Registry
-        uses: docker/login-action@dbcb813823bdd20940b903addbd779551569679f # v4.6.0
-        with:
-          registry: ghcr.io
-          username: ${{ github.actor }}
-          password: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
-      - name: Retag gateway as the legacy package tag
-        env:
-          SOURCE: ${{ needs.meta.outputs.gateway_image }}:${{ needs.meta.outputs.identity }}
-          LEGACY: ${{ needs.meta.outputs.ghcr_image }}:gateway
-        run: |
-          set -euo pipefail
-          docker buildx imagetools create -t "$LEGACY" "$SOURCE"
-          echo "Deprecated alias $LEGACY now points at $SOURCE" >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
-
   publish-release:
     name: Changelog and GitHub Release
     needs: [meta, build-main, build-gateway]
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     timeout-minutes: 20
+    permissions:
+      contents: write
+      pull-requests: write
     steps:
       - name: Checkout
         uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1
@@ -214,11 +225,17 @@ jobs:
       - name: Install git-cliff
         env:
           GIT_CLIFF_VERSION: v2.14.2
+          # SHA-256 of git-cliff-2.14.2-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu.tar.gz; upstream
+          # publishes the matching SHA-512 next to the asset. Update with the version.
+          GIT_CLIFF_SHA256: 24f397c733add5390fdceee3a2088588ab0d5f944ce00d34cb7029b888cf2db4
         run: |
           set -euo pipefail
           version="${GIT_CLIFF_VERSION#v}"
-          curl -fsSL -o /tmp/git-cliff.tar.gz             "https://github.com/orhun/git-cliff/releases/download/$GIT_CLIFF_VERSION/git-cliff-$version-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu.tar.gz"
+          asset="git-cliff-${version}-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu.tar.gz"
-          tar -xzf /tmp/git-cliff.tar.gz -C /tmp
+          curl -fsSL --proto '=https' -o "/tmp/$asset" \
+            "https://github.com/orhun/git-cliff/releases/download/$GIT_CLIFF_VERSION/$asset"
+          printf '%s  %s\n' "$GIT_CLIFF_SHA256" "/tmp/$asset" | sha256sum -c -
+          tar -xzf "/tmp/$asset" -C /tmp
           install -m 0755 "/tmp/git-cliff-$version/git-cliff" /usr/local/bin/git-cliff
           git-cliff --version
 
@@ -248,6 +265,7 @@ jobs:
         env:
           GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
           IDENTITY: ${{ needs.meta.outputs.identity }}
+        continue-on-error: true
         run: |
           set -euo pipefail
           git config user.name "github-actions[bot]"

AGENTS.md

@@ -9,8 +9,8 @@ before changing anything; it encodes the conventions the CI enforces.
   Harness Web (dsh web) as a slim, non-root, multi-arch image. Everything else
   exists to support it or to demonstrate an implementation on top of it.
 - **Every implementation is a self-contained example** under examples/<name>/.
-  There is exactly one example for the agents-as-a-service platform; do not
+  The multi-tenant platform lives in exactly one directory; do not split it into
-  split it into parallel directories.
+  parallel examples.
 - **versions.env is the single source of truth** for the DSH ref, pnpm, the
   control-plane versions and the image names.
 - **Docs describe the shipped behavior**, not intentions. If you change a
@@ -43,18 +43,18 @@ before changing anything; it encodes the conventions the CI enforces.
 | versions.env | Every pinned version and image name |
 | Makefile | Canonical local entrypoint |
 | build.sh | Deprecated shim that forwards to make |
-| docs/ | main-image.md, examples.md, gitflow.md, versioning.md |
+| docs/ | main-image.md, examples.md, gitflow.md, versioning.md (index: README.md) |
 | examples/ | One implementation per directory (contract in docs/examples.md) |
 | examples/dsh-agents-as-a-service/ | The multi-tenant platform example (manifests, gateway, docs, scripts) |
 | examples/minimal-single-tenant/ | The just-one-DSH-Web quickstart |
 | scripts/ | check-versions.sh, check-examples.sh, check-manifests.py, set-version.sh |
 | .dsh/skills/ | Project-local DSH skills (auto-discovered); dsh-agent-sandbox-platform covers platform operation, MCP limits and extension recipes |
-| .github/workflows/ | ci.yaml, reusable _build-image.yaml, build-*, release.yaml, e2e-kind.yaml, pr-title.yaml, codeql.yml |
+| .github/workflows/ | ci.yaml (lint, dependency-review), ci-python.yaml, ci-manifests.yaml, ci-image.yaml (amd64 build + smoke test on Dockerfile/versions.env changes), reusable _build-image.yaml, build-*, release.yaml, e2e-kind.yaml, pr-title.yaml, codeql.yml |
 
 ## Commands
 
     make check        # versions, example layout and manifest YAML (run before every commit)
-    make test         # gateway unit tests (109+ tests)
+    make test         # gateway unit tests (pytest)
     make lint         # ruff + shellcheck (+ yamllint/actionlint when installed)
     make image        # build the main DSH Web image (slow: clones and builds DSH)
     make gateway      # build the example gateway image (fast)
@@ -72,21 +72,18 @@ needs kind plus the agent-sandbox CRDs (see the example README).
 | --- | --- |
 | Documentation only | make check; verify relative links |
 | Example manifest | make check; kubectl apply --dry-run=server in CI |
-| Optional hardening (gVisor, nodeSelector, NetworkPolicy, provider keys) | make check; server dry-run in CI; manual verification on a capable cluster |
+| Optional hardening (gVisor, nodeSelector, NetworkPolicy, provider keys, failed-Pod recovery) | make check; server dry-run in CI; manual verification on a capable cluster |
 | Gateway code | make test; make lint; add or update tests |
-| Dockerfile / versions.env | make check; make image (amd64) and a container smoke test |
+| Dockerfile / versions.env | make check; the CI `build-amd64` job (`ci-image.yaml`) builds and smoke-tests the image on the PR; run `make image` locally only when you need the image |
 | Workflow | actionlint in CI; keep actions SHA-pinned; no hard-coded versions |
 | New example | make check; all files described in docs/examples.md |
-| Project skill (.dsh/skills/) | make check; frontmatter and size check; shellcheck skill scripts; load it with the skill tool |
+| Project skill (.dsh/skills/) | make check; validate frontmatter; keep SKILL.md under ~8 KB; shellcheck skill scripts; load it with the skill tool |
 
 ## Versioning and releases
 
-- Release identity = DSH_VERSION, optionally with a repository revision suffix
+- Release identity = DSH_VERSION plus an optional -rN repository revision.
-  for re-releases at the same DSH ref (current identity:
+  The current identity is dsh-v0.2.1-rc.5-r6 (first release at this DSH ref, so no
-  dsh-v0.2.1-rc.3-r4).
+  suffix); a repository-only change at the same ref publishes -r2.
-- The current identity is dsh-v0.2.1-rc.3-r4 (stored in versions.env). The
-  dsh-v0.2.1-rc.3 image tag already exists and tags are immutable, which is why
-  the first release under this scheme carries -r2.
 - Channels: release tags are immutable; latest follows the newest release;
   main is the development channel for both image packages.
 - A broken release is fixed by publishing -r(N+1), never by re-tagging.
@@ -99,8 +96,9 @@ needs kind plus the agent-sandbox CRDs (see the example README).
 - Branch names: feat/, fix/, docs/, chore/, refactor/, test/.
 - Conventional Commit subjects and PR titles (feat(scope): ..., fix(scope): ...).
 - PRs are squash-merged; main stays linear and protected.
-- Required checks: lint, python, manifests, gateway-image, pr-title, CodeQL,
+- Required on every PR: lint, pr-title, CodeQL (both Analyze jobs) and
-  dependency-review.
+  dependency-review. python, manifests and build-amd64 are path-filtered
+  on-demand checks; run them when the change touches their scope.
 - Keep diffs scoped; update docs with the code; never mix a version bump with
   unrelated changes.
 
@@ -108,9 +106,9 @@ needs kind plus the agent-sandbox CRDs (see the example README).
 
 1. Read docs/examples.md and examples/README.md.
 2. Create examples/<name>/ with README.md, manifests/NN-*.yaml, optional
-   manifests/exposure/<variant>/ (plus README), optional components with their
+   manifests/optional/<feature>/ or manifests/exposure/<variant>/ (each with a
-   own Dockerfile/README/tests, and scripts/ (executable, idempotent,
+   README), optional components with their own Dockerfile/README/tests, and
-   self-cleaning).
+   scripts/ (executable, idempotent, self-cleaning).
 3. Publish component images under <registry>/<owner>/<repo>/<example>/<component>.
 4. Add the example to examples/README.md; scripts/check-examples.sh enforces
    the layout.
@@ -119,16 +117,33 @@ needs kind plus the agent-sandbox CRDs (see the example README).
 
 - AUTH_PROXY_HEADER is opt-in. Only enable it when the gateway Service is
   reachable exclusively through the authenticating proxy; otherwise any client
-  can spoof X-Forwarded-User.
+  can spoof X-Forwarded-User. The SSO variant's NetworkPolicy is required for
+  production, and `examples/dsh-agents-as-a-service/scripts/preflight-sso.sh`
+  verifies the setup (Secrets, gateway env, TLS reference, placeholders, second
+  paths).
 - The example gateway reads the DSH launch token from pod logs. Treat pod logs
   as sensitive and keep its RBAC namespace-scoped.
+- Browser sessions are opaque server-side ids held in gateway memory: they are
+  revocable (logout/delete/recreate/expiry) but a gateway restart logs everyone
+  out and horizontal scaling needs a shared store. Session cookies are never
+  accepted as bearer tokens.
+- AUTH_RATE_LIMIT, SIGNUP_INVITE_CODE, MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PER_USER and
+  WS_MAX_MESSAGE_BYTES are in-process abuse guards, not ingress rate limits,
+  quotas or an audit log. Add those for an internet-facing deployment.
 - The example shares provider keys (dsh-provider-keys plus the optional
   dsh-provider-keys-extra) across sandboxes; do not describe it as
   tenant-isolated.
-- gVisor, nodeSelector and the NetworkPolicies are opt-in and are not active in
+- gVisor, nodeSelector, the shipped sandbox/exposure NetworkPolicies and the
-  the base manifests; do not describe the base example as hardened.
+  documented gateway egress policy, extra provider keys and failed-Pod recovery
-- TLS terminates outside the gateway; set COOKIE_SECURE=true for HTTPS and keep
+  are opt-in and are not active in the base manifests; do not describe the base
-  the base manifest safe for local HTTP.
+  example as hardened.
+  The sandbox and gateway-egress policies are required production steps; an
+  exposure without its NetworkPolicy is demo-only. See the example's
+  production checklist.
+- TLS terminates outside the gateway. Set COOKIE_SECURE=true for HTTPS and drop
+  ALLOW_INSECURE_COOKIES; the gateway refuses COOKIE_SECURE=false unless
+  ALLOW_INSECURE_COOKIES=1, which is only for the plain-HTTP local demo. Never
+  expose that combination.
 
 ## Ask before
 

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -3,6 +3,67 @@
 All notable changes to this repository are documented here.
 Generated by git-cliff from Conventional Commits; do not edit this file by hand.
 
+## [dsh-v0.2.1-rc.5-r6] - 2026-10-31
+
+### Added
+
+- **example:** Persist the agent workspace on the PVC via subPath (#34) (367294b)
+- **example:** Start DSH's folder picker on the persisted workspace (#36) (82ee0d0)
+
+### CI
+
+- **workflows:** Streamline CI and remove redundant builds (#31) (dcb5b43)
+
+### Documentation
+
+- Align readmes, docs and agent guidance with current behavior (#37) (24f23e0)
+
+### Fixed
+
+- **gateway:** Answer client-aborted requests with 499, not a traceback (#32) (cbcc56f)
+- Ship bubblewrap for DSH's command sandbox, keep agents usable without it (#35) (a09d4ac)
+- **ci:** Harden workflow token scope and download integrity (#39) (2f959e6)
+- **gateway:** Replace token cookies with revocable sessions and harden abuse controls (#40) (1a929e3)
+
+### Maintenance
+
+- **changelog:** Refresh for dsh-v0.2.1-rc.5 (#30) (b57916d)
+- Bump docker/login-action (#28) (8c34f43)
+- **deps:** Bump agent-sandbox to v1.0.9 (#38) (4c073ee)
+- Improve package installation and add Python depend… (#42) (8e9bd47)
+
+### Other
+
+- Add continue-on-error to CHANGELOG PR step (97c5632)
+
+## [dsh-v0.2.1-rc.5] - 2026-10-30
+
+### Added
+
+- **example:** Add optional failed-Pod recovery (#26) (14c3fb8)
+
+### Fixed
+
+- **ci:** Make release image digests unique and allow changelog PRs (#24) (2b43d5d)
+
+### Maintenance
+
+- **changelog:** Refresh for dsh-v0.2.1-rc.3-r4 (#23) (97abf75)
+- **deps:** Bump agent-sandbox to v1.0.8 (#25) (96d3030)
+- **release:** Dsh-v0.2.1-rc.5 (#29) (bed8e56)
+
+## [dsh-v0.2.1-rc.3-r4] - 2026-10-26
+
+### Added
+
+- **skills:** Add agent-sandbox platform skill (#20) (bf24306)
+- **example:** Add optional gVisor, nodeSelector, NetworkPolicy and provider keys (#21) (3e9ba38)
+
+### Maintenance
+
+- **changelog:** Refresh for dsh-v0.2.1-rc.3-r3 (#19) (8681412)
+- **release:** Dsh-v0.2.1-rc.3-r4 (#22) (e2f1fe5)
+
 ## [dsh-v0.2.1-rc.3-r3] - 2026-10-25
 
 ### Added

CONTRIBUTING.md

@@ -43,8 +43,10 @@ Install the gateway dev dependencies once:
 - Use a Conventional Commit title, for example feat(gateway): add wake metrics
   or docs(examples): clarify SSO trust boundary. PR titles are linted.
 - Keep the diff scoped. Squash merge into main; history stays linear.
-- Required checks: lint, python, manifests, gateway-image, pr-title, CodeQL,
+- Required on every PR: lint, pr-title, CodeQL (both Analyze jobs) and
-  and dependency-review. Branch protection is described in docs/gitflow.md.
+  dependency-review. python, manifests and build-amd64 are path-filtered
+  on-demand checks; run them when the change touches their scope. Branch
+  protection is described in docs/gitflow.md.
 - Update the docs that the change affects; docs are part of the change, not a
   follow-up.
 - Never commit a real secret. Secret-shaped YAML belongs in a *.yaml.example
@@ -60,16 +62,12 @@ it by hand; the release workflow regenerates it.
 
 ## Adding an example
 
-Read docs/examples.md, then add examples/<name>/ with:
+Read docs/examples.md, then add examples/<name>/ with a README.md,
-
+numbered manifests/NN-*.yaml, optional manifests/optional/<feature>/ or
-- README.md (what it demonstrates, prerequisites, steps, teardown)
+manifests/exposure/<variant>/ (each with a README), optional components (a
-- manifests/NN-*.yaml (numbered, plain kubectl)
+Dockerfile plus README and tests), and executable, idempotent, self-cleaning
-- optional manifests/exposure/<variant>/ with its own README.md
+scripts. Add the literal examples/<name>/ entry to examples/README.md;
-- optional components (a Dockerfile plus README and tests per component)
+scripts/check-examples.sh enforces the layout.
-- scripts/ with executable, idempotent, self-cleaning scripts
-- docs/ for deeper material
-
-List it in examples/README.md. scripts/check-examples.sh enforces this layout.
 
 ## Documentation
 

Dockerfile

@@ -6,13 +6,14 @@
 # Build args (all pinned in versions.env, verified by scripts/check-versions.sh):
 #   DSH_REPO              upstream git remote to package
 #   DSH_VERSION           upstream git ref to build (tag or branch)
+#   DSH_COMMIT            full commit SHA DSH_VERSION must resolve to
 #   RELEASE_REVISION      optional repository revision label (r2, r3, ...)
 #   PNPM_VERSION          pnpm used to build DSH
 #   VCS_REF               this repository's commit, recorded in OCI labels
-#   NODE_BUILD_IMAGE      node image used to build DSH
+#   NODE_BUILD_IMAGE      node image used to build DSH (pinned by digest)
-#   NODE_RUNTIME_IMAGE    node image used at runtime
+#   NODE_RUNTIME_IMAGE    node image used at runtime (pinned by digest)
-ARG NODE_BUILD_IMAGE=docker.io/node:24-trixie
+ARG NODE_BUILD_IMAGE=docker.io/node:24-trixie@sha256:8c761eca2bf7eec965f946cf47b8090143cb41f45f2f8699af0cc0298d2d2d19
-ARG NODE_RUNTIME_IMAGE=docker.io/node:24-trixie-slim
+ARG NODE_RUNTIME_IMAGE=docker.io/node:24-trixie-slim@sha256:54f84b4cf8432b21aaffd5d3ce8d41e12cea0d10d33c09d2f3c9879d49d6b446
 
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 # Build stage: clone DSH at the pinned ref, build, and package the CLI.
@@ -20,7 +21,8 @@ ARG NODE_RUNTIME_IMAGE=docker.io/node:24-trixie-slim
 FROM $NODE_BUILD_IMAGE AS build
 
 ARG DSH_REPO=https://github.com/deepseek-ai/deepseek-harness.git
-ARG DSH_VERSION=dsh-v0.2.1-rc.3
+ARG DSH_VERSION=dsh-v0.2.1-rc.5
+ARG DSH_COMMIT=b830ec950faba0a46dda564be3e2d854afed94f1
 ARG PNPM_VERSION=11.28.5
 
 ENV CI=true \
@@ -31,7 +33,15 @@ RUN corepack enable \
 
 WORKDIR /src
 
-RUN git clone --depth 1 --branch "$DSH_VERSION" "$DSH_REPO" .
+# Clone the pinned ref and fail closed unless it resolves to DSH_COMMIT. A moved
+# tag would otherwise silently change what the image packages.
+RUN git clone --depth 1 --branch "$DSH_VERSION" "$DSH_REPO" . \
+ && actual="$(git -C /src rev-parse HEAD)" \
+ && if [ "$actual" != "$DSH_COMMIT" ]; then \
+      echo "error: $DSH_REPO $DSH_VERSION resolved to $actual, expected DSH_COMMIT $DSH_COMMIT" >&2; \
+      echo "error: update DSH_VERSION/DSH_COMMIT in versions.env with scripts/set-version.sh" >&2; \
+      exit 1; \
+    fi
 
 RUN pnpm install --frozen-lockfile
 
@@ -57,8 +67,8 @@ RUN cd /opt/dsh \
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 FROM $NODE_RUNTIME_IMAGE AS runtime
 
-ARG DSH_VERSION=dsh-v0.2.1-rc.3
+ARG DSH_VERSION=dsh-v0.2.1-rc.5
-ARG RELEASE_REVISION=r4
+ARG RELEASE_REVISION=r6
 ARG PNPM_VERSION=11.28.5
 ARG VCS_REF=unknown
 
@@ -79,6 +89,11 @@ ENV NODE_ENV=production \
 
 # git/ripgrep/jq/yq/curl/gh are deliberate agent tooling parity: a sandboxed DSH
 # instance expects the usual developer CLI. tini reaps signals for a clean stop.
+# bubblewrap is DSH's first-choice command-sandbox runner on Linux. It ships
+# unsetuid, so it needs unprivileged user namespaces plus the namespace/mount
+# syscalls; a hardened pod (all capabilities dropped, RuntimeDefault seccomp)
+# usually cannot create one, which is why DSH then falls back to Landlock and,
+# when that is unavailable too, to DSH_PERMISSION_MODE=danger-full-access.
 RUN apt-get update \
  && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
       ca-certificates \
@@ -90,8 +105,12 @@ RUN apt-get update \
       wget \
       tini \
       gh \
+      bubblewrap \
+      python3 \
+      python3-pip \
+      python3-venv \
  && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/* \
- && curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh \
+ && apt-get autoclean -y \
      && install -d -o node -g node -m 0755 /workspace "$DSH_HOME" \
      && corepack enable \
      && corepack prepare "pnpm@$PNPM_VERSION" --activate \
@@ -144,6 +163,6 @@ WORKDIR /workspace
 USER node
 
 EXPOSE 3080
-VOLUME ["/home/node/.dsh"]
+VOLUME ["/home/node/.dsh", "/workspace"]
 STOPSIGNAL SIGTERM
 ENTRYPOINT ["/usr/bin/tini", "--", "/usr/local/bin/dsh-entrypoint"]

Makefile

@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ help: ## Show available targets
 image: ## Build the main DSH Web image (no push)
 	docker build \
 		--build-arg DSH_VERSION=$(DSH_VERSION) \
+		--build-arg DSH_COMMIT=$(DSH_COMMIT) \
 		--build-arg RELEASE_REVISION=$(RELEASE_REVISION) \
 		--build-arg PNPM_VERSION=$(PNPM_VERSION) \
 		--build-arg VCS_REF=$(VCS_REF) \

README.md

@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ docker run -d --name dsh-web \
   -p 3080:3080 \
   -v dsh-home:/home/node/.dsh \
   -e DEEPSEEK_API_KEY \
-  ghcr.io/sredevopsorg/deepseek-kubernetes-sandbox:dsh-v0.2.1-rc.3-r4
+  ghcr.io/sredevopsorg/deepseek-kubernetes-sandbox:dsh-v0.2.1-rc.5-r6
 ```
 
 DSH Web is **not usable at a bare `/`**. Without its launch-token cookie it
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ docker run -d --name dsh-web -p 18081:3080 \
   -e DSH_PUBLIC_URL=http://localhost:18081 \
   -v dsh-home:/home/node/.dsh \
   -e DEEPSEEK_API_KEY \
-  ghcr.io/sredevopsorg/deepseek-kubernetes-sandbox:dsh-v0.2.1-rc.3-r4
+  ghcr.io/sredevopsorg/deepseek-kubernetes-sandbox:dsh-v0.2.1-rc.5-r6
 # then open http://localhost:18081/?token=...
 ```
 
@@ -94,21 +94,20 @@ ghcr.io/sredevopsorg/deepseek-kubernetes-sandbox/dsh-agents-as-a-service/gateway
 
 | Tag | Contents | Meaning |
 | --- | --- | --- |
-| `dsh-v0.2.1-rc.3-r4` | DSH Web, port `3080` | **Current release identity.** Immutable: once published it never moves. |
+| `dsh-v0.2.1-rc.5-r6` | DSH Web, port `3080` | **Current release identity.** Immutable: once published it never moves. |
 | `latest` | DSH Web | Most recent release; same digest as the current identity. |
-| `main` | DSH Web | Development channel rebuilt from every push to `main`. Not a release; not for production. |
+| `main` | DSH Web | Development channel rebuilt when image-definition files change on `main`. Not a release; not for production. |
-| `dsh-v0.2.1-rc.3` | DSH Web | **Legacy tag** published before the release-identity scheme. It is not updated. New deployments use `dsh-v0.2.1-rc.3-r4`. |
 
 The example gateway is published under its nested path with the same release
 identity, e.g.
-`ghcr.io/sredevopsorg/deepseek-kubernetes-sandbox/dsh-agents-as-a-service/gateway:dsh-v0.2.1-rc.3-r4`.
+`ghcr.io/sredevopsorg/deepseek-kubernetes-sandbox/dsh-agents-as-a-service/gateway:dsh-v0.2.1-rc.5-r6`.
 
 Release identities, channels and rollback rules are explained in
 [docs/versioning.md](docs/versioning.md). Production deployments should pin a
 digest:
 
 ```bash
-docker buildx imagetools inspect ghcr.io/sredevopsorg/deepseek-kubernetes-sandbox:dsh-v0.2.1-rc.3-r4
+docker buildx imagetools inspect ghcr.io/sredevopsorg/deepseek-kubernetes-sandbox:dsh-v0.2.1-rc.5-r6
 # image: ghcr.io/sredevopsorg/deepseek-kubernetes-sandbox@sha256:<digest>
 ```
 
@@ -132,8 +131,8 @@ Self-contained implementations that consume the image. Index and contract:
 
 | Example | What it demonstrates |
 | --- | --- |
-| [`examples/dsh-agents-as-a-service/`](examples/dsh-agents-as-a-service/) | Full multi-tenant platform: SandboxTemplate with per-user PVCs, warm pool, one claim per user, suspend-when-idle, wake-on-return, browser gateway with signup + `HttpOnly` sessions + HTTP/WebSocket proxy, Ingress or Gateway API + GitHub SSO exposure, and opt-in gVisor/NetworkPolicy/provider-key hardening. Start with the [walkthrough](examples/dsh-agents-as-a-service/README.md) and the [architecture](examples/dsh-agents-as-a-service/docs/architecture.md). |
+| [`examples/dsh-agents-as-a-service/`](examples/dsh-agents-as-a-service/) | Full multi-tenant platform: SandboxTemplate with per-user PVCs, warm pool, one claim per user, suspend-when-idle, wake-on-return, browser gateway with signup + `HttpOnly` sessions + HTTP/WebSocket proxy, Ingress or Gateway API + GitHub SSO exposure, and opt-in gVisor/NetworkPolicy/provider-key hardening and failed-Pod recovery. Start with the [walkthrough](examples/dsh-agents-as-a-service/README.md) and the [architecture](examples/dsh-agents-as-a-service/docs/architecture.md). |
-| [`examples/minimal-single-tenant/`](examples/minimal-single-tenant/) | The smallest useful setup: one `SandboxTemplate` and one `SandboxClaim`, reached through `kubectl port-forward` + the launch-token URL. Manifest: [`manifests/sandbox-template.yaml`](examples/minimal-single-tenant/manifests/sandbox-template.yaml). |
+| [`examples/minimal-single-tenant/`](examples/minimal-single-tenant/) | The smallest useful setup: one `SandboxTemplate` and one `SandboxClaim`, reached through `kubectl port-forward` + the launch-token URL. Manifest: [`manifests/10-sandboxtemplate.yaml`](examples/minimal-single-tenant/manifests/10-sandboxtemplate.yaml). |
 
 The gateway is a component of the multi-tenant example and has its own
 [README](examples/dsh-agents-as-a-service/gateway/README.md) (API, configuration,
@@ -164,7 +163,7 @@ guide and troubleshooting notes live beside `SKILL.md`.
 | [`scripts/`](scripts/) | Repository checks: versions, example layout, manifest YAML, version bump. |
 | [`.dsh/skills/`](.dsh/skills/) | Project-local DSH skills, auto-discovered from the git root. |
 | [`.github/`](.github/) | CI, release automation, dependency updates, PR/issue templates. |
-| [`.env.sample`](.env.sample) | Documented local configuration (copy to `.env`; never commit it). |
+| [`.env.sample`](.env.sample) | Reference environment names for local runs; nothing reads it automatically. Never commit a real key. |
 
 ## Development
 
@@ -189,34 +188,15 @@ required checks and releases: [docs/gitflow.md](docs/gitflow.md).
 
 The release identity is the upstream DSH ref plus an optional repository
 revision: `DSH_VERSION` and `RELEASE_REVISION` in [versions.env](versions.env).
-The current identity is **`dsh-v0.2.1-rc.3-r4`** — the first release under the
+The current identity is **`dsh-v0.2.1-rc.5-r6`** — the first release at this
-mirrored-DSH scheme at the same upstream DSH ref as the legacy
+upstream DSH ref, so it carries no repository revision. Tags are immutable; a
-`dsh-v0.2.1-rc.3` tag. Tags are immutable; a broken release is fixed by
+broken release is fixed by publishing `-r(N+1)`, never by re-tagging.
-publishing `-r(N+1)`, never by re-tagging.
 
 `CHANGELOG.md` is generated by [git-cliff](https://git-cliff.org) from
 Conventional Commits and is never edited by hand. See
 [`CHANGELOG.md`](CHANGELOG.md), [docs/versioning.md](docs/versioning.md) and
 [cliff.toml](cliff.toml).
 
-## Migrating from the previous layout
-
-If you are coming from an older checkout, these paths moved. Nothing else changed
-semantically; the content was split into the example it belongs to.
-
-| Old path | New path |
-| --- | --- |
-| `gateway-api/dsh-demo/` (Gateway API + oauth2-proxy / GitHub SSO) | `examples/dsh-agents-as-a-service/manifests/exposure/gateway-api-sso/` (now `70-gateway.yaml` ... `74-tls-secret.yaml.example`) |
-| `examples/dsh-agents-as-a-service/60-ingress.yaml` | `examples/dsh-agents-as-a-service/manifests/exposure/ingress/60-ingress.yaml` |
-| `examples/dsh-agents-as-a-service/NN-*.yaml` (`00-` ... `50-`) | `examples/dsh-agents-as-a-service/manifests/NN-*.yaml` |
-| `examples/dsh-agents-as-a-service/run-test-kind.sh` | `examples/dsh-agents-as-a-service/scripts/e2e-kind.sh` |
-| `deploy/k8s/sandbox-template.yaml` | `examples/minimal-single-tenant/manifests/sandbox-template.yaml` |
-| `docs/architecture.md` | `examples/dsh-agents-as-a-service/docs/architecture.md` |
-
-The SSO walkthrough that lived in `gateway-api/dsh-demo/README.md` is merged
-into the [multi-tenant example README](examples/dsh-agents-as-a-service/README.md)
-(step 9) and the [exposure README](examples/dsh-agents-as-a-service/manifests/exposure/README.md).
-
 ## Contributing
 
 - [CONTRIBUTING.md](CONTRIBUTING.md) — local setup, PR workflow, what a change needs.

SECURITY.md

@@ -21,23 +21,41 @@ disclosure once a fix is available.
   from pod logs (pods/log). Anyone with access to those logs can impersonate a
   tenant. Keep the gateway's RBAC namespace-scoped and treat pod logs as
   sensitive. Replacing log scraping with an upstream token API is tracked in
-  the example architecture document.
+  the [example architecture document](examples/dsh-agents-as-a-service/docs/architecture.md#upstream-feature-request-remove-log-scraping).
+- **Browser sessions are server-side.** The gateway session cookie holds an
+  opaque session id, not a user name or token; it is not accepted as a bearer
+  token. Sessions are revoked on logout, user delete, `/recreate` and expiry,
+  but they live in gateway memory, so a gateway restart logs every browser out
+  and scaling beyond one replica requires a shared store. Do not treat the
+  cookie as durable or cross-replica state.
 - **SSO header trust boundary.** AUTH_PROXY_HEADER makes the gateway trust an
   identity header (for example X-Forwarded-User). Enable it only when the
-  gateway Service is reachable exclusively through the authenticating proxy;
+  gateway Service is reachable exclusively through the authenticating proxy
-  otherwise any client can spoof the header. The SSO exposure variant ships a
+  and its NetworkPolicy; otherwise any client can spoof the header. The SSO
-  NetworkPolicy that restricts gateway access to oauth2-proxy pods; a custom
+  exposure variant's policy is required, not optional: an exposure without it
-  exposure needs an equivalent.
+  is demo-only. Run `examples/dsh-agents-as-a-service/scripts/preflight-sso.sh`
+  after applying the variant; it checks the Secrets, gateway env, TLS
+  reference, leftover placeholders and accidental second paths.
+- **Insecure-cookie guard.** TLS terminates outside the gateway. Set
+  COOKIE_SECURE=true for HTTPS and remove ALLOW_INSECURE_COOKIES; the gateway
+  refuses to start with COOKIE_SECURE=false unless ALLOW_INSECURE_COOKIES=1 is
+  explicitly set, which exists only for the plain-HTTP local demo. Never expose
+  that combination outside localhost.
+- **Abuse controls are in-process.** AUTH_RATE_LIMIT/AUTH_RATE_WINDOW,
+  SIGNUP_INVITE_CODE, MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PER_USER and WS_MAX_MESSAGE_BYTES bound
+  casual abuse and resource exhaustion on the single gateway replica. They
+  reset on restart and are not an ingress rate limiter, WAF, quota system or
+  audit log; add those for an internet-facing deployment.
 - **Shared provider keys.** The example injects DEEPSEEK_API_KEY and any keys in
   the optional dsh-provider-keys-extra Secret into every tenant sandbox (a
   warm-pool constraint). Treat tenants as mutually trusting until per-tenant
   credentials or an egress proxy exist.
-- **Optional isolation is opt-in.** gVisor, nodeSelector, the sandbox/exposure
+- **The base example is demo-only, not hardened.** gVisor, nodeSelector, the
-  NetworkPolicies and extra provider keys are opt-in. Without a
+  sandbox/exposure NetworkPolicies, the gateway egress policy and extra provider
-  NetworkPolicy-capable CNI or a gVisor runtime, the base example is not
+  keys are opt-in. Without gVisor and the network policies there is no
-  tenant-isolated; see examples/dsh-agents-as-a-service/docs/optional-hardening.md.
+  tenant-to-tenant isolation; the sandboxes share the host kernel and can reach
-- **TLS is external.** Terminate TLS at an Ingress or Gateway and set
+  cluster-internal endpoints. Production requirements are enumerated in the
-  COOKIE_SECURE=true. Plain HTTP outside localhost exposes session cookies.
+  [production checklist](examples/dsh-agents-as-a-service/docs/optional-hardening.md#6-production-checklist).
 - **No secrets in the repository.** The repository only ships empty Secret
   manifests and *.yaml.example files.
 

cliff.toml

@@ -44,6 +44,6 @@ commit_parsers = [
 ]
 protect_breaking_commits = false
 filter_commits = false
-# Release tags are dsh-vX.Y.Z[-rN]; the single legacy pre-scheme tag is v0.0.1.
+# Release tags are dsh-vX.Y.Z[-rN]; the single pre-scheme tag is v0.0.1.
 tag_pattern = "^(v|dsh-v).*$"
 sort_commits = "oldest"

docs/README.md

@@ -2,8 +2,7 @@
 
 Repository-wide documentation lives here. Example-specific material lives with
 its example under [`examples/<name>/docs/`](../examples/) — see the
-[agents-as-a-service architecture](../examples/dsh-agents-as-a-service/docs/architecture.md)
+[agents-as-a-service architecture](../examples/dsh-agents-as-a-service/docs/architecture.md).
-for the deep-dive that used to live in this directory.
 
 If you are new, read the [root README](../README.md) first: it is image-first and
 gets a DSH Web container running before anything else.
@@ -15,7 +14,8 @@ gets a DSH Web container running before anything else.
 | [main-image.md](main-image.md) | The primary artifact: build args, runtime environment, entrypoint, probes, volumes/ports/signals, non-root contract, image names, tags and digests. |
 | [examples.md](examples.md) | The example contract: required layout, manifest rules, exposure variants, components and image naming, scripts, docs, and how to add a new example. |
 | [gitflow.md](gitflow.md) | Branches, protected `main`, squash merges, Conventional PR titles, required CI checks, release branches, hotfixes and the one-time GitHub settings checklist. |
-| [versioning.md](versioning.md) | Release identity (`DSH ref` + optional `-rN`), why the current identity is `dsh-v0.2.1-rc.3-r4`, channels, compatibility matrix, bumping pins, the release checklist, rollback, git-cliff and digest pinning. |
+| [versioning.md](versioning.md) | Release identity (`DSH ref` + optional `-rN`), the current identity `dsh-v0.2.1-rc.5-r6`, why identities are immutable, channels, compatibility matrix, bumping pins, the release checklist, rollback, git-cliff and digest pinning. |
+| [workflow-security.md](workflow-security.md) | GitHub Actions security posture: least-privilege tokens, pinned actions, untrusted-input handling, download integrity checks, artifact hygiene, the latest audit record and residual repository-setting recommendations. |
 
 ## Project skills
 
@@ -34,6 +34,8 @@ DSH discovers project skills from `<git root>/.dsh/skills/<name>/SKILL.md`
 | [dsh-agents-as-a-service README](../examples/dsh-agents-as-a-service/README.md) | The multi-tenant platform walkthrough: warm pool, claims, suspend/resume, gateway, exposure and troubleshooting. |
 | [dsh-agents-as-a-service architecture](../examples/dsh-agents-as-a-service/docs/architecture.md) | Container/sequence diagrams, ADRs, security and RBAC, failure modes and the evolution path. |
 | [gateway README](../examples/dsh-agents-as-a-service/gateway/README.md) | The gateway's HTTP/WebSocket API, configuration, auth (including SSO), and limitations. |
+| [optional hardening](../examples/dsh-agents-as-a-service/docs/optional-hardening.md) | Opt-in gVisor, nodeSelector, NetworkPolicy, provider keys and failed-Pod recovery. |
+| [exposure variants](../examples/dsh-agents-as-a-service/manifests/exposure/README.md) | The mutually exclusive Ingress and Gateway API + SSO exposure paths. |
 
 ## Project policies
 

docs/examples.md

@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ examples/<name>/
   example directory;
 - an example has no `README.md` or no `manifests/` directory;
 - `manifests/` contains no top-level `*.yaml` files;
+- a top-level `manifests/*.yaml` is not named `NN-*.yaml`;
 - a `*.yaml` file sits at the example root instead of under `manifests/`;
 - `manifests/exposure/` exists without a `manifests/exposure/README.md` describing
   the variants;

docs/gitflow.md

@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ branch; the PR is squash-merged, so individual branch commits are never part of
    `docs(scope): ...`, `build: ...`, `ci: ...`, `refactor: ...`, `test: ...`,
    `chore: ...`. Breaking changes use `feat(scope)!: ...` or a
    `BREAKING CHANGE:` footer.
-3. **CI must be green.** All required checks below must pass before merge.
+3. **CI must be green.** All applicable checks below must pass before merge.
 4. **Squash merge only.** `main` stays linear and protected; merged PRs are one
    commit each.
 5. **No direct pushes to `main`** or to a release branch. Both are protected.
@@ -40,15 +40,33 @@ branch; the PR is squash-merged, so individual branch commits are never part of
 
 ## Required checks
 
-| Check | Workflow / job | What it verifies |
+| Check | Workflow / job | Required on every PR? | What it verifies |
-| --- | --- | --- |
+| --- | --- | --- | --- |
-| `lint` | `ci.yaml` | `scripts/check-versions.sh` (version pins and markdown tokens), ruff on the gateway, shellcheck on shell scripts, yamllint/actionlint when available. |
+| `lint` | `ci.yaml` | yes | `scripts/check-versions.sh` (version pins and markdown tokens), `scripts/check-examples.sh` (example layout and numbered manifests), shellcheck, actionlint, yamllint, hadolint and documentation links. |
-| `python` | `ci.yaml` | Gateway unit tests (`pytest`). |
+| `python` | `ci-python.yaml` | no (path-filtered) | Gateway ruff check/format and unit tests (`pytest` with coverage). Runs only when the gateway or this workflow changes. |
-| `manifests` | `ci.yaml` | `scripts/check-examples.sh`, `scripts/check-manifests.py` and a server-side dry-run of every example manifest against the agent-sandbox CRDs. |
+| `manifests` | `ci-manifests.yaml` | no (path-filtered) | `scripts/check-manifests.py` (manifest shape) and a server-side dry-run of every example manifest against the agent-sandbox CRDs. Runs when manifest files, `scripts/check-manifests.py` or `versions.env` change. |
-| `gateway-image` | `ci.yaml` | Builds the gateway image and smoke-tests `/healthz` without a cluster. |
+| `pr-title` | `pr-title.yaml` | yes | Conventional Commit PR title. |
-| `pr-title` | `pr-title.yaml` | Conventional Commit PR title. |
+| `Analyze (python)`, `Analyze (actions)` | `codeql.yml` | yes (both jobs) | CodeQL static analysis for Python and GitHub Actions. |
-| `CodeQL` | `codeql.yml` | Static analysis for Python and GitHub Actions. |
+| `dependency-review` | `ci.yaml` | yes | Dependency changes introduced by the PR (job `dependency-review`; runs on pull requests only). |
-| `dependency-review` | `ci.yaml` | Dependency changes introduced by the PR (job `dependency-review`; runs on pull requests only). |
+
+`python`, `manifests` and `build-amd64` use native `on.pull_request.paths`
+filtering, so PRs that do not touch the gateway, the manifests or the image
+definition skip them. The gateway image is built and published by
+`build-gateway.yaml` on merge; `/healthz` is covered by the gateway unit tests and
+the Dockerfile is linted by `lint` (hadolint).
+
+`ci-image.yaml` (`build-amd64`) is the PR-side check for the main image: when
+`Dockerfile`, `.dockerignore` or `versions.env` change it builds `linux/amd64`
+with the pins from `versions.env` — no registry login, no push — and smoke-tests
+the result (`--version`, non-root UID, `/workspace` + `DSH_HOME`, the
+`bubblewrap` runner, the version label, and `/favicon.svg` served from a running
+container). The published multi-arch build still happens only in
+`build-main.yaml` on merge.
+
+Because a skipped path-filtered check is not a passing check, require only the
+always-on set: `lint`, `pr-title`, both CodeQL `Analyze` jobs and
+`dependency-review`. Keep `python`, `manifests` and `build-amd64` as on-demand
+checks that skip when unrelated to the change.
 
 The image build workflows (`_build-image.yaml`, `build-main.yaml`,
 `build-gateway.yaml`) and `e2e-kind.yaml` are **not** required on every PR: the
@@ -90,7 +108,8 @@ Rollback is also a re-release, never a retag: see
 
 ## Tag protection
 
-All release tags match `dsh-*` and are protected:
+Release tags follow `dsh-*` and are protected (the pre-scheme `v0.0.1` tag is
+historical and unmaintained):
 
 - only maintainers (the release workflow) may create them;
 - they cannot be deleted or force-updated;
@@ -104,9 +123,10 @@ respectively.
 
 Configure these on the repository before relying on the workflow:
 
-- [ ] **Branches → main**: require a pull request; require the checks `lint`,
+- [ ] **Branches → main**: require a pull request; require the always-on checks
-      `python`, `manifests`, `gateway-image`, `pr-title`, `CodeQL`,
+      `lint`, `pr-title`, both CodeQL `Analyze` jobs and `dependency-review`
-      `dependency-review`; require branches to be up to date; require conversation
+      (`python`, `manifests` and `build-amd64` are path-filtered and must not be
+      required); require branches to be up to date; require conversation
       resolution; restrict direct pushes; allow only squash merges and enable
       "Automatically delete head branches".
 - [ ] **Branches → release/***: same protections, plus allow the release workflow

docs/main-image.md

@@ -11,14 +11,19 @@ The image is image-first: it is the product, and the examples under
 
 ## What the build does
 
-The Dockerfile is a two-stage build:
+The Dockerfile is a two-stage build. Both stages use the `node` images pinned by
+digest in [versions.env](../versions.env): a mutable tag alone is not trusted, and
+`./scripts/check-versions.sh` rejects an image reference without a `@sha256:` digest.
 
-1. **Build stage** (`node:24-trixie`) clones DSH at the pinned git ref, installs
+1. **Build stage** (`NODE_BUILD_IMAGE`) clones DSH at the pinned git ref, verifies
+   that the clone's `HEAD` is exactly `DSH_COMMIT` (the build fails otherwise, so a
+   moved upstream tag cannot silently change what the image packages), installs
    dependencies with pnpm, runs the production build, packages the `@deepseek-ai/dsh`
    CLI with `pnpm pack`, and installs its production dependencies with npm.
-2. **Runtime stage** (`node:24-trixie-slim`) copies `/opt/dsh` to `/app`, adds the
+2. **Runtime stage** (`NODE_RUNTIME_IMAGE`) copies `/opt/dsh` to `/app`, adds the
    CLI tools DSH agents commonly use (`git`, `ripgrep`, `jq`, `yq`, `curl`, `wget`,
-   `gh`, `tini`, `uv`), and starts `dsh web` through a small entrypoint.
+   `gh`, `tini`, `uv`), installs `bubblewrap` as DSH's preferred command-sandbox
+   runner, and starts `dsh web` through a small entrypoint.
 
 ## Build it
 
@@ -27,15 +32,19 @@ make image          # canonical: builds the DSH Web image, no push
 ```
 
 `make image` reads [versions.env](../versions.env) and passes the pins as build args.
+Pull requests that touch `Dockerfile`, `.dockerignore` or `versions.env` get the
+same build for `linux/amd64` from the [`ci-image.yaml`](../.github/workflows/ci-image.yaml)
+workflow — no registry login, no push — followed by a container smoke test.
 To reproduce the equivalent by hand:
 
 ```bash
 docker build \
-  --build-arg DSH_VERSION=dsh-v0.2.1-rc.3 \
+  --build-arg DSH_VERSION=dsh-v0.2.1-rc.5-r6 \
-  --build-arg RELEASE_REVISION=r4 \
+  --build-arg DSH_COMMIT=b830ec950faba0a46dda564be3e2d854afed94f1 \
+  --build-arg RELEASE_REVISION= \
   --build-arg PNPM_VERSION=11.28.5 \
   --build-arg VCS_REF="$(git rev-parse --short HEAD)" \
-  -t ghcr.io/sredevopsorg/deepseek-kubernetes-sandbox:dsh-v0.2.1-rc.3-r4 .
+  -t ghcr.io/sredevopsorg/deepseek-kubernetes-sandbox:dsh-v0.2.1-rc.5-r6 .
 ```
 
 ### Build args
@@ -43,12 +52,18 @@ docker build \
 | Arg | Default / source | Purpose |
 | --- | --- | --- |
 | `DSH_REPO` | `https://github.com/deepseek-ai/deepseek-harness.git` | Upstream DSH repository to clone. |
-| `DSH_VERSION` | `DSH_VERSION` in [versions.env](../versions.env) | Upstream DSH git tag/ref to package; recorded as `org.opencontainers.image.version`. |
+| `DSH_VERSION` | `DSH_VERSION` in [versions.env](../versions.env) | Upstream DSH git tag/ref to package. The Dockerfile records it as `io.sredevopsorg.dsh.version` and (for local builds) `org.opencontainers.image.version`; published builds set the version label to the full release identity. |
-| `RELEASE_REVISION` | `RELEASE_REVISION` in [versions.env](../versions.env) | Repository revision suffix (`rN`); the release identity is `DSH_VERSION-RELEASE_REVISION`, recorded in the `io.sredevopsorg.release.revision` label. See [versioning](versioning.md). |
+| `DSH_COMMIT` | `DSH_COMMIT` in [versions.env](../versions.env) | Full commit SHA `DSH_VERSION` must resolve to upstream. The build stage fails unless `git rev-parse HEAD` in the clone equals this value, which pins the source independently of a movable tag. |
+| `RELEASE_REVISION` | `RELEASE_REVISION` in [versions.env](../versions.env) | Repository revision suffix (`rN`), recorded in `io.sredevopsorg.release.revision`. The release identity is `DSH_VERSION` plus `-RELEASE_REVISION` when set. See [versioning](versioning.md). |
 | `PNPM_VERSION` | `PNPM_VERSION` in [versions.env](../versions.env) | pnpm version activated with corepack in both stages. |
 | `VCS_REF` | `git rev-parse --short HEAD` (via `make image`) | Source revision recorded for traceability. |
-| `NODE_BUILD_IMAGE` | `docker.io/node:24-trixie` | Build-stage base image. |
+| `NODE_BUILD_IMAGE` | `docker.io/node:24-trixie@sha256:8c761eca2bf7eec965f946cf47b8090143cb41f45f2f8699af0cc0298d2d2d19` | Build-stage base image, pinned to the multi-arch index digest. |
-| `NODE_RUNTIME_IMAGE` | `docker.io/node:24-trixie-slim` | Runtime-stage base image. |
+| `NODE_RUNTIME_IMAGE` | `docker.io/node:24-trixie-slim@sha256:54f84b4cf8432b21aaffd5d3ce8d41e12cea0d10d33c09d2f3c9879d49d6b446` | Runtime-stage base image, pinned to the multi-arch index digest. |
+
+Base images are pinned by digest because tags are mutable: `node:24-trixie` can be
+re-pointed at a new build at any time. Bumping the tag and its digest is a
+deliberate, reviewable change in [versions.env](../versions.env); environments that
+mirror the image should also mirror the `node` digest they build from.
 
 Never hard-code a version outside [versions.env](../versions.env):
 `./scripts/check-versions.sh` (and `make check`) fails when a pin drifts.
@@ -76,10 +91,40 @@ The entrypoint is `tini -- /usr/local/bin/dsh-entrypoint`:
 | `DSH_TRUSTED_HOSTS` | empty | Extra `Host`/`Origin` allow-list entries, comma- or space-separated. `localhost`/`127.0.0.1` are always trusted. Required when a proxy forwards the browser's `Host`. |
 | `DEEPSEEK_API_KEY` | empty | Provider credential read by DSH. Inject it with `-e`/`envFrom`; never bake it into the image. Only model calls fail when it is missing. |
 | `DSH_HOME` | `/home/node/.dsh` | DSH state directory (conversations, sessions, config, credentials). Mount a volume here to persist it. |
+| `HOME` | `/home/node` | OS home: where `~` resolves and where tools keep caches and config. DSH's directory picker has no start-path setting, so it lists `$HOME` when opened. The shipped sandbox templates override it to `/workspace` so the picker opens on the persisted workspace; the trade-offs are below. |
+| `DSH_PERMISSION_MODE` | `workspace-write` | Deployment default for DSH's file policy: `read-only`, `workspace-write`, or `danger-full-access` (which also turns approval prompts off). The confined modes need `bubblewrap` or Landlock inside the container; where neither is usable every bash command fails closed with `SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE`. See the note below. |
 
 The image also sets `NODE_ENV=production`, `HOME=/home/node`, and a `PATH` that
 includes `/app/node_modules/.bin`.
 
+`HOME` decides where DSH's folder picker starts. DSH has no start-path setting:
+the picker's browse backend lists `$HOME` when the dialog opens and labels that
+listing *Home*. With the image default (`/home/node`) that listing is outside a
+mounted volume; the example sandbox templates
+([minimal](../examples/minimal-single-tenant/manifests/10-sandboxtemplate.yaml),
+[agents as a service](../examples/dsh-agents-as-a-service/manifests/10-sandboxtemplate.yaml))
+mount the same PVC's `workspace` subPath at `/workspace` and set `HOME=/workspace`
+so the picker opens on the persisted agent workspace. `~`
+and every tool that keeps caches or config under `$HOME` (`npm`/`pnpm`, `uv`,
+`git`, `gh`, DSH's global `~/.agents` instructions and skills) follow, so those
+dotfiles then live on the workspace volume too. `DSH_HOME` is separate and stays
+`/home/node/.dsh`, so sessions, config and credentials stay out of the
+workspace. An existing sandbox stamps this environment at pod creation, so the
+override only applies to sandboxes created after it was added.
+
+DSH confines bash commands itself (a second layer inside whatever container
+sandbox you already run). Its Linux runners are `bubblewrap` and then Landlock,
+and it fails closed rather than running unconfined. The image ships
+`bubblewrap`, but Debian's binary is unsetuid: it needs **unprivileged user
+namespaces** plus the namespace/mount syscalls. A hardened pod — non-root,
+`capabilities.drop: ["ALL"]`, `seccompProfile: RuntimeDefault` — usually cannot
+create one, and it may expose no Landlock runner either, in which case every
+command fails with `SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE`. Set
+`DSH_PERMISSION_MODE=danger-full-access` only when the surrounding pod or VM is
+the isolation boundary you rely on; keep the confined modes when the host
+provides a working runner (check `grep -o landlock /sys/kernel/security/lsm` and
+`bwrap --ro-bind / / true` inside the container first).
+
 ### Provider credentials
 
 DSH resolves provider API keys from the environment when no stored credential
@@ -108,7 +153,7 @@ procedure.
 | --- | --- | --- |
 | Exposed port | `3080/tcp` | `EXPOSE 3080`; one port serves the UI, assets, API, SSE and WebSocket traffic. |
 | State volume | `/home/node/.dsh` | Declared with `VOLUME`; use a named volume (Docker) or PVC (Kubernetes). |
-| Working directory | `/workspace` | The agent workspace; mount a volume here if agents should keep files. |
+| Working directory | `/workspace` | The agent workspace. Mount a volume here if agents should keep files; the shipped example templates mount the same PVC's `workspace` subPath here and point `HOME` at it, so DSH's folder picker opens on it. |
 | Stop signal | `SIGTERM` | `tini` forwards it to `dsh web`; allow a graceful shutdown period. |
 | User | `node`, UID/GID `1000` | The process is non-root. A PVC mounted at `DSH_HOME` must be writable by UID 1000. |
 
@@ -131,8 +176,8 @@ livenessProbe:
   periodSeconds: 15
 ```
 
-The shipped templates use exactly this shape; see
+The shipped templates use the same path and startup budget; see
-[`examples/minimal-single-tenant/manifests/sandbox-template.yaml`](../examples/minimal-single-tenant/manifests/sandbox-template.yaml).
+[`examples/minimal-single-tenant/manifests/10-sandboxtemplate.yaml`](../examples/minimal-single-tenant/manifests/10-sandboxtemplate.yaml).
 A `startupProbe` is important because plugin activation (or the first start of a
 large sandbox) can exceed a default liveness budget.
 
@@ -164,17 +209,16 @@ GitHub Container Registry:
 
 | Tag | Meaning |
 | --- | --- |
-| `dsh-v0.2.1-rc.3-r4` | Current release identity. **Immutable**: once published it never moves. |
+| `dsh-v0.2.1-rc.5-r6` | Current release identity. **Immutable**: once published it never moves. |
 | `latest` | Most recent release; points at the same digest as the current identity. |
-| `main` | Development channel rebuilt from every push to `main`; not a release, not for production. |
+| `main` | Development channel rebuilt when image-definition files change on `main`; not a release, not for production. |
-| `dsh-v0.2.1-rc.3` | Legacy tag published before the release-identity scheme existed. Do not use it for new deployments; see the migration table in the [root README](../README.md). |
 
 Release identities, channels and rollback rules are defined in
 [versioning](versioning.md). Tags are immutable, so production deployments should
 pin a digest:
 
 ```bash
-docker buildx imagetools inspect ghcr.io/sredevopsorg/deepseek-kubernetes-sandbox:dsh-v0.2.1-rc.3-r4
+docker buildx imagetools inspect ghcr.io/sredevopsorg/deepseek-kubernetes-sandbox:dsh-v0.2.1-rc.5-r6
 # ... pin the digest in your deployment manifests:
 #   image: ghcr.io/sredevopsorg/deepseek-kubernetes-sandbox@sha256:<digest>
 ```
@@ -182,9 +226,10 @@ docker buildx imagetools inspect ghcr.io/sredevopsorg/deepseek-kubernetes-sandbo
 ## Verifying an image
 
 ```bash
-docker inspect ghcr.io/sredevopsorg/deepseek-kubernetes-sandbox:dsh-v0.2.1-rc.3-r4 \
+docker inspect ghcr.io/sredevopsorg/deepseek-kubernetes-sandbox:dsh-v0.2.1-rc.5-r6 \
   --format '{{json .Config.Labels}}'
 # org.opencontainers.image.title / .version / .source
+# io.sredevopsorg.dsh.version / io.sredevopsorg.release.revision
 ```
 
 Release builds also publish SBOM and provenance attestations from the release

docs/versioning.md

@@ -15,48 +15,40 @@ release identity = DSH_VERSION + optional "-" + RELEASE_REVISION
 
 | Piece | Meaning |
 | --- | --- |
-| `DSH_VERSION` | The upstream DeepSeek Harness git ref being packaged, e.g. `dsh-v0.2.1-rc.3`. It mirrors upstream's own tag, which is what "mirrored-DSH scheme" means. |
+| `DSH_VERSION` | The upstream DeepSeek Harness git ref being packaged, e.g. `dsh-v0.2.1-rc.5-r6`. It mirrors upstream's own tag. |
 | `RELEASE_REVISION` | An optional repository revision at that DSH ref: empty for the first release, `rN` (`N >= 2`) for a repository-only re-release. |
 
 Examples:
 
-- `DSH_VERSION=dsh-v0.2.1-rc.3`, `RELEASE_REVISION=` → identity `dsh-v0.2.1-rc.3`
+- `DSH_VERSION=dsh-v0.2.1-rc.5-r6`, `RELEASE_REVISION=` → identity `dsh-v0.2.1-rc.5-r6`
   (first release at that upstream ref).
-- `DSH_VERSION=dsh-v0.2.1-rc.3`, `RELEASE_REVISION=r4` → identity
+- `DSH_VERSION=<ref>`, `RELEASE_REVISION=rN` → identity `<ref>-rN` (for example
-  `dsh-v0.2.1-rc.3-r4` (documentation, CI or gateway changes on top of the same
+  documentation, CI or gateway changes on top of an already-released ref; no DSH
-  upstream DSH; no DSH upgrade).
+  upgrade). Use `r2` for the first re-release: revision 1 is the plain tag.
 
 A DSH upgrade produces a new base identity (for example the next upstream ref
 with an empty revision); a repository-only change at the same DSH ref increments
 `rN`.
 
-## Why the current identity is `dsh-v0.2.1-rc.3-r4`
+## Why release identities are immutable
 
-The image tag `dsh-v0.2.1-rc.3` was already published to GHCR for an earlier
+**Container tags are immutable** in this project: re-pushing a tag would silently
-repository state. **Container tags are immutable** in this project: re-pushing a
+change what an existing deployment runs. A fix therefore publishes a new identity;
-tag would silently change what an existing deployment runs. The mirrored-DSH
+see the rules above.
-scheme therefore starts its first identity at `-r2`: the plain tag is
-conceptually revision 1 and is taken, so the first publishable repository
-revision at the same upstream ref is `r2`.
 
-The identity is stored in [versions.env](../versions.env) and consumed everywhere:
+The current identity is `dsh-v0.2.1-rc.5-r6`, the first release at this upstream
-the Dockerfile label, the example manifests, the Makefile and the release
+ref, so it carries no revision suffix. The identity is stored in
-workflow. The legacy `dsh-v0.2.1-rc.3` tag remains published but is not updated;
+[versions.env](../versions.env) and consumed everywhere: the Dockerfile labels
-new deployments use `dsh-v0.2.1-rc.3-r4`.
+(version and revision), the example manifests, the Makefile and the release
-
+workflow.
-The gateway image moved from the repository-level `:gateway` tag to a nested
-package (`<repository>/dsh-agents-as-a-service/gateway`). The release workflow
-also republishes the legacy `<repository>:gateway` tag as a deprecated
-compatibility alias; it may be removed in a later release, so deployments
-should pin the nested package.
 
 ## Channels
 
 | Channel | Image tag | Meaning |
 | --- | --- | --- |
-| Release | `dsh-v0.2.1-rc.3-r4` | The current immutable release identity. What production should pin (preferably by digest). |
+| Release | `dsh-v0.2.1-rc.5-r6` | The current immutable release identity. What production should pin (preferably by digest). |
 | `latest` | `latest` | Alias for the most recent release; moves only when a new release is published. |
-| `main` | `main` | Development channel, rebuilt from every push to `main`. Never treat it as a release; it exists so `main` can be tested. |
+| `main` | `main` | Development channel, rebuilt when image or gateway sources change on `main`. Never treat it as a release; it exists so `main` can be tested. |
 
 The same channels exist for every published package, including the nested
 example component image.
@@ -68,15 +60,28 @@ Values from [versions.env](../versions.env) at the current identity:
 | Component | Pin | Source |
 | --- | --- | --- |
 | Upstream DSH source | `DSH_REPO` | [versions.env](../versions.env) |
-| DSH ref | `dsh-v0.2.1-rc.3` | `DSH_VERSION` |
+| DSH ref | `dsh-v0.2.1-rc.5-r6` | `DSH_VERSION` |
-| Repository revision | `r4` | `RELEASE_REVISION` |
+| DSH commit | `b830ec950faba0a46dda564be3e2d854afed94f1` | `DSH_COMMIT`; the main image build fails unless the clone's `HEAD` matches |
+| Repository revision | `(empty)` | `RELEASE_REVISION` |
 | pnpm | `11.28.5` | `PNPM_VERSION` |
-| agent-sandbox (CRDs) | `v1.0.7` | `AGENT_SANDBOX_VERSION`, used by the examples and CI dry-run |
+| Node build image | `docker.io/node:24-trixie@sha256:8c761eca2bf7eec965f946cf47b8090143cb41f45f2f8699af0cc0298d2d2d19` | `NODE_BUILD_IMAGE`, digest-pinned |
+| Node runtime image | `docker.io/node:24-trixie-slim@sha256:54f84b4cf8432b21aaffd5d3ce8d41e12cea0d10d33c09d2f3c9879d49d6b446` | `NODE_RUNTIME_IMAGE`, digest-pinned |
+| Gateway Python image | `docker.io/python:3.12-slim@sha256:aa943ce411423c7582288f18707ff66eddcbaeb510502d747a72aeb34f30d159` | `GATEWAY_PYTHON_IMAGE`, digest-pinned |
+| agent-sandbox (CRDs) | `v1.0.9` | `AGENT_SANDBOX_VERSION`, used by the examples and CI dry-run |
 | Kubernetes Gateway API | `v1.2.1` | `GATEWAY_API_VERSION`, used by the SSO exposure variant |
-| oauth2-proxy | `quay.io/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy:v7.15.5` | `OAUTH2_PROXY_IMAGE` |
+| oauth2-proxy | `quay.io/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy:v7.15.5@sha256:8498b0d0ef0a7b29686414000a08aee467f02d0299c9ed1e006a8f33fc017916` | `OAUTH2_PROXY_IMAGE`, digest-pinned and used by the SSO exposure variant |
 | Main image | `ghcr.io/sredevopsorg/deepseek-kubernetes-sandbox` | `GHCR_IMAGE` |
 | Gateway image | `ghcr.io/sredevopsorg/deepseek-kubernetes-sandbox/dsh-agents-as-a-service/gateway` | `GATEWAY_IMAGE`, nested below `GHCR_IMAGE` |
 
+Every container base image is referenced as `name:tag@sha256:<index digest>`, not
+by tag alone: `check-versions.sh` rejects a pin without a digest, so a re-pushed
+tag cannot change what we build from. The example gateway's Python dependencies
+are fully hash-pinned in
+[requirements.txt](../examples/dsh-agents-as-a-service/gateway/requirements.txt)
+and
+[requirements-dev.txt](../examples/dsh-agents-as-a-service/gateway/requirements-dev.txt)
+and installed with `pip install --require-hashes`.
+
 Example component images are always nested below the main package:
 `<GHCR_IMAGE>/<example>/<component>`. `check-versions.sh` rejects an unrelated
 top-level package.
@@ -94,8 +99,15 @@ file to derive from it. Never edit the Dockerfile, manifests, Makefile or
 workflows with a literal version.
 
 - New upstream DSH ref: change `DSH_VERSION` and clear `RELEASE_REVISION`.
-- Repository-only change at the same DSH ref: keep `DSH_VERSION`, set
+  `set-version` resolves the new ref's commit with `git ls-remote` (peeled `^{}`
-  `RELEASE_REVISION=r(N+1)`.
+  commit first, tag ref as fallback) and rewrites `DSH_COMMIT` in `versions.env`,
+  the Dockerfile ARG default and `.env.sample`; the build then verifies it.
+- Repository-only change at the same DSH ref: keep `DSH_VERSION` and `DSH_COMMIT`,
+  set `RELEASE_REVISION=r(N+1)`.
+- Base images (Node and Python) are bumped by hand: change the tag *and* the
+  `@sha256:` digest in `versions.env` together, then run `make check` and a build.
+  There is deliberately no automated digest refresh, because a silent base-image
+  change is exactly what digest pinning exists to prevent.
 
 ## Release checklist
 
@@ -106,14 +118,16 @@ workflows with a literal version.
    the tag does not already exist, and previews the generated notes.
 5. Create and push the annotated `dsh-*` release tag (or dispatch
    `release.yaml` with an existing tag). The workflow validates that the tag
-   matches [versions.env](../versions.env).
+   matches [versions.env](../versions.env) and that the upstream ref still
+   resolves to `DSH_COMMIT` before building anything.
 6. The workflow builds and pushes multi-arch images for the main image and the
    example components (the identity tag plus `latest`), creates the GitHub
-   Release from the git-cliff notes, records the published digests, and opens a
+   Release from the git-cliff notes, and opens a `chore(changelog)` PR that
-   `chore(changelog)` PR that refreshes `CHANGELOG.md` on `main`.
+   refreshes `CHANGELOG.md` on `main`. The publish log shows each image manifest
+   and digest.
 7. Merge the changelog PR. Verify:
-   `docker buildx imagetools inspect <image>:<identity>` shows both platforms,
+   `docker buildx imagetools inspect <image>:<identity>` shows both platforms;
-   and the GitHub Release references the tag and the digest.
+   the GitHub Release references the tag, and the workflow log shows the digest.
 8. Announce the identity and the digest; deployments pin the digest.
 
 ## Rollback
@@ -149,11 +163,20 @@ make changelog   # regenerate CHANGELOG.md locally
 
 ## Digest pinning
 
-Release identities are mutable only in theory; deployments should still pin the
+Supply-chain inputs are pinned to immutable content, not to mutable tags:
-resolved digest for reproducibility and supply-chain safety:
+
+- **Build inputs**: every container base image is referenced by multi-arch index
+  digest in [versions.env](../versions.env), and the example gateway's Python
+  dependencies are hash-pinned (`--require-hashes`).
+- **Upstream source**: the Dockerfile clones `DSH_VERSION` and fails unless the
+  clone's `HEAD` equals `DSH_COMMIT`, so a moved upstream tag cannot change what
+  a rebuild packages.
+
+Release identities are immutable in theory; deployments should still pin the
+_resolved_ digest for reproducibility and supply-chain safety:
 
 ```bash
-docker buildx imagetools inspect ghcr.io/sredevopsorg/deepseek-kubernetes-sandbox:dsh-v0.2.1-rc.3-r4
+docker buildx imagetools inspect ghcr.io/sredevopsorg/deepseek-kubernetes-sandbox:dsh-v0.2.1-rc.5-r6
 # then, in the deployment:
 #   image: ghcr.io/sredevopsorg/deepseek-kubernetes-sandbox@sha256:<digest>
 ```

docs/workflow-security.md

@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+# Workflow security (GitHub Actions)
+
+The CI/CD surface lives entirely in [`.github/workflows/`](../.github/workflows/)
+and runs on GitHub-hosted runners. This page describes the controls those
+workflows enforce and records the most recent audit. They complement the threat
+notes in [SECURITY.md](../SECURITY.md) and the release procedure in
+[versioning.md](versioning.md).
+
+## Controls
+
+| Control | Where | What it does |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| Least-privilege tokens | Every workflow | A top-level `permissions:` block defaults to read-only; `packages: write`, `contents: write`, `id-token: write` and `attestations: write` are granted only to the jobs that publish images, attestations or releases. |
+| Pinned actions | Every `uses:` | Third-party actions and reusable workflows are pinned to a full 40-character commit SHA (the version is kept in the trailing comment). Dependabot updates the pins weekly. The only unpinned reference is the in-repository `./.github/workflows/_build-image.yaml`. |
+| No privileged untrusted triggers | Trigger blocks | No workflow uses `pull_request_target` or `workflow_run`. PR-triggered workflows run untrusted code with a read-only token and no secrets. |
+| Untrusted input is data | `release.yaml` | The release tag (from a tag push or `workflow_dispatch` input) is passed through `env:` and read as a shell variable; it is never interpolated into a `run:` script, so metacharacters in a tag name cannot execute. |
+| Checkout credential hygiene | Checkout steps | `persist-credentials: false` is set wherever the job does not need to push. The changelog job keeps credentials because it pushes a branch and opens a PR with `GITHUB_TOKEN`. |
+| Download integrity | `ci.yaml`, `release.yaml` | actionlint, hadolint and git-cliff are downloaded with `curl --proto '=https'` and verified against a pinned SHA-256 with `sha256sum -c` before execution. |
+| Cluster manifest integrity | `ci-manifests.yaml`, `e2e-kind.yaml` | The agent-sandbox and Gateway API release manifests are downloaded and checked against the `*_MANIFEST_SHA256` pins in [versions.env](../versions.env) before `kubectl apply`. |
+| Log and artifact hygiene | `ci-image.yaml`, `e2e-kind.yaml` | Pod logs are truncated and token material is redacted before logs are printed or diagnostic files are uploaded as artifacts. |
+| Supply-chain monitoring | Repository settings | Dependabot (GitHub Actions, pip, Docker), CodeQL advanced setup and the dependency-review action run on every applicable change. CODEOWNERS covers the whole repository, including `.github/workflows/`. |
+
+## Maintaining the pins
+
+- The tool versions and their SHA-256 digests live together in the install step
+  (`ACTIONLINT_SHA256`, `HADOLINT_SHA256`, `GIT_CLIFF_SHA256`); update both
+  values when bumping a version.
+- Control-plane versions are in `versions.env`; update
+  `AGENT_SANDBOX_MANIFEST_SHA256` or `GATEWAY_API_MANIFEST_SHA256` together with
+  the corresponding version, otherwise CI fails the digest check by design.
+- GitHub Actions pins are updated by Dependabot; never replace a SHA with a tag.
+
+## Audit record (2026-10-30)
+
+Scope: all 11 workflows under `.github/workflows/`, plus `.github/CODEOWNERS`
+and `.github/dependabot.yml`. Findings are grouped by the categories in
+GitHub's [Secure use reference](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/reference/security/secure-use).
+
+| # | Category | File | Severity | Finding | Status |
+| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
+| 1 | Script injection | `release.yaml` | High | Tag name / dispatch input interpolated into a privileged `run:` block | Fixed: passed through `env` |
+| 2 | Token permissions | `release.yaml` | Medium | `meta` and `tests` inherited workflow-level write scopes | Fixed: workflow default is `contents: read` |
+| 3 | Token permissions | `build-main.yaml`, `build-gateway.yaml` | Low | `meta` inherited `packages`/`id-token`/`attestations` write | Fixed: workflow default is `contents: read` |
+| 4 | Checkout | `_build-image.yaml` | Low | Checkout persisted the token in `.git/config` | Fixed: `persist-credentials: false` |
+| 5 | Checkout | `codeql.yml` | Low | Checkout persisted the token in `.git/config` | Fixed: `persist-credentials: false` |
+| 6 | Supply chain | `ci.yaml` | Medium | actionlint and hadolint were executed without a checksum | Fixed: pinned SHA-256 verified before install |
+| 7 | Supply chain | `release.yaml` | Medium | git-cliff was executed without a checksum in the release job | Fixed: pinned SHA-256 verified before install |
+| 8 | Supply chain | `ci-manifests.yaml`, `e2e-kind.yaml` | Medium | Upstream CRD/controller manifests applied without integrity checks | Fixed: pinned SHA-256 in `versions.env` |
+| 9 | Secret hygiene | `e2e-kind.yaml` | Low | Raw gateway logs uploaded in a 7-day artifact | Fixed: `token=` values redacted |
+| 10 | Repository controls | Repository settings | Low | No environment approval gate on publishing; single CODEOWNER | Recommendation: see below |
+
+Checked and clean: no `pull_request_target`/`workflow_run`, no self-hosted
+runners, all third-party actions pinned, PR workflows read-only, no secrets in
+workflow files, no secret interpolation into scripts.
+
+## Residual recommendations (repository settings)
+
+These cannot be enforced from workflow files alone:
+
+- Add a protected `release` environment with required reviewers and attach it to
+  the `build-main`, `build-gateway` and `publish-release` jobs. This requires the
+  environment to exist in repository settings first, so it is intentionally not
+  wired into the workflow yet.
+- Keep "Allow GitHub Actions to create and approve pull requests" limited to
+  creating PRs (the changelog job needs create, not approve).
+- Require review from Code Owners for `.github/workflows/` and add a second
+  owner so workflow changes are never single-person.
+- Optionally run OpenSSF Scorecard on a schedule for continuous checks on these
+  controls.

examples/README.md

@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ reference material, not libraries.
 | [`examples/minimal-single-tenant/`](minimal-single-tenant/) | The smallest useful setup: a single `SandboxTemplate` and one `SandboxClaim`, no gateway — reach DSH Web with a launch-token URL through `kubectl port-forward`. | agent-sandbox with extensions. |
 
 The multi-tenant example also documents opt-in gVisor, `nodeSelector`,
-NetworkPolicy and extra provider-key hardening in
+NetworkPolicy, extra provider-key hardening and failed-Pod recovery in
 [optional hardening](dsh-agents-as-a-service/docs/optional-hardening.md).
 
 ## The example contract (short version)
@@ -19,37 +19,26 @@ NetworkPolicy and extra provider-key hardening in
 Full rules: [docs/examples.md](../docs/examples.md). `scripts/check-examples.sh`
 enforces the layout, and `make check` runs it.
 
-```
+- `README.md` is the walkthrough; `manifests/NN-*.yaml` is applied with plain
-examples/<name>/
+  kubectl and read in order.
-+-- README.md                  # walkthrough: prerequisites, steps, troubleshooting, cleanup
+- Optional `manifests/optional/<feature>/` and `manifests/exposure/<variant>/`
-+-- manifests/                 # NN-*.yaml, applied with plain kubectl
+  each ship a README; exposure variants are mutually exclusive.
-|   +-- optional/<feature>/    # optional opt-in manifests...
+- Optional `scripts/` must be executable, idempotent and self-cleaning; `docs/`
-|   +-- optional/README.md     # ...required whenever optional/ exists
+  holds deeper material.
-|   +-- exposure/<variant>/    # optional per-variant manifests...
+- Components with a Dockerfile need a README and tests; images are published
-|   +-- exposure/README.md     # ...required whenever exposure/ exists
+  nested below the main image (`<registry>/<owner>/<repo>/<example>/<component>`).
-+-- scripts/                   # optional executable, idempotent, self-cleaning *.sh
+- Secrets are `*.yaml.example` with placeholders; every example is listed above
-+-- docs/                      # optional architecture/ADR material
+  with its literal `examples/<name>/` path.
-+-- <component>/               # optional component with Dockerfile + README + tests
-```
-
-- Secrets never ship populated: use `*.yaml.example` files with placeholders.
-- Manifests are numbered (`00-`, `10-`, ...) and read as an ordered walkthrough.
-- Component images are published nested below the main image:
-  `<registry>/<owner>/<repo>/<example>/<component>`.
-- Every example must be listed above with its literal `examples/<name>/` path.
-- Scripts under `scripts/` must be executable, idempotent and clean up after
-  themselves.
 
 ## Running an example
 
-```bash
+Each example README has the exact prerequisites, commands, optional hardening,
-# e.g. the multi-tenant platform example
+exposure options and teardown. The multi-tenant example also has a full kind
-kubectl apply -f examples/dsh-agents-as-a-service/manifests/
+walkthrough that cleans up after itself:
 
-# or run the whole walkthrough (kind + agent-sandbox required) and let it clean up
+```bash
 examples/dsh-agents-as-a-service/scripts/e2e-kind.sh
 ```
 
 `kubectl apply -f manifests/` is non-recursive: `optional/` and `exposure/`
-subdirectories are applied explicitly. Each example README has the exact
+subdirectories are applied explicitly.
-prerequisites, optional hardening, exposure options and teardown.

examples/dsh-agents-as-a-service/README.md

@@ -6,16 +6,19 @@ platform pattern into pure agent-sandbox resources + kubectl, running **DeepSeek
 Harness Web (DSH)** instead of Hermes. Every user of such a platform gets a
 personal, long-lived DSH Web instance that is **provisioned in ~2 seconds from a
 warm pool, suspended when idle to save cost, and woken transparently when the
-user returns** — with all state (conversations, sessions, config) surviving on a
+user returns** — with all state (conversations, sessions, config, and the agent
-per-user PVC at `/home/node/.dsh`.
+workspace) surviving on the per-user PVC at `/home/node/.dsh` + `/workspace`.
+Suspend-when-idle plus the warm pool keep cost proportional to use: a return
+after absence pays a short cold-start pause, not an always-on instance.
 
 It ships in three layers:
 
 1. **The resource layer** (steps 1–7): pure manifests + kubectl, so every
    mechanism is visible.
 2. **The service layer** (step 8): a small included **gateway** (`gateway/`) that
-   makes the platform browser-usable — a signup page/API, `HttpOnly` cookie
+   makes the platform browser-usable — a signup page/API, revocable server-side
-   sessions, a `/u/{user}/**` proxy for HTTP **and WebSocket** that transparently
+   **opaque-cookie sessions**, auth rate limiting and an optional signup invite
+   code, a `/u/{user}/**` proxy for HTTP **and WebSocket** that transparently
    **wakes suspended instances on connect**, and an idle sweeper that suspends
    them again. The gateway performs the DSH launch-token handshake server-side,
    so the browser never sees the token.
@@ -46,7 +49,7 @@ What it demonstrates, feature by feature:
 
 | agent-sandbox feature | Role in the platform |
 | --- | --- |
-| `SandboxTemplate` with `volumeClaimTemplates` | Identical DSH pods; per-user state on a PVC at `/home/node/.dsh` |
+| `SandboxTemplate` with `volumeClaimTemplates` | Identical DSH pods; per-user state at `/home/node/.dsh` and the agent workspace at `/workspace`, on one PVC (the workspace is a `subPath` mount, so DSH state stays private) |
 | `envVarsInjectionPolicy` / `volumeClaimTemplatesPolicy: Disallowed` | Claims that would bypass the warm pool are **rejected loudly**, not cold-started silently |
 | `service: true` | Stable per-sandbox DNS (`status.serviceFQDN`) for the gateway to route on |
 | `SandboxWarmPool` | Signup latency is pre-paid: image pull, PVC provision, DSH boot all happen before any user exists |
@@ -63,12 +66,13 @@ What it demonstrates, feature by feature:
   upstream instead of splitting `/v1/*` (API) from the dashboard.
 - **Shared provider keys**: `DEEPSEEK_API_KEY` plus any keys in the optional
   `dsh-provider-keys-extra` Secret are injected via `envFrom` into every
-  sandbox. There is no per-tenant key, dashboard basic-auth, session-cookie
+  sandbox. There is no per-tenant key, dashboard basic-auth, signed-session
-  secret, or API-server key.
+  secret (sessions are opaque server-side ids), or API-server key.
 - **Launch-token handshake**: DSH gates `/` behind a token it prints only in its
   logs. The gateway reads it, performs the handshake, and keeps the resulting
   auth cookie server-side; the browser authenticates to the gateway with its own
-  cookie. See [How the DSH handshake works](#how-the-dsh-handshake-works).
+  opaque session cookie, never the token. See
+  [How the DSH handshake works](#how-the-dsh-handshake-works).
 - **Host allow-list**: DSH rejects unknown `Host` headers. The gateway forwards
   the browser's `Host`, so the public hostname must be added to
   `DSH_TRUSTED_HOSTS` in the template.
@@ -79,12 +83,14 @@ What it demonstrates, feature by feature:
 
 ## Prerequisites
 
+Run the walkthrough from this example's directory (`examples/dsh-agents-as-a-service/`).
+
 - A Kubernetes cluster with a default StorageClass (kind and GKE both work as-is).
 - agent-sandbox with extensions installed:
 
   ```bash
-  VERSION=v1.0.7   # AGENT_SANDBOX_VERSION in versions.env
+  . ../../versions.env
-  kubectl apply -f https://github.com/kubernetes-sigs/agent-sandbox/releases/download/$VERSION/sandbox-with-extensions.yaml
+  kubectl apply -f "https://github.com/kubernetes-sigs/agent-sandbox/releases/download/${AGENT_SANDBOX_VERSION}/sandbox-with-extensions.yaml"
   kubectl -n agent-sandbox-system rollout status deployment --timeout=180s
   ```
 
@@ -201,9 +207,30 @@ kubectl -n dsh-demo port-forward "pod/$SB" 18081:3080
 ## 4. Write state on the PVC
 
 ```bash
+kubectl -n dsh-demo exec "$SB" -- printenv HOME                        # /workspace
 kubectl -n dsh-demo exec "$SB" -- sh -c 'echo "remember me" > /home/node/.dsh/marker.txt'
+kubectl -n dsh-demo exec "$SB" -- sh -c 'echo "remember me too" > /workspace/marker.txt'
 ```
 
+`/workspace` (the DSH image's `WORKDIR`, where agents keep files) is the same
+`dsh-home` PVC mounted again with `subPath: workspace`. The two trees stay
+separate, so `.credentials.yaml` and the session store are never part of the
+agent-visible workspace.
+
+The template also sets `HOME=/workspace`. DSH's directory picker (the folder
+explorer used to choose a workspace) has no start-path setting: when it opens,
+its browse backend lists `$HOME`, so with the image default (`/home/node`, which
+is not on a volume) it would start outside the persisted tree. Pointing `HOME`
+at the workspace makes the picker open on it (labelled *Home* in its breadcrumbs)
+and makes `~` in agent commands mean `/workspace`. The trade-off is that tools
+keeping caches or config under `$HOME` (`npm`/`pnpm`, `uv`, `git`, `gh`, and
+DSH's global `~/.agents` instructions and skills) write dotfiles onto the PVC
+inside the agent workspace, where the agent and the file explorer can see them.
+`DSH_HOME` is explicit (`/home/node/.dsh`), so sessions, config and credentials
+are unaffected. Pod env is stamped when a sandbox is created: a sandbox from
+before this setting keeps `HOME=/home/node` until it is recreated (see
+[Troubleshooting](#troubleshooting)).
+
 ## 5. Suspend: delete the pod, keep the PVC + Service
 
 ```bash
@@ -219,13 +246,12 @@ kubectl -n dsh-demo get svc "$SB"            # still here
 kubectl -n dsh-demo patch sandbox "$SB" --type merge -p '{"spec":{"operatingMode":"Running"}}'
 kubectl -n dsh-demo wait sandbox "$SB" --for=condition=Ready --timeout=180s
 kubectl -n dsh-demo exec "$SB" -- cat /home/node/.dsh/marker.txt   # "remember me"
+kubectl -n dsh-demo exec "$SB" -- cat /workspace/marker.txt        # "remember me too"
 ```
 
-> **Why resume works:** the pod template sets `fsGroupChangePolicy: OnRootMismatch`.
+> **Why resume works:** the pod template sets `fsGroupChangePolicy: OnRootMismatch`;
-> DSH requires its `.credentials.yaml` to be `0600`, while the kubelet's default
+> without it the kubelet widens `.credentials.yaml` to `0660` and DSH crash-loops.
-> fsGroup policy widens every file to `0660` on each pod start — a resumed sandbox
+> See [Troubleshooting](#troubleshooting) for the one-time fix on older sandboxes.
-> would crash-loop. See [Troubleshooting](#troubleshooting) for the one-time fix
-> on sandboxes created before this setting existed.
 
 ## 7. Injection policy rejects env-carrying claims
 
@@ -244,13 +270,13 @@ kubectl delete -f manifests/40-claim-rejected.yaml
 ```bash
 # Published image (on kind, load it into the cluster; on a real cluster the
 # kubelet pulls it from GHCR):
-GW=ghcr.io/sredevopsorg/deepseek-kubernetes-sandbox/dsh-agents-as-a-service/gateway:dsh-v0.2.1-rc.3-r4
+GW=ghcr.io/sredevopsorg/deepseek-kubernetes-sandbox/dsh-agents-as-a-service/gateway:dsh-v0.2.1-rc.5-r6
 docker pull "$GW"
 kind load docker-image "$GW" --name <kind-cluster>
 
 # ... or build it locally and tag it exactly as manifests/50-gateway.yaml
 # expects (make gateway builds dsh-aaas-gateway:dev):
-make gateway
+make -C ../.. gateway
 docker tag dsh-aaas-gateway:dev "$GW"
 kind load docker-image "$GW" --name <kind-cluster>
 
@@ -261,6 +287,15 @@ kubectl -n dsh-demo port-forward svc/dsh-gateway 18080:8080
 
 > The gateway binds `8080`; the local port-forward uses `18080` and never `3080`.
 >
+> **Cookie/TLS guard.** The base manifest serves plain HTTP through port-forward,
+> so it sets `COOKIE_SECURE=false` **and** `ALLOW_INSECURE_COOKIES=1`. The gateway
+> refuses to start when `COOKIE_SECURE=false` unless
+> `ALLOW_INSECURE_COOKIES=1` explicitly acknowledges that the session cookie
+> travels in clear text; that prevents an HTTPS deployment from silently serving
+> an insecure cookie. Before exposing the gateway over TLS, set
+> `COOKIE_SECURE=true` and remove the acknowledgement:
+> `kubectl -n dsh-demo set env deploy/dsh-gateway COOKIE_SECURE=true ALLOW_INSECURE_COOKIES-`.
+>
 > **Image pull policy.** `manifests/50-gateway.yaml` uses
 > `imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent` with the release identity, so a locally built
 > image must be loaded into the cluster under exactly that name (kind:
@@ -293,25 +328,40 @@ kubectl -n dsh-demo port-forward svc/dsh-gateway 18080:8080
 
 ### Browser flow
 
-Open <http://localhost:18080>. The landing page has a one-field signup form.
+Open <http://localhost:18080>. The landing page has a one-field signup form (plus
-Enter `bob`, and the gateway:
+an invite-code field when `SIGNUP_INVITE_CODE` is configured). Enter `bob`, and
+the gateway:
 
-1. creates the `SandboxClaim` over the warm pool,
+1. enforces the auth rate limit and, if configured, the signup invite code,
-2. waits for it to become `Ready`,
+2. creates the `SandboxClaim` over the warm pool,
-3. sets an `HttpOnly`, `SameSite=Lax` cookie `dsh_gw_session=<user>:<token>` on
+3. waits for it to become `Ready`,
-   the browser,
+4. mints a random, server-side session (the cookie value is an opaque `sid`, not
-4. redirects to `/u/bob/`, where the DSH Web UI loads through the gateway.
+   a user name and not a token), stores `sid -> (user, expiry)` in memory, and
+   sets the `HttpOnly`, `SameSite=Lax` cookie `dsh_gw_session=<sid>` on the
+   browser (`__Host-dsh_gw_session` when `COOKIE_SECURE=true`),
+5. redirects to `/u/bob/`, where the DSH Web UI loads through the gateway.
 
 From then on every request under `/u/bob/` (assets, API calls, SSE, WebSocket) is
 proxied to bob's sandbox. The DSH launch token and DSH's own auth cookie stay in
-the gateway; the browser only holds the gateway cookie.
+the gateway; the browser only holds the opaque gateway session id. The cookie is
+useless as a bearer token.
+
+**Sessions are revocable and mostly short-lived in practice.** `POST /logout`,
+deleting the user, `POST /recreate` and cookie expiry (default 7 days,
+`COOKIE_MAX_AGE`) invalidate the server-side session. The session table lives in
+gateway memory, so **restarting the gateway logs every browser out** — expected
+for this single-replica demo; a production deployment needs a shared session
+store and sticky routing or per-request re-authentication. With SSO enabled, the
+gateway mints a session for the identity oauth2-proxy asserts instead of asking
+for a token.
 
 The same flow with `curl`, no JavaScript (the session cookie is the only
 credential):
 
 ```bash
 JAR=$(mktemp)
-# signup (form POST, exactly what the landing page sends)
+# signup (form POST, exactly what the landing page sends); add -d 'invite=...'
+# when SIGNUP_INVITE_CODE is configured, or send X-Signup-Invite
 curl -s -i -c "$JAR" -H 'Origin: http://localhost:18080' \
   -d 'user=bob' http://localhost:18080/users
 # proxy: bob's DSH Web through the gateway
@@ -320,52 +370,54 @@ curl -s -b "$JAR" http://localhost:18080/u/bob/ | head -5
 curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' http://localhost:18080/u/bob/   # 401
 # derived state: Ready / Waking / Suspended / ...
 curl -s -b "$JAR" http://localhost:18080/users/bob
-# delete bob (cascades sandbox + PVC)
+# sign out (revokes the server-side session)
+curl -s -b "$JAR" -H 'Origin: http://localhost:18080' -X POST http://localhost:18080/logout
+# delete bob (cascades sandbox + PVC and revokes every session for bob)
 curl -s -b "$JAR" -H 'Origin: http://localhost:18080' -X DELETE http://localhost:18080/users/bob
 ```
 
 API clients that prefer bearer tokens can use `POST /users` with a JSON body
 (`{"user":"bob"}`) and the returned one-time token, `POST /login` to exchange a
-token for a cookie, and `Authorization: Bearer <token>` on subsequent calls.
+token for a cookie, and `Authorization: Bearer <token>` on subsequent calls. A
+cookie/session value is never accepted as a bearer token, and a token for one
+user cannot read another user's path.
 
-### Gateway API
+### Auth abuse controls and proxy limits
 
-| Route | Purpose |
+The gateway is a single process, so these limits are per replica. They stop
-| --- | --- |
+casual abuse and one tenant monopolizing the service; an internet-facing
-| `GET /healthz` | Liveness/readiness; no cluster access |
+deployment still needs ingress-level rate limiting and an audit trail.
-| `GET /` | Landing page: signup, token login, logout. With SSO it auto-provisions and connects instead. |
-| `POST /users` | Signup. JSON or form; `201` (JSON), `202` (waking), `303` (browser redirect), `409` if user exists; sets the session cookie |
-| `POST /login` | Exchange a bearer token for the session cookie |
-| `POST /logout` | Clear the session cookie |
-| `POST /recreate` | SSO only: delete the authenticated user's claim (wiping workspace data) and provision a fresh one; `303` to `/u/{user}/`. Cookie-authenticated calls must be same-origin. |
-| `GET /users/{user}` | Derived state (`Ready`/`Waking`/`Suspended`) |
-| `DELETE /users/{user}` | Delete claim (cascades sandbox + PVC) |
-| `GET /u/{user}` | `308` redirect to `/u/{user}/` |
-| `GET /u/{user}/**` | HTTP/SSE proxy to the user's DSH Web |
-| `WS /u/{user}/**` | WebSocket proxy to the user's DSH Web |
 
-The full API reference, configuration table, auth semantics and failure matrix
+| Setting | Default | Behavior |
-live in the [gateway README](gateway/README.md).
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| `AUTH_RATE_LIMIT` / `AUTH_RATE_WINDOW` | `30` per `60` s | Throttles `/users` and `/login` per client (rightmost `X-Forwarded-For` when behind a proxy, else the TCP peer) and answers `429` + `Retry-After` before reading the body or touching the cluster. `0` disables it. The base manifest sets it explicitly. |
+| `SIGNUP_INVITE_CODE` | unset | When set, `POST /users` requires the code as form field `invite` or header `X-Signup-Invite` (constant-time compare, `403` before user lookup). Put it in a Secret and restart the gateway to rotate. |
+| `MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PER_USER` | `32` | Caps concurrent proxied requests + WebSockets per user; excess HTTP gets `503` + `Retry-After`, excess WebSocket upgrades close with `1011`. |
+| `WS_MAX_MESSAGE_BYTES` | `16 MiB` | Largest WebSocket message received from DSH; oversized frames close the connection. Browser-to-DSH frames are bounded by uvicorn's own limit. HTTP/SSE streaming is not capped by this. |
+| `MAX_BODY_MB` | `32` | Largest proxied HTTP request body (`413`). |
+
+The gateway also strips client-supplied `Forwarded`, `X-Forwarded-User` and
+`X-Auth-Request-*` headers (and `x-forwarded-*` / `x-auth-request-*` prefixes)
+before proxying, so a tenant cannot inject identity or spoof hop headers into
+DSH. `UPSTREAM_HEADER_ALLOWLIST` can replace that denylist with an explicit
+comma-separated allowlist. See the [gateway README](gateway/README.md) for the
+full configuration.
+
+### Gateway routes
+
+The browser flow above uses the gateway's main routes. The full route table,
+status codes, configuration and failure matrix live in the
+[gateway README](gateway/README.md).
 
 ### How the DSH handshake works
 
-DSH does not expose an API for its launch token; it prints a URL containing
+DSH prints its launch token only in pod logs. The gateway resolves
-`?token=…` in the pod logs. For each `(user, pod UID, Host)` the gateway:
+claim → sandbox → pod, reads the pod-log tail, performs the `?token=` handshake
-
+under the browser's `Host`, caches `dsh-auth-*` per `(user, pod UID, Host)`, and
-1. resolves the claim → sandbox → pod (annotation `agents.x-k8s.io/pod-name`, or
+refreshes once on a `401`. That is why its RBAC includes `pods` `get`/`list` and
-   the sandbox name as pod name),
+`pods/log` `get`; it is also the most fragile part of the design (see
-2. reads the pod's logs (last `DSH_LOG_TAIL_LINES` lines) and parses the most
+[Limitations](#limitations) and the
-   recent `dsh web: …?token=…` line,
+[architecture ADR](docs/architecture.md#adr-3-server-side-launch-token-handshake-instead-of-exposing-the-token)).
-3. requests `http://<serviceFQDN>:3080/?token=…` with the browser's `Host`,
-4. captures DSH's `dsh-auth-*` `Set-Cookie` response and caches it,
-5. injects that cookie (and strips the browser's `Cookie`/`Authorization` and any
-   `?token=`) on every proxied HTTP and WebSocket request,
-6. refreshes the handshake once if DSH answers `401`, and drops the cached cookie
-   when the sandbox suspends or is deleted.
-
-This is why the gateway's RBAC includes `pods` `get`/`list` and `pods/log`
-`get`. It is also the most fragile part of the design; see
-[Limitations](#limitations).
 
 ### DSH_TRUSTED_HOSTS
 
@@ -384,27 +436,21 @@ The same applies to a local `docker run`: the printed token URL uses
 
 ### WebSocket
 
-The gateway is a Starlette ASGI app and proxies WebSocket upgrades with a
+The gateway proxies WebSocket upgrades with a bidirectional pump, so the DSH web
-bidirectional pump, so the DSH web GUI is fully interactive. Requirements:
+GUI is fully interactive. The entry point must pass `Upgrade`/`Connection`
-
-- the ingress/load balancer in front of the gateway must pass `Upgrade`/`Connection`
 headers; [`manifests/exposure/ingress/60-ingress.yaml`](manifests/exposure/ingress/60-ingress.yaml)
-  is a starting point (Traefik handles upgrades by default),
+is a starting point (Traefik handles upgrades by default). Idle suspension is
-- idle suspension is disabled for users with in-flight proxied requests or open
+disabled while a proxied request or socket is in flight, so a long-running turn is
-  WebSockets, so a long-running chat stream is not cut off mid-turn,
+not cut off.
-- the upstream upgrade dials the sandbox **pod IP**, forwards no `Host`/`Origin`,
+
-  and performs the launch-token handshake under that same `pod-IP:3080` authority.
+The upstream upgrade dials the sandbox **pod IP**, forwards no `Host`/`Origin`,
-  DSH fences on `Host` (only its bind address, loopback, or an allow-listed host
+and performs the launch-token handshake under the same `pod-IP:3080` authority.
-  passes) and binds its auth cookie to the request authority
+Missing or cross-origin auth closes with `4401`; upstream bridging failures close
-  (`payload.authority === authority`), while `websockets` derives `Host` from the
+with `1011`, as does exceeding `MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PER_USER` (per-user socket cap).
-  URI and cannot be overridden. A browser-host cookie or forwarded origin makes
+Messages received from DSH larger than `WS_MAX_MESSAGE_BYTES` (16 MiB by
-  the upgrade fail (`401`/`403`, surfaced as close `1011`), which the client
+default) close the connection instead of being buffered; browser-to-DSH frames
-  retries forever as `[connection] connection lost, retry #N`,
+are bounded by uvicorn's own limit. See the
-- missing/invalid gateway auth is rejected right after the upgrade with close code
+[gateway README](gateway/README.md#proxy-failure-semantics) for the full matrix.
-  `4401` (WebSocket auth has no HTTP `401` path); cross-origin or Origin-less
-  upgrades with the cookie are rejected the same way (CSWSH protection), so
-  clients must send a matching `Origin`; upstream bridging failures close with
-  `1011`.
 
 ### Path routing
 
@@ -428,33 +474,27 @@ not a stack. Details, commands and the switch procedure are in the
 Both variants also ship NetworkPolicies: `ingress/61-networkpolicy.yaml` limits
 gateway ingress to Traefik pods, and `gateway-api-sso/75-networkpolicies.yaml`
 limits the gateway to oauth2-proxy and oauth2-proxy egress to DNS, public HTTPS
-and the gateway. They are part of the variant; see the
+and the gateway. They are part of the variant **and required for production**:
-[exposure README](manifests/exposure/README.md) and
+an exposure applied without its policy is demo-only. The sandbox side needs a
-[optional hardening](docs/optional-hardening.md).
+separate policy, and the gateway needs an egress policy; both are covered in
+[optional hardening](docs/optional-hardening.md) (see the production checklist)
+and summarized in the [exposure README](manifests/exposure/README.md).
 
 ### Option A — plain Ingress (gateway's own session auth)
 
-```bash
+1. Set the Ingress host/TLS (or drop the `tls:` block), and set
-# Replace the dsh.example.com host and TLS Secret (or drop the tls: block for
+   `DSH_TRUSTED_HOSTS` in `manifests/10-sandboxtemplate.yaml` to the same public
-# plain HTTP), then:
+   host; re-apply the template.
-kubectl apply -f manifests/exposure/ingress/
+2. Set `COOKIE_SECURE=true` and drop the plain-HTTP acknowledgement once the
-```
+   Ingress serves HTTPS:
-
+   `kubectl -n dsh-demo set env deploy/dsh-gateway COOKIE_SECURE=true ALLOW_INSECURE_COOKIES-`.
-1. Set `DSH_TRUSTED_HOSTS` in `manifests/10-sandboxtemplate.yaml` to the same
+3. `kubectl apply -f manifests/exposure/ingress/`; verify
-   public host (the gateway forwards the browser's `Host`) and re-apply the
+   `curl -sI https://<host>/healthz` returns `200`.
-   template.
-2. Set `COOKIE_SECURE=true` on the gateway once the Ingress serves HTTPS:
-   `kubectl -n dsh-demo set env deploy/dsh-gateway COOKIE_SECURE=true`.
-   (The base manifest keeps `false` so the plain-HTTP port-forward demo works.)
-3. Verify: `curl -sI https://<host>/healthz` returns `200`; sign up in a browser
-   at `https://<host>/`.
-4. `manifests/exposure/ingress/61-networkpolicy.yaml` is part of this variant:
-   it allows only Traefik pods to reach the gateway on `8080`. Adjust its
-   selector if your ingress controller uses a different pod label or
-   `hostNetwork`; if kubelet probes fail, see the hardening doc.
 
 Keep the router free of buffering/compression middlewares: they break WebSocket
-upgrades and streaming.
+upgrades and streaming. The variant's `61-networkpolicy.yaml` allows only Traefik
+pods to reach the gateway; see the [exposure README](manifests/exposure/README.md)
+for selector and probe caveats.
 
 ### Option B — Gateway API + GitHub SSO (oauth2-proxy)
 
@@ -464,99 +504,86 @@ front of **oauth2-proxy**, which authenticates the browser against GitHub
 `X-Forwarded-User` set. The gateway trusts that header only when
 `AUTH_PROXY_HEADER` is set (SSO is **opt-in**).
 
-Prerequisites:
+1. Install Gateway API CRDs and a Gateway implementation; the manifests assume
-
+   `gatewayClassName: traefik` (the CRD version is `GATEWAY_API_VERSION` in
-- Gateway API CRDs and a Gateway implementation; the manifests assume
+   `versions.env`).
-  `gatewayClassName: traefik` (the CRD version is pinned as
+2. Create a GitHub OAuth App whose homepage/callback match the public FQDN, and
-  `GATEWAY_API_VERSION` in `versions.env`).
+   create the oauth2-proxy and TLS Secrets from
-- A GitHub OAuth App whose homepage/callback match the public FQDN
+   `73-oauth2-proxy-secret.yaml.example` and `74-tls-secret.yaml.example`.
-  (`https://<host>/` and `https://<host>/oauth2/callback`).
+3. Replace `dsh-demo.example.com` and `your-github-org` in the variant
-- The oauth2-proxy credentials Secret (template:
+   manifests, set `DSH_TRUSTED_HOSTS` in the template, and enable SSO:
-  `73-oauth2-proxy-secret.yaml.example`) and a TLS Secret for the Gateway
+   `kubectl -n dsh-demo set env deploy/dsh-gateway AUTH_PROXY_HEADER=X-Forwarded-User COOKIE_SECURE=true ALLOW_INSECURE_COOKIES-`.
-  listener (template: `74-tls-secret.yaml.example`).
+4. `kubectl apply -f manifests/exposure/gateway-api-sso/`; then run
-
+   [`scripts/preflight-sso.sh`](scripts/preflight-sso.sh) and fix everything it
-Steps:
+   reports **before** pointing real traffic at the Gateway. It verifies the
-
+   Secrets (including a valid oauth2-proxy cookie secret length), the gateway's
-```bash
+   `AUTH_PROXY_HEADER`/`COOKIE_SECURE`, that the Gateway's TLS certificate
-# 1. Real Secrets; the committed *.yaml.example files are templates only.
+   reference resolves, and that no `your-github-org`/`dsh-demo.example.com`
-kubectl -n dsh-demo create secret generic oauth2-proxy \
+   placeholder was left applied. Full verification steps are in the
-  --from-literal=client-id='<GitHub OAuth App client ID>' \
+   [exposure README](manifests/exposure/README.md).
-  --from-literal=client-secret='<GitHub OAuth App client secret>' \
-  --from-literal=cookie-secret="$(python3 -c 'import secrets; print(secrets.token_urlsafe(32))')"
-kubectl -n dsh-demo create secret tls dsh-demo-tls --cert=tls.crt --key=tls.key
-
-# 2. Replace dsh-demo.example.com (70/71/72) and your-github-org (72).
-
-# 3. Enable SSO on the gateway and trust the public host in the template.
-kubectl -n dsh-demo set env deploy/dsh-gateway \
-  AUTH_PROXY_HEADER=X-Forwarded-User COOKIE_SECURE=true
-#    ... and set DSH_TRUSTED_HOSTS=dsh-demo.example.com in
-#    manifests/10-sandboxtemplate.yaml, then re-apply the template.
-
-# 4. Apply the variant.
-kubectl apply -f manifests/exposure/gateway-api-sso/
-```
-
-Verification:
-
-```bash
-kubectl get gateway dsh-gateway -n dsh-demo -o yaml        # Programmed=True
-kubectl get httproute -n dsh-demo -o wide                  # backend oauth2-proxy:4180, Accepted
-kubectl get deploy oauth2-proxy -n dsh-demo                # 1/1 Ready
-kubectl get endpoints oauth2-proxy -n dsh-demo             # backend present
-kubectl -n dsh-demo logs deploy/oauth2-proxy --tail=50     # no config errors
-```
-
-Browser check: open `https://<host>/` — you are redirected to GitHub, and after
-signing in as a member of the allowed organization the gateway auto-provisions
-your sandbox (the first page can show `Provisioning`) and connects you. A
-non-member is denied before reaching the gateway. GitHub logins are lowercase
-DNS-1123 labels, so they map 1:1 onto the gateway's `user` validation. The SSO
-landing page also offers **Recreate sandbox** (`POST /recreate`), which deletes
-the claim — wiping the workspace PVC — and provisions a fresh one.
-
-Sign-out: the gateway `/logout` clears `dsh_gw_session`; oauth2-proxy's session
-can be cleared at `/oauth2/sign_out`.
 
+> **Exposure without the variant NetworkPolicy is demo-only.** The SSO
+> variant's `75-networkpolicies.yaml` is not optional in practice: it is the
+> only thing that makes oauth2-proxy the sole path to the gateway. Applying
+> only the Gateway/HTTPRoute/oauth2-proxy objects leaves the trust boundary
+> unenforced, so anyone who can reach `dsh-gateway:8080` can send
+> `X-Forwarded-User` and impersonate the user they claim to be.
+>
 > **SSO trust boundary — read this before enabling it.** After SSO is on, the
 > `dsh-gateway` Service must be reachable **only** through oauth2-proxy (it is
 > ClusterIP). The variant's `75-networkpolicies.yaml` restricts pod traffic
 > accordingly: the gateway accepts traffic only from oauth2-proxy pods,
-> oauth2-proxy only from the Gateway implementation, and oauth2-proxy egress is
+> oauth2-proxy only from the Gateway implementation, and its egress only to DNS,
-> limited to DNS, public HTTPS and the gateway. Anyone who can reach
+> public HTTPS and the gateway. The gateway's own egress (Kubernetes API,
-> `dsh-gateway:8080` directly can still send `X-Forwarded-User: <victim>` and be
+> sandbox pods) is not restricted by that file because the API-server endpoint is
-> treated as that user, so never add a second path (the Ingress variant, a
+> cluster-specific; add the
-> shared-host port-forward, a permissive policy). To turn SSO off, remove the
+> [gateway egress policy](docs/optional-hardening.md#gateway-egress-required-for-production)
-> variable (`kubectl -n dsh-demo set env deploy/dsh-gateway AUTH_PROXY_HEADER-`)
+> for production. Anyone who can reach `dsh-gateway:8080` directly can send
-> and delete the SSO variant; the gateway falls back to bearer-token/session
+> `X-Forwarded-User: <victim>`, so never add a second path. To turn SSO off,
-> auth.
+> remove the variable
+> (`kubectl -n dsh-demo set env deploy/dsh-gateway AUTH_PROXY_HEADER-`) and
+> delete the SSO variant.
 
 ### Switching variants
 
-Delete the variant you had before applying the other one
+Delete the variant you had before applying the other one, revert
-(`kubectl delete -f manifests/exposure/ingress/`), revert
 `AUTH_PROXY_HEADER`/`COOKIE_SECURE`, and verify with
 `kubectl -n dsh-demo get ingress,gateway,httproute` that exactly one path to the
-gateway remains.
+gateway remains. Full commands and verification are in the
+[exposure README](manifests/exposure/README.md).
 
 ## Optional hardening
 
-The base walkthrough is deliberately portable. Four opt-in layers are documented
+The base walkthrough is deliberately portable, which means it is **not
-in [optional hardening](docs/optional-hardening.md):
+hardened**: without the policies and gVisor it is demo-only, not a safe
+multi-tenant platform. [Optional hardening](docs/optional-hardening.md) has the
+settings and a production checklist. In short:
 
 - **gVisor** — uncomment `runtimeClassName: gvisor` before applying, or patch an
   existing install. Requires a `gvisor` RuntimeClass and capable nodes.
   `kubectl port-forward` does not work under gVisor; the gateway path does.
+  Required for untrusted agents in production.
 - **nodeSelector** — uncomment and replace the placeholder node label to pin
   sandboxes and the gateway to a dedicated pool; add a toleration for tainted
   pools.
 - **Sandbox NetworkPolicy** —
   `kubectl apply -f manifests/optional/network-policy/` allows only
-  gateway→sandbox on `3080` and sandbox→DNS/public `443`.
+  gateway→sandbox on `3080` and sandbox→DNS/public `443`. Required for
+  production; exposure without it is demo-only.
+- **Gateway egress policy** — the gateway needs DNS, the Kubernetes API and
+  `3080` to sandbox pods. It is not shipped because the API-server endpoint is
+  cluster-specific; use the
+  [recipe](docs/optional-hardening.md#gateway-egress-required-for-production).
+  Required for production.
 - **Provider keys** — create `dsh-provider-keys-extra` as shown in step 1.
+- **Failed-Pod recovery** — uncomment `failedPodPolicy: Recreate` so the
+  controller replaces a `Failed` sandbox Pod (node eviction) instead of parking
+  the sandbox at `Finished=True`. Requires agent-sandbox v1.0.8+.
 
-Apply each independently and re-run the walkthrough. `kubectl apply -f manifests/`
+The **exposure variants' NetworkPolicies** are not optional in production
-is non-recursive, so the optional manifest is not applied by the base step.
+either; see step 9. Apply each setting independently and re-run the walkthrough.
+`kubectl apply -f manifests/` is non-recursive, so the optional manifests are not
+applied by the base step.
 
 ## Troubleshooting
 
@@ -565,17 +592,26 @@ is non-recursive, so the optional manifest is not applied by the base step.
 | Pod `CrashLoopBackOff`, probes failing with `401` | Probe path is `/`; change readiness/liveness to `/favicon.svg` |
 | Browser shows `401` from DSH through the gateway | Gateway handshake failed — check `kubectl -n dsh-demo logs deploy/dsh-gateway` and that RBAC grants `pods/log` |
 | `502` / `upstream unavailable` | Sandbox pod is not Ready (wake timed out) or the Service DNS is stale; check `kubectl get sandbox`, `WAKE_TIMEOUT` |
-| `503` with `Retry-After` | The launch token was not found in the pod logs yet; the gateway retries after a short delay. Check the pod logs and `DSH_LOG_TAIL_LINES` |
+| `503` with `Retry-After` | Either the launch token was not found in the pod logs yet (the gateway retries after a short delay; check the pod logs and `DSH_LOG_TAIL_LINES`) or the user hit `MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PER_USER` (default 32 concurrent requests/WebSockets); reduce client concurrency or raise the limit deliberately |
+| `429` with `Retry-After` on signup/login | The per-client auth rate limit (`AUTH_RATE_LIMIT`, default explicitly `30` per `AUTH_RATE_WINDOW=60` s) rejected the attempt before reading the body. Wait for the window, or raise the limit; behind a proxy make sure the real client IP is the rightmost `X-Forwarded-For` entry, not a shared NAT address |
+| `403` on signup: invite required/invalid | `SIGNUP_INVITE_CODE` is configured. Send the code as form field `invite` or header `X-Signup-Invite`; the landing page shows the field when enabled. A wrong code is rejected before the user lookup |
+| Gateway pod `CrashLoopBackOff` with `refusing to start with an insecure session cookie` | Intentional guard: plain HTTP is only allowed when explicitly acknowledged. For the local demo set `ALLOW_INSECURE_COOKIES=1` (the base manifest does); for HTTPS set `COOKIE_SECURE=true` and remove `ALLOW_INSECURE_COOKIES` |
+| Every browser is logged out after a gateway rollout/restart | Expected: sessions are opaque ids in gateway memory and a restart drops them. Sign in again; a production deployment needs shared session state or per-request re-authentication. The DSH sandboxes and their data are unaffected |
+| WebSocket closes with `1011` for a busy client | `MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PER_USER` (per-user connection cap) or an upstream/handshake failure closed the socket; check the gateway logs to tell them apart |
+| WebSocket closes after a very large message from DSH | A message received from DSH exceeded `WS_MAX_MESSAGE_BYTES` (16 MiB), so the relay closed it instead of buffering; raise the limit only if DSH legitimately sends larger frames. Browser-to-DSH frames are bounded by uvicorn's own limit |
+| `scripts/preflight-sso.sh` exits non-zero | It names the failing item: a missing Secret/key, a bad oauth2-proxy cookie-secret length, missing `AUTH_PROXY_HEADER`/`COOKIE_SECURE`, a dangling Gateway TLS reference, a leftover `your-github-org`/`dsh-demo.example.com` placeholder, or a second path to the gateway (an Ingress). Fix all items before exposing the SSO variant |
 | `409` on signup | User already has a claim; use `POST /login` with the existing token or delete the user first |
-| Cookie set but browser keeps getting `401` | `COOKIE_SECURE=true` while serving over plain HTTP (secure cookies are not sent); use HTTPS or set `false` for local demos |
+| Cookie set but browser keeps getting `401` | `COOKIE_SECURE=true` while serving over plain HTTP (secure cookies are not sent); use HTTPS or set `false` **and** `ALLOW_INSECURE_COOKIES=1` for local demos |
 | WebSocket closes immediately (`4401`) | Missing/expired gateway cookie, or the upgrade's `Origin` does not match `Host` (CSWSH check); DSH rejecting `Host` instead surfaces as close `1011` — add the host to `DSH_TRUSTED_HOSTS` |
 | Console spams `[connection] connection lost, retry #N` | The upstream WS upgrade is being rejected, surfaced as close `1011`. The gateway dials the sandbox **pod IP**, forwards no `Host`/`Origin`, and handshakes under the same `pod-IP:3080` authority DSH binds its cookie to; an older gateway image, or a sandbox with an empty `status.podIPs`, hits this loop |
 | `manifest.webmanifest` returns `401` in the console | Browsers fetch the Web App Manifest without credentials, so the gateway's session cookie is absent and the request fails closed. The UI is unaffected; only the PWA install prompt is lost |
 | Signup is slow / `202` then `Waking` | Warm pool exhausted (`kubectl get sandboxes -l agents.x-k8s.io/warm-pool-sandbox`); scale the pool |
 | `403` from the Kubernetes API in gateway logs | The gateway ServiceAccount is missing claim/sandbox/pod-log verbs (see `manifests/50-gateway.yaml`) |
-| Gateway pod `ErrImagePull` / `ImagePullBackOff` (especially on kind) | The manifest uses `imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent` with the release identity. Build with `make gateway`, retag to exactly the manifest's image, `kind load docker-image <that-ref>`, or set the Deployment image to your local tag / pinned digest. On a real cluster, make sure the GHCR package is readable (public or a pull secret) |
+| Gateway pod `ErrImagePull` / `ImagePullBackOff` (especially on kind) | The manifest uses `imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent` with the release identity. Build with `make -C ../.. gateway`, retag to exactly the manifest's image, `kind load docker-image <that-ref>`, or set the Deployment image to your local tag / pinned digest. On a real cluster, make sure the GHCR package is readable (public or a pull secret) |
 | Step 3: `pod "$SB" not found` after deploying the gateway | The claim was suspended by the idle sweeper. Claims created by the gateway carry `aaas.example.com/managed-by=dsh-gateway`; hand-applied claims (steps 1–7) do not and are never swept. Resume the sandbox: `kubectl -n dsh-demo patch sandbox "$SB" --type merge -p '{"spec":{"operatingMode":"Running"}}'` |
 | Resume crash-loops: `credentials-local: … is readable beyond its owner (mode 660)` | The pod template lacks `fsGroupChangePolicy: OnRootMismatch`, so the kubelet's default fsGroup policy rewrote `.credentials.yaml` to `0660`; DSH requires `0600` and refuses to start. New installs get the policy from the template. For an existing sandbox: suspend it, run a throwaway pod on `dsh-home-$SB` to `chmod 600 /home/node/.dsh/.credentials.yaml`, patch the sandbox's `podTemplate` with the policy, then resume |
+| Agents get `Permission denied` writing to `/workspace` on a fresh or resumed pod | The `/workspace` mount is the `dsh-home` PVC's `workspace/` subPath, and the kubelet is known to leave a `subPath` directory at `0755` if it is interrupted between creating and chmodding it ([kubernetes#142464](https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/issues/142464)); later mounts never correct it. Suspend the sandbox, run a throwaway pod on `dsh-home-$SB` mounted at `/data`, `chmod 2775 /data/workspace` (do **not** chown/chmod recursively — that rewrites `.credentials.yaml`), then resume. If you recreate the sandbox instead, its current `/workspace` contents go with the PVC |
+| Every bash command fails: `SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE`, `sandbox mode "workspace-write" is requested but no sandbox backend is usable` | DSH's own command sandbox found neither backend: `bubblewrap` ships in the image but is unsetuid, so it needs an unprivileged user namespace this hardened pod does not grant, and no Landlock runner exists on this kernel/runtime — the confined executor fails closed. The template sets `DSH_PERMISSION_MODE=danger-full-access` to keep agents usable inside the pod boundary. To restore confinement, confirm a backend inside the pod (`bwrap --ro-bind / / true`; `grep -o landlock /sys/kernel/security/lsm`), set `DSH_PERMISSION_MODE=workspace-write` (or `read-only`), and recreate the pod — the value is stamped at creation. A session that explicitly chose a mode keeps that choice |
 | SSO: GitHub login succeeds but the gateway asks for a token / returns `401` to `/recreate` | `AUTH_PROXY_HEADER` is not set on `deploy/dsh-gateway` (SSO is opt-in). Set `AUTH_PROXY_HEADER=X-Forwarded-User` and confirm the request actually reaches the gateway through oauth2-proxy |
 | SSO: gateway treats a caller as another user / bad `X-Forwarded-User` accepted | Trust boundary violation: something other than oauth2-proxy can reach `dsh-gateway:8080`. Remove the second path (Ingress/Gateway/port-forward), keep the Service ClusterIP, and only re-enable SSO once the proxy is the sole entry point. Never put a trusted identity header in front of a service that is directly reachable |
 | SSO: oauth2-proxy `cookie_secret must be 16, 24, or 32 bytes ... but is 44 bytes` | The cookie secret was generated as standard base64. Use URL-safe unpadded base64 (see `73-oauth2-proxy-secret.yaml.example`) |
@@ -586,14 +622,27 @@ is non-recursive, so the optional manifest is not applied by the base step.
 | Sandbox cannot reach a model API after applying the optional NetworkPolicy | The policy allows DNS and public TCP `443` only; a proxy, custom base URL, port `80` or non-443 endpoint needs an explicit egress rule |
 | Gateway cannot reach a sandbox after applying an exposure NetworkPolicy | Check that the CNI enforces NetworkPolicy and that the Traefik/oauth2-proxy pod labels match; kubelet probes may also need the node CIDR |
 | New provider key not visible in a sandbox | Pod env is stamped at creation: delete the warm-pool spares and recreate claimed pods. A key saved in DSH's credential store also wins over env |
+| Folder picker opens on `/home/node` instead of the workspace | The sandbox was created before the template set `HOME=/workspace`, and pod env is stamped at creation. Verify with `kubectl -n dsh-demo exec "$SB" -- printenv HOME`; patch the sandbox's `podTemplate` with the env (or recreate the sandbox — the PVC keeps DSH state and workspace) and resume |
+| File explorer and `ls /workspace` show `.cache`, `.config`, `.local`, `.npm`, `.agents` | Expected with `HOME=/workspace`: `~`-relative tool caches and DSH's global agent instructions/skills live on the PVC inside the workspace. Remove the `HOME` env from the template (and recreate the sandbox) if you would rather keep the picker on the ephemeral image home; point caches elsewhere per tool if only they are unwanted |
+| Sandbox reports `Finished=True` and every gateway request fails | The sandbox Pod reached phase `Failed` (node eviction, spot reclaim) and the default `Retain` keeps it. Delete the Pod so the controller recreates it, or set `failedPodPolicy: Recreate` (agent-sandbox v1.0.8+; see optional hardening) |
 
 ## Limitations
 
 Deliberately **not** production code:
 
-- **Single replica.** Idle clocks, in-flight tracking, and the handshake cache
+- **Single replica.** Idle clocks, in-flight tracking, the handshake cache and
-  are in memory. Running two gateway replicas would double-suspend or lose wake
+  the browser session table are in memory. Running two gateway replicas would
-  tracking; scale up only after moving that state to a shared store.
+  double-suspend or lose wake tracking, and sessions would land on the wrong
+  replica; scale up only after moving that state to a shared store.
+- **Sessions die with the process.** Browser sessions are opaque ids held in
+  gateway memory (revocable on logout/delete/recreate, but not durable). A
+  gateway restart logs every browser out. There is no SSO refresh-token or
+  password store; identity is re-established by oauth2-proxy on the next
+  request.
+- **Abuse controls are per-process and coarse.** `AUTH_RATE_LIMIT`, the signup
+  invite code, `MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PER_USER` and `WS_MAX_MESSAGE_BYTES` limit casual
+  abuse, but they are not a substitute for ingress rate limiting, WAF/quota, or
+  an audit log, and the in-memory rate buckets reset on restart.
 - **Log scraping.** The launch token is recovered from pod logs. Log rotation, a
   restarted pod, or a changed DSH log format can break the handshake until the
   next `401` refresh.
@@ -603,30 +652,41 @@ Deliberately **not** production code:
   but the platform does not manage that. Real multi-tenancy needs per-tenant
   credentials or an egress proxy.
 - **No TLS in the gateway.** Terminate TLS at an Ingress or Gateway and set
-  `COOKIE_SECURE=true`.
+  `COOKIE_SECURE=true`, then remove `ALLOW_INSECURE_COOKIES`. The base manifest
+  runs plain HTTP for the port-forward demo and is demo-only.
 - **SSO trust is hop-based.** `AUTH_PROXY_HEADER` trusts whoever sets the header.
   The SSO variant ships `75-networkpolicies.yaml`, which restricts the gateway
   to oauth2-proxy and oauth2-proxy egress to the gateway/DNS/public HTTPS; a
   custom exposure without that policy has no signature, mTLS or network
-  enforcement.
+  enforcement. Exposure without the policy is demo-only.
-- **Isolation is opt-in.** gVisor, the sandbox NetworkPolicy and the exposure
+- **DSH's inner file sandbox is off here.** The template sets
-  policies are opt-in; without them, sandboxes share the host kernel and can
+  `DSH_PERMISSION_MODE=danger-full-access` because neither backend of DSH's own
-  reach the cluster network. The base example is a demo, not a hardened
+  command sandbox is usable in this pod: `bubblewrap` is installed in the image
-  multi-tenant platform.
+  but is unsetuid, so it needs an unprivileged user namespace that the pod's
+  seccomp/capability surface does not grant (`capabilities.drop: ["ALL"]`), and
+  the kernel/runtime exposes no Landlock runner. The executor therefore fails
+  closed with `SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE` and every bash command fails. The per-user
+  pod remains the boundary — non-root,
+  capabilities dropped, `seccompProfile: RuntimeDefault`, its own PVC and Service
+  — but an agent command can now read its own `DSH_HOME` (including
+  `.credentials.yaml`) and write anywhere in the container. Run sandboxes under
+  gVisor in production. On hosts where a backend works, set `workspace-write`
+  (or `read-only`) and verify before relying on the inner policy.
+- **Isolation is opt-in.** gVisor, the sandbox NetworkPolicy, the gateway egress
+  policy and the exposure policies are opt-in; without them, sandboxes share the
+  host kernel and can reach the cluster network. The base example is a demo, not
+  a hardened multi-tenant platform. See the
+  [production checklist](docs/optional-hardening.md#6-production-checklist).
 - **OAuth org is the only authorization.** Any GitHub user in the configured
   organization gets an auto-provisioned sandbox; there is no per-user allow-list,
-  quota, or admin API.
+  quota, or admin API. `SIGNUP_INVITE_CODE` gates the gateway's own signup form,
+  not SSO auto-provisioning.
 - **In-memory user directory.** Users are claims + annotations; there is no
   database, password reset, or admin API. Tokens are stored only as SHA-256
   hashes in claim annotations.
 - **Bearer tokens in URLs.** Avoid putting the signup token in a URL/log; the
-  browser flow uses the `HttpOnly` cookie instead.
+  browser flow uses the `HttpOnly` cookie instead. The cookie no longer contains
-
+  the token, and a cookie value is never accepted as a bearer token.
-## Cost model
-
-The same economics as the upstream pattern: suspend-when-idle plus warm pools turn
-an always-on instance into a sub-second cold-start pause per return-after-absence,
-at a fraction of the cost.
 
 ## Cleanup
 
@@ -648,5 +708,8 @@ delete the Secrets with the namespace and revoke the OAuth App in GitHub.
 - [Architecture](docs/architecture.md) — container/sequence diagrams, ADRs,
   security and RBAC, failure modes, evolution path.
 - [Exposure README](manifests/exposure/README.md) — the two variants in detail.
+- [SSO preflight](scripts/preflight-sso.sh) — read-only checks for the SSO
+  variant (Secrets, gateway env, TLS reference, placeholders, second paths).
 - [Optional hardening](docs/optional-hardening.md) — gVisor, nodeSelector,
-  NetworkPolicy and extra provider keys, with verification and rollback.
+  NetworkPolicy, extra provider keys and failed-Pod recovery, with verification,
+  the production checklist and rollback.

examples/dsh-agents-as-a-service/docs/architecture.md

@@ -6,7 +6,8 @@ Kubernetes, and DSH Web fit together, and why the design looks the way it does.
 
 Scope: one Kubernetes namespace (`dsh-demo`), one shared DSH Web image, one gateway deployment,
 and one DSH Web pod + PVC per user. The cluster is assumed to run
-[agent-sandbox](https://github.com/kubernetes-sigs/agent-sandbox) v1.0.7 with the extensions
+[agent-sandbox](https://github.com/kubernetes-sigs/agent-sandbox) with the pinned
+`AGENT_SANDBOX_VERSION` from [`versions.env`](../../../versions.env) and the extensions
 (`SandboxTemplate`, `SandboxWarmPool`, `SandboxClaim`).
 
 ## Container view
@@ -24,7 +25,7 @@ flowchart LR
         sb["Sandbox dsh-pool-xxxx<br/>spec.operatingMode"]
         svc["Headless Service<br/>status.serviceFQDN"]
         pod["DSH Web pod<br/>node process :3080"]
-        pvc[("PVC dsh-home-SANDBOX<br/>/home/node/.dsh")]
+        pvc[("PVC dsh-home-SANDBOX<br/>/home/node/.dsh + /workspace (subPath)")]
     end
 
     browser -->|"HTTP + WebSocket<br/>/u/USER/**"| gw
@@ -46,7 +47,7 @@ Responsibilities:
 | **Gateway** | Signup/login, session auth, `SandboxClaim` lifecycle, wake-on-connect, idle sweeper, HTTP/SSE/WebSocket reverse proxy, DSH launch-token handshake. |
 | **Kubernetes API** | Source of truth for claims, sandboxes, and pods; also the log source for the DSH launch token. |
 | **agent-sandbox controller** | Adopts warm spares on claim, flips `operatingMode` (Running/Suspended), garbage-collects sandbox + PVC on claim delete. |
-| **DSH Web pod** | One `dsh web` process per user, state on the per-user PVC, listening on `3080`. |
+| **DSH Web pod** | One `dsh web` process per user, DSH state and the agent workspace on the per-user PVC (`/home/node/.dsh` + `/workspace`), listening on `3080`. |
 | **Warm pool** | Keeps `N` Ready sandboxes so signup is a label flip instead of a cold start. |
 
 ## Exposure variants
@@ -71,8 +72,10 @@ Each variant also ships a NetworkPolicy: `ingress/61-networkpolicy.yaml` limits
 to Traefik pods, and `gateway-api-sso/75-networkpolicies.yaml` limits the gateway to
 oauth2-proxy, oauth2-proxy ingress to the Gateway implementation, and oauth2-proxy egress to
 DNS/public HTTPS/the gateway. The SSO policy turns the trust boundary into pod-traffic
-enforcement; the caveats (Traefik label, `hostNetwork`, kubelet probes) are in
+enforcement. These policies are **required for production**: exposing the gateway by applying
-[optional hardening](optional-hardening.md).
+only the Gateway/HTTPRoute/Ingress objects is demo-only. The sandbox-side policy and the
+gateway's own egress policy are separate (the API-server endpoint is cluster-specific); see
+[optional hardening](optional-hardening.md#gateway-egress-required-for-production).
 
 ## Flows
 
@@ -86,20 +89,22 @@ sequenceDiagram
     participant K as Kubernetes API
     participant C as agent-sandbox controller
 
-    B->>G: POST /users (form: user=bob, Origin)
+    B->>G: POST /users (form: user=bob, invite, Origin)
-    G->>G: validate user name and body size
+    G->>G: rate limit, invite check, validate user name and body size
     G->>K: create SandboxClaim dsh-bob (warmPoolRef)
     K->>C: reconcile claim
     C-->>K: adopt spare, Ready, status.sandbox.name = dsh-pool-xxxx
     G->>K: read claim (status) + sandbox + pod
-    G-->>B: 303 Location /u/bob/ + Set-Cookie dsh_gw_session
+    G->>G: mint opaque sid, store sid -> (user, expiry)
+    G-->>B: 303 Location /u/bob/ + Set-Cookie dsh_gw_session=<sid>
     Note over G: JSON clients instead get 201 (Ready),<br/>202 (accepted, still waking), or 409 (conflict)
 ```
 
 Form signup waits up to `WAKE_TIMEOUT` for the claim to become `Ready`, then redirects; the
 first proxied request also waits for `Ready` and performs the DSH handshake (below). A `409`
 means the user already has a claim, in which case `POST /login` (bearer token) or the existing
-cookie is the right path.
+cookie is the right path. The cookie value is an opaque session id: it is meaningless outside
+this gateway process and is never accepted as a bearer token.
 
 ### First request / proxy (with handshake)
 
@@ -111,8 +116,8 @@ sequenceDiagram
     participant K as Kubernetes API
     participant D as DSH Web pod
 
-    B->>G: GET /u/bob/ (Cookie dsh_gw_session)
+    B->>G: GET /u/bob/ (Cookie dsh_gw_session=<sid>)
-    G->>G: authenticate cookie, user = bob
+    G->>G: look up sid -> session (valid, not expired), user = bob
     G->>K: resolve claim -> sandbox -> pod
     alt sandbox Suspended
         G->>K: patch operatingMode=Running (wake)
@@ -135,6 +140,36 @@ Handshake cache behavior: one entry per `(user, pod UID, Host)`; refreshed once
 `401`; dropped when the sandbox is suspended or deleted. The launch token and the DSH auth
 cookie never reach the browser.
 
+Inside `proxy_http` the order is auth, in-flight slot, sandbox resolution/wake, DSH handshake,
+body read, upstream send. An upload aborted mid-body may therefore already have paid for a wake
+and a handshake, but it never reaches DSH.
+
+### Browser sessions
+
+The browser never holds a DSH credential. On signup/login the gateway mints a random session id
+(`secrets.token_urlsafe(32)`), stores `sid -> Session(user, expires_at)` in memory, and sets it
+as the `HttpOnly`, `SameSite=Lax` cookie `dsh_gw_session` (`__Host-dsh_gw_session` when
+`COOKIE_SECURE=true`). Every browser request is resolved through that table; the cookie value is
+not a bearer token and cannot be replayed against another user's path.
+
+Sessions end on explicit logout, user delete, `/recreate` (all sessions for that user) and
+expiry (`COOKIE_MAX_AGE`, default 7 days). Because the table is process memory, a gateway
+restart logs every browser out; scaling beyond one replica therefore requires a shared session
+store (or re-authentication on every request). The sweeper prunes expired entries and sessions
+for users whose claim no longer exists.
+
+### Auth abuse controls and proxy limits
+
+Unauthenticated endpoints are throttled before the body is read: `AUTH_RATE_LIMIT` attempts per
+client per `AUTH_RATE_WINDOW` (defaults 30/60s; keyed on the rightmost `X-Forwarded-For` entry
+when present, else the peer address), answered with `429` + `Retry-After`. When
+`SIGNUP_INVITE_CODE` is set, signup additionally requires a constant-time-matched code (form
+field or `X-Signup-Invite`) and answers `403` otherwise. Proxied traffic is capped per user
+(`MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PER_USER`, default 32 concurrent HTTP requests + WebSockets: `503` for HTTP,
+close `1011` for WebSocket) and per WebSocket message received from DSH
+(`WS_MAX_MESSAGE_BYTES`, 16 MiB). These are in-process guards for a single replica, not an ingress
+rate limiter or quota system.
+
 ### Wake-on-connect and idle suspend
 
 ```mermaid
@@ -155,8 +190,21 @@ sequenceDiagram
     G-->>B: request held, then served
 ```
 
-Suspend deletes only the pod. The PVC keeps conversations, sessions, and config, so resume
+Suspend deletes only the pod. The PVC keeps conversations, sessions, config **and the agent
-reattaches exactly the same state.
+workspace**, so resume reattaches exactly the same state. Both trees live on one PVC: DSH state at
+`/home/node/.dsh` (the volume root) and the workspace at `/workspace` (a second mount of the same
+volume with `subPath: workspace`, which keeps `.credentials.yaml` out of the agent-visible tree).
+The idle sweeper never touches the volume; deleting the claim still garbage-collects it, so
+`POST /recreate` wipes state and workspace together.
+
+**Workspace as home.** The template sets `HOME=/workspace`. DSH has no start-path setting for its
+directory picker: the browse backend lists `$HOME` when the dialog opens, so with the image default
+(`/home/node`, off the PVC) the picker would start on a throwaway directory. The override makes the
+picker open on the persisted workspace and makes `~` resolve there; the cost is that tool caches
+and config kept under `$HOME` (`npm`/`pnpm`, `uv`, `git`, `gh`, and DSH's global `~/.agents`
+instructions and skills) become dotfiles in the workspace. `DSH_HOME` stays `/home/node/.dsh`, so
+sessions, config and credentials remain outside the agent-visible tree. Pod env is stamped when a
+sandbox is created, so an existing sandbox keeps the old `HOME` until it is recreated.
 
 **Ownership boundary.** The gateway shares its namespace with claims created outside it — the
 example's resource-layer walkthrough applies `dsh-alice` by hand, and every claim is named
@@ -202,6 +250,14 @@ sequenceDiagram
     end
 ```
 
+An upgrade with a missing/expired session, or one that would exceed
+`MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PER_USER`, is accepted and then closed: `4401` for authentication, `1011` for
+the per-user socket cap. Messages received from DSH above `WS_MAX_MESSAGE_BYTES` (16 MiB) close
+the connection instead of being buffered; browser-to-DSH frames are bounded by uvicorn's own
+limit. Client-supplied `Forwarded`, `X-Forwarded-User`,
+`X-Auth-Request-*` and `x-forwarded-*`/`x-auth-request-*` headers are stripped on the HTTP and
+WebSocket paths; `UPSTREAM_HEADER_ALLOWLIST` replaces that denylist with an explicit allowlist.
+
 ## Decisions and trade-offs
 
 ### ADR-1: Starlette ASGI instead of a sync Flask proxy
@@ -261,14 +317,21 @@ sequenceDiagram
   (`kubectl annotate sandboxclaim ...`) to keep being swept. Fine for a reference pattern, not
   for a product.
 
-### ADR-6: Gateway cookie session instead of bearer tokens in the browser
+### ADR-6: Opaque server-side session cookie instead of bearer tokens in the browser
 
-- **Decision:** browsers get `dsh_gw_session=<user>:<token>`, `HttpOnly`, `SameSite=Lax`
+- **Decision:** browsers get `dsh_gw_session=<sid>`, `HttpOnly`, `SameSite=Lax` (`Secure` when
-  (`Secure` when enabled); API clients may still use `Authorization: Bearer`.
+  enabled); the sid maps to `Session(user, expires_at)` in gateway memory. API clients may still
-- **Why:** tokens never appear in URLs or JS-readable storage, and `SameSite=Lax` plus a strict
+  use `Authorization: Bearer`. The cookie name is `__Host-dsh_gw_session` when the Secure flag
-  `Origin`/`Referer` check on cookie-authenticated mutations blocks basic CSRF.
+  is on and no explicit `COOKIE_NAME` is set.
-- **Cost:** cookie-based auth needs TLS and correct `COOKIE_SECURE`; there is no signed-cookie
+- **Why:** tokens never appear in URLs or JS-readable storage, the cookie value is useless if
-  layer, so the gateway trusts the token hash comparison for validation.
+  leaked outside the gateway session table, sessions can be revoked server-side (logout,
+  user delete, recreate, expiry), and a cookie cannot be reused as a bearer token for another
+  user's path. `SameSite=Lax` plus a strict `Origin`/`Referer` check on cookie-authenticated
+  mutations blocks basic CSRF.
+- **Cost:** stateful auth in a single process: a restart logs everyone out and horizontal
+  scaling needs a shared session store. Cookie-based auth also needs TLS and the correct
+  `COOKIE_SECURE` setting; the gateway refuses to start with `COOKIE_SECURE=false` unless
+  `ALLOW_INSECURE_COOKIES=1` is set for a local HTTP demo.
 
 ## Security and RBAC
 
@@ -287,26 +350,52 @@ Notes and limits:
   permission is scoped to one namespace, but anyone who can read gateway memory or logs can
   impersonate users. Prefer the upstream token API when available.
 - **No cluster-wide access, no secret reads.** The gateway does not read `dsh-provider-keys`.
-- **Browser-facing hardening:** `HttpOnly`/`SameSite=Lax`/optional `Secure` cookies,
+  (It does read the optional signup invite code if it is mounted as an env var.)
-  timing-safe SHA-256 token comparison, strict same-origin check on cookie-auth mutations,
+- **Browser-facing hardening:** opaque server-side sessions instead of token-bearing cookies,
-  request-body limit (`MAX_BODY_MB`), hop-by-hop header stripping, upstream `Set-Cookie`
+  `HttpOnly`/`SameSite=Lax`/optional `Secure` (+ `__Host-` prefix when secure),
-  dropped, DSH `Location` headers rewritten under `/u/<user>/`.
+  timing-safe SHA-256 bearer-token comparison, timing-safe invite-code comparison, strict
+  same-origin check on cookie-auth mutations, request-body limit (`MAX_BODY_MB`), hop-by-hop
+  header stripping, client identity/hop headers (`Forwarded`, `X-Forwarded-User`,
+  `X-Auth-Request-*`, `x-forwarded-*`/`x-auth-request-*`) stripped on HTTP and WebSocket,
+  upstream `Set-Cookie` dropped, DSH `Location` headers rewritten under `/u/<user>/`.
+- **Session lifecycle:** login/signup mint an opaque sid; logout and user delete revoke it;
+  `/recreate` revokes every session for that user; expiry (`COOKIE_MAX_AGE`, default 7 days) is
+  enforced on lookup. The table is in memory, so a restart logs browsers out and a second
+  replica needs shared state.
+- **Abuse controls (per replica):** `AUTH_RATE_LIMIT`/`AUTH_RATE_WINDOW` throttle
+  unauthenticated signup/login per client with `429` + `Retry-After`; `SIGNUP_INVITE_CODE`
+  gates signup; `MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PER_USER` caps concurrent proxied requests + WebSockets per user;
+  `WS_MAX_MESSAGE_BYTES` caps messages received from DSH; browser-to-DSH frames are bounded by
+  uvicorn. These are in-process guards, not an ingress rate limiter or audit log.
 - **Host allow-list:** DSH rejects unknown `Host` headers. The gateway forwards the browser's
   `Host`, so every public hostname must be in `DSH_TRUSTED_HOSTS`; `localhost`/`127.0.0.1` are
   always trusted.
 - **TLS is external.** The gateway serves plain HTTP; terminate TLS at the Ingress and set
-  `COOKIE_SECURE=true`. Without TLS, session cookies are replayable on the network.
+  `COOKIE_SECURE=true`. The base demo sets `COOKIE_SECURE=false` with
+  `ALLOW_INSECURE_COOKIES=1` for the port-forward walkthrough; without TLS, session cookies are
+  replayable on the network and that combination must never be exposed.
 - **Tenant isolation** is pod + PVC separation; all tenants share one namespace, one DSH binary,
   and the shared provider keys (`dsh-provider-keys` plus the optional
-  `dsh-provider-keys-extra`). `manifests/optional/network-policy/` adds an opt-in sandbox
+  `dsh-provider-keys-extra`). The base example is demo-only: production requires gVisor for the
-  NetworkPolicy, and gVisor/`nodeSelector` are opt-in PodSpec fields. Add per-tenant
+  sandboxes, the sandbox NetworkPolicy, the gateway egress policy and the exposure NetworkPolicy,
-  credentials before calling it multi-tenant-grade.
+  plus per-tenant credentials or an egress proxy. See the
-- **Optional hardening is opt-in.** gVisor, node selection, the sandbox/exposure NetworkPolicies
+  [production checklist](optional-hardening.md#6-production-checklist).
-  and extra provider keys are documented in [optional hardening](optional-hardening.md). The
+- **DSH's inner file sandbox is disabled by deployment override.** The template sets
-  base manifests stay portable (no gVisor RuntimeClass, no active node labels, no
+  `DSH_PERMISSION_MODE=danger-full-access` because the in-container backends are unusable here:
-  NetworkPolicy and no extra Secret required).
+  `bubblewrap` ships in the image but is unsetuid and cannot create an unprivileged user namespace
-- **No gateway rate limiting.** Signup can create claims until the cluster or warm pool is
+  under the pod's seccomp/capability surface, and no Landlock runner is available; the confined
-  exhausted; put limits at the ingress for real deployments.
+  executor would otherwise fail closed on every command. The pod remains the boundary, so an
+  agent can read its own `DSH_HOME`. Hosts with a working backend can keep a confined mode;
+  multi-tenant deployments must put the pod in gVisor and a NetworkPolicy.
+- **Optional hardening is opt-in.** gVisor, node selection, the sandbox/exposure NetworkPolicies,
+  extra provider keys and failed-Pod recovery are documented in
+  [optional hardening](optional-hardening.md). The base manifests stay portable (no gVisor
+  RuntimeClass, no active node labels, no NetworkPolicy, no extra Secret required, and the
+  controller's default `failedPodPolicy: Retain`).
+- **SSO is trust-on-hop.** `AUTH_PROXY_HEADER` makes the gateway trust the proxy-asserted
+  identity; the SSO variant must remain the only path to the Service, and its NetworkPolicy is
+  required, not optional. Run [`scripts/preflight-sso.sh`](../scripts/preflight-sso.sh) after
+  applying it.
 
 ## Failure modes
 
@@ -315,7 +404,15 @@ Notes and limits:
 | DSH log line changed or rotated away | Proxy returns `503` (missing launch token) | Fix the parser or restart the pod so the token line is re-emitted |
 | Probe on `/` | Pod `CrashLoopBackOff`, `401` in probe logs | Use `/favicon.svg` for readiness/liveness (shipped templates do) |
 | Warm pool exhausted | JSON signup returns `202` (state `Waking`); form signup is slow | Increase `replicas` in the warm pool |
-| Gateway restart | Idle sandboxes stop suspending; handshake cache lost | Rebuilt lazily on next request; consider a shared store for production |
+| Gateway restart | Idle sandboxes stop suspending; handshake cache and browser sessions lost | Idle clocks and handshake cache rebuild lazily; sessions do not, so browsers must sign in again after a rollout. Use a shared session store for production |
+| Gateway configured `COOKIE_SECURE=false` without `ALLOW_INSECURE_COOKIES=1` | Gateway pod exits at startup / `CrashLoopBackOff` | Intentional guard against an insecure cookie on an HTTPS deployment; set `ALLOW_INSECURE_COOKIES=1` only for the local plain-HTTP demo, or set `COOKIE_SECURE=true` |
+| Auth rate limit hit | `429` + `Retry-After` on signup/login | Per-client in-memory bucket (`AUTH_RATE_LIMIT`/`AUTH_RATE_WINDOW`); wait for the window or tune it. Behind a proxy, keying uses the rightmost `X-Forwarded-For` entry |
+| Signup invite missing/wrong | `403` before the claim is created | `SIGNUP_INVITE_CODE` is set; send the `invite` form field or `X-Signup-Invite` header |
+| Per-user concurrency cap hit | HTTP `503` + `Retry-After`, or WebSocket close `1011` | `MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PER_USER` protects the single gateway from one busy tenant; reduce concurrency or raise the cap deliberately. These are per replica |
+| Oversized WebSocket message from DSH | Connection closes | `WS_MAX_MESSAGE_BYTES` (16 MiB) is enforced on upstream messages; raise it only if DSH legitimately needs larger frames |
+| Session expiry / revocation | `401` (HTTP) or close `4401` (WebSocket) | Expected after logout, user delete, `/recreate`, `COOKIE_MAX_AGE` expiry or a gateway restart; sign in again |
+| SSO variant applied without its NetworkPolicy (or with an Ingress) | Gateway accepts spoofed `X-Forwarded-User` | Demo-only configuration; keep `75-networkpolicies.yaml`, remove the second path, and run `scripts/preflight-sso.sh` |
+| Browser aborts a request (tab reload, back navigation) during a slow wake or handshake | No response reaches the client; nothing appears in the access log | If the abort lands before the response starts, the body read raises `ClientDisconnect` and the app answers `499` (`CLIENT_CLOSED_REQUEST`), which cannot reach the departed peer. Nothing reached DSH, no ERROR traceback is logged, and the in-flight slot is released. A request already streaming ends with its upstream status. |
 | DSH auth cookie expired mid-session | Proxy `401` once, then recovers | Gateway refreshes the handshake once |
 | Upstream pod name changed after resume | Cached cookie keyed by old pod UID is useless | Cache is invalidated on suspend; next request re-handshakes |
 | Two gateway replicas | Double suspend/wake races | Keep `replicas: 1` until state is externalized |
@@ -323,6 +420,7 @@ Notes and limits:
 | gVisor + `kubectl port-forward` | Forward refuses or returns nothing | Port-forward is incompatible with gVisor; use the gateway or a reachable Service |
 | Provider key added but missing in the pod | Requests still fail with `MISSING_CREDENTIAL` | Pod env is stamped at creation; recreate spares/pods. A stored credential wins over env |
 | `nodeSelector` matches no node | Pod `Pending`, `0/N nodes are available` | Fix the label, pool capacity or taint/toleration; RuntimeClass scheduling may also constrain it |
+| Sandbox Pod reaches phase `Failed` (node eviction, spot reclaim) | Sandbox reports `Finished=True`; the gateway keeps failing against a dead Pod | Set `failedPodPolicy: Recreate` (agent-sandbox v1.0.8+) so the controller replaces the Pod with the same identity and PVCs; otherwise delete the Pod by hand. See the hardening doc |
 
 ## Upstream feature request: remove log scraping
 
@@ -345,10 +443,11 @@ single-retry refresh are the supported workaround.
 ## Evolution path
 
 1. Replace log scraping with the upstream token API (above), deleting the `pods/log` permission.
-2. Move idle clocks, in-flight tracking, and handshake cache to a shared store; then scale the
+2. Move idle clocks, in-flight tracking, handshake cache **and sessions** to a shared store; then
-   gateway horizontally (sticky routing not required if state is shared).
+   scale the gateway horizontally (sticky routing not required if state is shared).
 3. Add per-tenant API keys or an egress proxy so a single key is not shared by all sandboxes.
-4. Add NetworkPolicies (gateway → sandboxes only), TLS everywhere, rate limits, and audit
+4. Add NetworkPolicies (gateway → sandboxes only, plus the documented gateway egress policy),
-   logging at the ingress.
+   gVisor for sandbox pods, TLS everywhere, ingress-level rate limits/quota and audit logging.
+   The gateway's in-process limits are not a substitute.
 5. If DSH grows absolute URLs or per-user cookies that cannot be rewritten, switch to
    per-user subdomains with wildcard DNS/TLS.

examples/dsh-agents-as-a-service/docs/optional-hardening.md

@@ -1,18 +1,31 @@
-# Optional hardening: gVisor, nodeSelector, NetworkPolicy and provider keys
+# Optional hardening: gVisor, nodeSelector, NetworkPolicy, provider keys and failed-Pod recovery
 
 The base example is deliberately portable: it runs on kind and GKE without a
 gVisor runtime, a tainted node pool or a NetworkPolicy-capable CNI, and it
-boots with only the required `dsh-provider-keys` Secret. This document covers
+boots with only the required `dsh-provider-keys` Secret. That portability is
-four **opt-in** layers:
+exactly why the base manifests are **demo-only**. This document covers the
+controls you add for production and the steps to enable or roll them back.
 
-| Layer | Where it lives | What it changes |
+**Production is not the base walkthrough.** At minimum, a production deployment
+needs: gVisor for the sandbox pods (or another kernel-isolation boundary), the
+sandbox NetworkPolicy, the gateway egress policy, the exposure variant's
+NetworkPolicy, TLS with `COOKIE_SECURE=true` (and no
+`ALLOW_INSECURE_COOKIES`), SSO (or an equivalent authenticating proxy) as the
+only path to the gateway, and per-tenant provider credentials/egress. The
+checklist at the end summarizes this; without the network and kernel layers the
+example is not tenant-isolated.
+
+This document covers four **opt-in** controls plus failed-Pod recovery:
+
+| Setting | Where it lives | What it changes |
 | --- | --- | --- |
-| gVisor | commented `runtimeClassName` in the SandboxTemplates and Deployments | puts DSH and/or the gateway in a userspace kernel |
+| gVisor | commented `runtimeClassName` in the SandboxTemplates and Deployments | puts DSH and/or the gateway in a userspace kernel; required for untrusted agents in production |
 | nodeSelector | commented `nodeSelector` in the same files | pins pods to a chosen node pool |
-| NetworkPolicy | `manifests/optional/network-policy/`, `manifests/exposure/*/` | limits sandbox, gateway and proxy connectivity |
+| NetworkPolicy | `manifests/optional/network-policy/`, `manifests/exposure/*/`, plus the gateway egress recipe | limits sandbox, gateway and proxy connectivity; the sandbox and gateway-egress policies are required for production |
 | Provider keys | optional `dsh-provider-keys-extra` Secret | injects extra provider API keys into every sandbox |
+| Failed-Pod recovery | commented `failedPodPolicy` in the SandboxTemplates | replaces a Failed sandbox Pod instead of parking the sandbox |
 
-Each layer is independent. Enable only what the cluster supports and test the
+Each setting is independent. Enable only what the cluster supports and test the
 walkthrough after each change.
 
 ## 1. gVisor
@@ -51,7 +64,7 @@ PodSpec; no CRD change is involved.
 - [`manifests/50-gateway.yaml`](../manifests/50-gateway.yaml)
 - [`manifests/exposure/gateway-api-sso/72-oauth2-proxy.yaml`](../manifests/exposure/gateway-api-sso/72-oauth2-proxy.yaml)
   (only with the SSO variant)
-- [minimal sandbox-template.yaml](../../minimal-single-tenant/manifests/sandbox-template.yaml)
+- [minimal template](../../minimal-single-tenant/manifests/10-sandboxtemplate.yaml)
 
 **Existing install:** a template edit does not update existing Sandboxes, and
 warm-pool spares use `OnReplenish`, so patch explicitly. Plan a maintenance
@@ -233,10 +246,17 @@ kubectl -n dsh-demo patch sandboxtemplate dsh-web --type merge \
 
 The base example does **not** manage NetworkPolicy: the SandboxTemplate is
 `networkPolicyManagement: Unmanaged`, and the gateway has no policy. That keeps
-the walkthrough portable and independent of the sandbox-router; the opt-in
+the walkthrough portable and independent of the sandbox-router. **For
-policies below are standard Kubernetes `NetworkPolicy` objects.
+production this is not optional**: without the sandbox policy every tenant can
+reach every other tenant and cluster-internal endpoints, and without a gateway
+egress policy the gateway can talk to anything the cluster network allows.
+Apply both. The policies below are standard Kubernetes `NetworkPolicy` objects.
 
-### Optional sandbox policy
+> **Demo vs production.** An installation that skips the sandbox NetworkPolicy
+> and the gateway egress policy is a demo. Exposure (Ingress/Gateway API) adds
+> ingress protection only; it does not isolate tenants from each other.
+
+### Sandbox policy (required for production)
 
 [`manifests/optional/network-policy/10-sandbox-networkpolicy.yaml`](../manifests/optional/network-policy/10-sandbox-networkpolicy.yaml)
 selects every Sandbox pod through the agent-sandbox tracking label
@@ -300,10 +320,10 @@ Caveats:
 - `kubectl port-forward` still works for debugging (the connection is local to
   the pod), except under gVisor.
 
-### Exposure-variant policies
+### Exposure-variant policies (required, part of the variant)
 
-Each exposure variant ships its own policy. They are part of the variant, not a
+Each exposure variant ships its own policy. They are part of the variant and
-separate opt-in step:
+**required for production**; an exposure without its policy is demo-only:
 
 - [`manifests/exposure/ingress/61-networkpolicy.yaml`](../manifests/exposure/ingress/61-networkpolicy.yaml)
   allows only Traefik pods (`app.kubernetes.io/name: traefik`) to reach the
@@ -316,7 +336,10 @@ separate opt-in step:
 The SSO policy is what turns the trust boundary in the
 [exposure README](../manifests/exposure/README.md) into network enforcement.
 The `dsh-gateway` Service must still stay ClusterIP; do not apply both exposure
-variants.
+variants. After applying the SSO variant, run
+[`scripts/preflight-sso.sh`](../scripts/preflight-sso.sh): it checks the
+gateway's SSO env, the Secrets, the TLS reference, leftover placeholders and
+accidental second paths (such as an Ingress).
 
 Verify the negative case from a sandbox pod (it is not the proxy):
 
@@ -331,11 +354,12 @@ different pod label, replace the `podSelector` with the correct selector or an
 `ipBlock`. As with the sandbox policy, kubelet probes can be affected on some
 CNIs.
 
-### Gateway egress (documented, not shipped)
+### Gateway egress (required for production)
 
-The gateway needs DNS, the Kubernetes API, and TCP `3080` to sandbox pods. The
+The gateway needs DNS, the Kubernetes API, and TCP `3080` to sandbox pods. An
-API server endpoint is cluster-specific (Service CIDR or node IP/port), so an
+egress policy is **required for production** but is not shipped, because the API
-egress policy is **not** shipped. If your cluster has a stable API-server CIDR
+server endpoint is cluster-specific (Service CIDR or node IP/port) and a wrong
+value silently breaks signup/proxy. If your cluster has a stable API-server CIDR
 and port, add an egress policy like this (replace the placeholders; verify the
 port, commonly `443` or `6443`):
 
@@ -412,7 +436,7 @@ Secrets; when the same key exists twice, the later `envFrom` entry wins.
 
 ### Supported names (curated)
 
-These are the names DSH v0.2.1-rc.3 resolves through its packaged provider
+These are the names the pinned DSH release resolves through its packaged provider
 catalog; the catalog has more entries, these are the common ones:
 
 | Provider | Environment variable |
@@ -473,14 +497,194 @@ kubectl -n dsh-demo exec "$POD" -- sh -c '
 - The optional Secret is created imperatively; the repository never contains a
   real key. Keep it out of Git and out of shell history where possible.
 
-## 5. Verification summary
+## 5. Failed-Pod recovery
+
+### What it changes
+
+When a sandbox Pod reaches phase `Failed`, the controller's default policy,
+`Retain`, leaves the Pod in place and surfaces `Finished=True` on the Sandbox.
+The Sandbox, its claim and its PVC survive, but nothing runs: the gateway keeps
+proxying to a dead Pod and every request fails until someone deletes the Pod or
+the claim.
+
+agent-sandbox v1.0.8+ (the current pin in [versions.env](../../../versions.env) is newer) adds
+`spec.failedPodPolicy` to `Sandbox` and to `SandboxTemplate`:
+
+| Value | Behavior |
+| --- | --- |
+| `Retain` (default) | The Failed Pod stays and the Sandbox reports `Finished=True`; the evidence stays available for debugging. |
+| `Recreate` | The controller deletes the Failed Pod and starts a replacement; the Sandbox identity and its Sandbox-owned PVCs are retained. |
+
+Repeated failures back off like a Deployment - 5 s, doubling to 5 min between
+creations - so a crash loop cannot hammer the API server. The backoff resets
+once the replacement Pod has been continuously `Running` for 10 minutes, and it
+lives in memory only, so a controller restart clears it.
+
+The base templates ship it commented out, for two reasons:
+
+- A deterministic failure (bad image, bad Secret, a wrong probe) would recreate
+  forever while hiding the cause.
+- The templates use `restartPolicy: OnFailure`, so the kubelet restarts a
+  crashing container in place and the Pod does not reach phase `Failed` anyway.
+  This policy matters for terminal failures - most commonly node eviction
+  (`Evicted`), when a spot/preemptible node is reclaimed or the node hits memory
+  pressure.
+
+No gateway change is needed: the handshake cache is keyed by Pod UID, so a
+replacement Pod re-handshakes on the next request, and the existing `401` retry
+covers containers restarted in place.
+
+### Enable it
+
+```bash
+# 1. The blueprint for future sandboxes.
+kubectl -n dsh-demo patch sandboxtemplate dsh-web --type merge \
+  -p '{"spec":{"failedPodPolicy":"Recreate"}}'
+
+# 2. Warm-pool spares were stamped at creation: delete them and let the pool
+#    replenish from the updated template.
+kubectl -n dsh-demo delete sandboxes -l agents.x-k8s.io/warm-pool-sandbox
+
+# 3. Claimed sandboxes keep their own spec: patch them in place.
+for sb in $(kubectl -n dsh-demo get sandboxes \
+  -l '!agents.x-k8s.io/warm-pool-sandbox' -o jsonpath='{.items[*].metadata.name}'); do
+  kubectl -n dsh-demo patch sandbox "$sb" --type merge \
+    -p '{"spec":{"failedPodPolicy":"Recreate"}}'
+done
+```
+
+For a fresh install, uncomment `failedPodPolicy: Recreate` in the template
+instead.
+
+### Verify
+
+```bash
+SB=$(kubectl -n dsh-demo get sandboxclaim dsh-alice -o jsonpath='{.status.sandbox.name}')
+kubectl -n dsh-demo get sandbox "$SB" -o jsonpath='{.spec.failedPodPolicy}{"\n"}'
+# Recreate
+```
+
+A failure drill that never touches a user sandbox - a `Sandbox` with
+`restartPolicy: Never` and a container that exits non-zero (swap the image if
+Docker Hub is unreachable):
+
+```bash
+kubectl -n dsh-demo apply -f - <<'EOF'
+apiVersion: agents.x-k8s.io/v1beta1
+kind: Sandbox
+metadata:
+  name: failed-pod-drill
+spec:
+  failedPodPolicy: Recreate
+  podTemplate:
+    spec:
+      restartPolicy: Never
+      containers:
+        - name: drill
+          image: busybox:1.36
+          command: ["sh", "-c", "exit 1"]
+EOF
+
+kubectl -n dsh-demo get pods -w
+# The drill Pod reaches phase Failed; a replacement appears within ~5 s, then
+# 10 s, 20 s, ... as the container keeps exiting non-zero.
+kubectl -n dsh-demo delete sandbox failed-pod-drill
+```
+
+Repeat the drill with `failedPodPolicy: Retain` (or omit the field) to see the
+default: the Pod stays `Failed` and the Sandbox condition `Finished` becomes
+`True`.
+
+### Caveats
+
+- `Recreate` deletes the Failed Pod, so its logs go with it. Capture
+  `kubectl get events` or switch back to `Retain` when debugging.
+- The replacement is a cold start: DSH boots again and issues a new launch
+  token. The workspace comes back from the PVC; in-flight sessions do not.
+- The field needs agent-sandbox v1.0.8+. A v1.0.7 cluster rejects it as an
+  unknown field.
+- It applies to sandbox Pods only. The gateway and oauth2-proxy are plain
+  Deployments, and their ReplicaSets already replace Failed Pods.
+
+### Roll back
+
+```bash
+kubectl -n dsh-demo patch sandboxtemplate dsh-web --type merge \
+  -p '{"spec":{"failedPodPolicy":"Retain"}}'
+for sb in $(kubectl -n dsh-demo get sandboxes -o jsonpath='{.items[*].metadata.name}'); do
+  kubectl -n dsh-demo patch sandbox "$sb" --type merge \
+    -p '{"spec":{"failedPodPolicy":"Retain"}}'
+done
+```
+
+Warm-pool spares pick the default up as they are claimed and replenished, or
+delete them as in step 2 above.
+
+## 6. Production checklist
+
+The base walkthrough is a demo. A production install must satisfy every item
+below; the sections above give the commands and caveats.
+
+**Isolation and network**
+
+- [ ] Sandbox pods run under gVisor (or an equivalent kernel-isolation
+      boundary) because DSH runs with `DSH_PERMISSION_MODE=danger-full-access`
+      in this image; the pod is the boundary. (Section 1.)
+- [ ] The sandbox NetworkPolicy is applied and verified: no tenant→tenant,
+      no tenant→cluster-Service/API, DNS + public HTTPS only. (Section 3.)
+- [ ] The gateway egress policy is applied with the cluster's real API-server
+      CIDR/port, scoped to DNS, the API server and sandbox pods on `3080`.
+      (Section 3, "Gateway egress".)
+- [ ] The exposure variant's NetworkPolicy is applied. An exposure without it is
+      demo-only. For SSO, the gateway is reachable **only** through
+      oauth2-proxy; there is no second Ingress/Gateway/port-forward path.
+- [ ] Nodes/CNI enforce NetworkPolicy (verify the negative cases, not just the
+      positive path).
+- [ ] The gateway and (optionally) oauth2-proxy run with `runAsNonRoot`,
+      dropped capabilities, `RuntimeDefault` seccomp and a read-only root
+      filesystem, as shipped.
+
+**Authentication, TLS and abuse controls**
+
+- [ ] TLS terminates in front of the gateway, `COOKIE_SECURE=true`, and
+      `ALLOW_INSECURE_COOKIES` is **not** set. The gateway refuses to start with
+      an insecure cookie unless explicitly acknowledged.
+- [ ] SSO (or an equivalent authenticating proxy) is enabled with
+      `AUTH_PROXY_HEADER=X-Forwarded-User`, and
+      [`scripts/preflight-sso.sh`](../scripts/preflight-sso.sh) exits `0`.
+- [ ] No `your-github-org` / `dsh-demo.example.com` placeholder remains.
+- [ ] `SIGNUP_INVITE_CODE` is set from a Secret if the gateway's own signup form
+      is reachable, and `AUTH_RATE_LIMIT` is set deliberately (`30`/60s shipped).
+      Add ingress-level rate limiting/quota too; the gateway's buckets are
+      in-process and reset on restart.
+- [ ] Session lifetime (`COOKIE_MAX_AGE`) and the logout/delete revocation
+      behavior are acceptable; account for gateway restarts logging users out.
+- [ ] `MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PER_USER` and `WS_MAX_MESSAGE_BYTES` fit the workload.
+
+**Credentials, platform and operations**
+
+- [ ] Provider keys are per-tenant (or routed through an egress proxy) instead
+      of the shared `dsh-provider-keys` Secrets; any shared key is treated as
+      visible to every tenant.
+- [ ] RBAC stays namespace-scoped; `pods/log` is treated as sensitive because
+      it contains launch tokens and model output. Plan the upstream token API
+      migration.
+- [ ] Images are digest-pinned and dependency installs are hash-locked.
+- [ ] Gateway replicas stay at `1` (in-memory sessions/idle state) or the state
+      is externalized.
+- [ ] `failedPodPolicy: Recreate` is set if node eviction/spot reclaim is
+      expected.
+- [ ] Audit logging, alerting and backups of the PVCs are in place.
+
+## 7. Verification summary
 
 Required locally for any change to this example:
 
 ```bash
 make check          # versions, example layout, manifest YAML shape
 yamllint .
-make test           # gateway unit tests (gateway code is untouched)
+make test           # only when the gateway code changed
+shellcheck examples/dsh-agents-as-a-service/scripts/*.sh
 ```
 
 CI additionally parses every manifest and runs `kubectl apply
@@ -494,19 +698,30 @@ Manual checks, on a cluster with the relevant CNI/runtime:
   gateway proxy works, port-forward limitation acknowledged.
 - nodeSelector: pods land on the intended nodes; no `Pending` events.
 - Sandbox policy: the allow/deny matrix above.
+- Gateway egress policy: signup and proxy still work; the gateway cannot reach
+  an arbitrary cluster Service or the metadata server.
 - Exposure policies: browser path works; a non-proxy pod cannot reach the
-  gateway; probes stay healthy.
+  gateway; probes stay healthy. `scripts/preflight-sso.sh` exits `0`.
+- Cookie/TLS guard: with `COOKIE_SECURE=false` and no
+  `ALLOW_INSECURE_COOKIES` the gateway refuses to start; with TLS it starts and
+  the cookie is `Secure` (`__Host-` prefixed).
+- Auth abuse controls: `429` + `Retry-After` after the configured limit, `403`
+  on a wrong invite code, and revocations on logout/delete/recreate.
 - Provider keys: set/unset output (never the values) and the refresh procedure.
+- Failed-Pod recovery: `spec.failedPodPolicy` on the Sandbox, and the drill
+  above replaces a `Failed` Pod while keeping the claim and PVC.
 
-## 6. Rollback summary
+## 8. Rollback summary
 
 | Layer | Rollback |
 | --- | --- |
 | Sandbox policy | `kubectl delete -f manifests/optional/network-policy/` |
+| Gateway egress policy | `kubectl delete networkpolicy dsh-gateway-egress -n dsh-demo` (do not leave it half-configured) |
 | Exposure policy | delete the exposure variant directory |
 | gVisor | patch `runtimeClassName: null`, recreate pods |
 | nodeSelector | patch `nodeSelector: null`, recreate pods |
 | Provider keys | delete the extra Secret or a key, recreate pods |
+| Failed-Pod recovery | patch `failedPodPolicy: Retain`, delete warm-pool spares |
 
 No PVC or workspace data is touched by any rollback. Deleting a `SandboxClaim`
 is different: it cascades to the Sandbox **and** its PVC, so do not use claim

examples/dsh-agents-as-a-service/gateway/Dockerfile

@@ -1,16 +1,73 @@
-FROM python:3.12-slim
+# syntax=docker/dockerfile:1.7
+#
+# Example gateway image: the tenant-facing proxy in front of DSH sandboxes.
+# The base image is digest-pinned in versions.env (GATEWAY_PYTHON_IMAGE) and
+# scripts/check-versions.sh verifies the ARG default below.
+#
+# Two stages on that base:
+#   build    installs the fully hash-pinned runtime dependencies into /venv as
+#            a dedicated non-root UID, so the runtime stage copies a venv that
+#            contains no root-owned files.
+#   runtime  copies /venv and the app, runs as UID 10000 with HOME=/tmp and no
+#            writable location of its own: usable with readOnlyRootFilesystem.
+ARG GATEWAY_PYTHON_IMAGE=docker.io/python:3.12-slim@sha256:aa943ce411423c7582288f18707ff66eddcbaeb510502d747a72aeb34f30d159
 
-# Read-only-rootfs friendly: no .pyc writes, no home directory writes.
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Build stage: hash-pinned virtualenv owned by the runtime identity.
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+FROM $GATEWAY_PYTHON_IMAGE AS build
+
+ARG APP_UID=10000
+ARG APP_GID=10000
+
+# No .pyc writes and no user cache dirs: the runtime image stays read-only.
 ENV PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1 \
     PYTHONUNBUFFERED=1 \
+    PIP_NO_CACHE_DIR=1 \
     HOME=/tmp
 
-WORKDIR /app
+RUN groupadd --gid "$APP_GID" app \
+ && useradd --uid "$APP_UID" --gid "$APP_GID" --no-create-home \
+      --home-dir /tmp --shell /usr/sbin/nologin app \
+ && python -m venv /venv \
+ && chown -R "$APP_UID:$APP_GID" /venv
+
+WORKDIR /build
 COPY requirements.txt .
-RUN pip install --no-cache-dir -r requirements.txt
+
-COPY gateway.py .
+# Install as the unprivileged user so every file in /venv is owned by UID 10000.
+# --require-hashes makes pip reject any requirement without a matching hash:
+# the dependency set in requirements.txt is fully pinned and verified. Use the
+# venv's own pip: the system pip would user-install into $HOME instead.
+USER $APP_UID:$APP_GID
+RUN /venv/bin/pip install --no-cache-dir --require-hashes -r requirements.txt
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Runtime stage
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+FROM $GATEWAY_PYTHON_IMAGE AS runtime
+
+ARG APP_UID=10000
+ARG APP_GID=10000
+
+ENV PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1 \
+    PYTHONUNBUFFERED=1 \
+    HOME=/tmp \
+    PATH="/venv/bin:$PATH"
+
+RUN groupadd --gid "$APP_GID" app \
+ && useradd --uid "$APP_UID" --gid "$APP_GID" --no-create-home \
+      --home-dir /tmp --shell /usr/sbin/nologin app
+
+WORKDIR /app
+
+# Dependencies come from the build stage: same interpreter, no build tools left
+# in the runtime image and nothing owned by root inside /venv.
+COPY --from=build --chown=$APP_UID:$APP_GID /venv /venv
+COPY --chown=$APP_UID:$APP_GID gateway.py .
 
 EXPOSE 8080
+
 # Run as a fixed non-root UID; HOME=/tmp keeps caches out of the image.
 USER 10000
 

examples/dsh-agents-as-a-service/gateway/README.md

@@ -10,11 +10,13 @@ It does four things:
    (only its SHA-256 is stored as a claim annotation), reports derived state,
    and deletes the claim (cascading the sandbox and PVC).
 2. **Browser sessions** — exchanges a user token for an HttpOnly session
-   cookie so the DSH UI works in a browser at `/u/<user>/`. Automation can
+   cookie whose value is only an opaque, server-side session id (user and
-   still use `Authorization: Bearer <token>`.
+   expiry stay in the gateway's memory) so the DSH UI works in a browser at
+   `/u/<user>/`. Automation can still use
+   `Authorization: Bearer <token>`, which never comes from the cookie.
 3. **Reverse proxy** — proxies HTTP (including SSE) and WebSocket traffic to
    the sandbox's DSH Web server on `:3080`, including DSH's own cookie
-   handshake.
+   handshake. Client-supplied forwarding/identity headers are stripped.
 4. **Optional SSO** — when `AUTH_PROXY_HEADER` is set, trusts the identity
    header an authenticating reverse proxy (for example oauth2-proxy) forwards,
    auto-provisions that user, and exposes `POST /recreate` for a clean restart.
@@ -22,7 +24,7 @@ It does four things:
 The DSH version pin lives in [`versions.env`](../../../versions.env)
 (`DSH_VERSION` plus the optional repository `RELEASE_REVISION`); the example
 manifests and published images use the release identity built from it (currently
-`dsh-v0.2.1-rc.3-r4`). DSH binds `:3080`, serves `/`, gates `/api` behind a
+`dsh-v0.2.1-rc.5-r6`). DSH binds `:3080`, gates the UI and `/api` behind a
 `dsh-auth-*` cookie and requires a WebSocket at `/api/remote.mux`.
 
 ## Flow
@@ -63,10 +65,10 @@ token. A failed handshake returns `503` with `Retry-After: 10`.
 | Method | Path | Auth | Purpose |
 | --- | --- | --- | --- |
 | `GET` | `/healthz` | none | Liveness/readiness. Never touches the cluster. |
-| `GET` | `/` | none | Landing page with signup + token login forms. With SSO it auto-provisions the proxy-identified user and redirects to their workspace. |
+| `GET` | `/` | none | Landing page with signup + token login forms (plus an invite-code input when `SIGNUP_INVITE_CODE` is set). With SSO it auto-provisions the proxy-identified user and redirects to their workspace. |
-| `POST` | `/users` | none | Signup. JSON body `{"user": "<dns-1123 label>"}` or form field `user`. JSON returns `201` when Ready, `202` when accepted but still Waking; form returns `303` to `/u/<user>/`. Both set the session cookie. `409` if the user exists, `400` if invalid, `413` if the body is too large. |
+| `POST` | `/users` | none | Signup. JSON body `{"user": "<dns-1123 label>"}` or form field `user`; when `SIGNUP_INVITE_CODE` is set, an `invite` form field or `X-Signup-Invite` header must match it (`403` otherwise, checked before the user lookup). JSON returns `201` when Ready, `202` when accepted but still Waking; form returns `303` to `/u/<user>/`. Both set the session cookie. `409` if the user exists, `400` if invalid, `413` if the body is too large, `429` when the auth rate limit is hit. |
-| `POST` | `/login` | none | Form (`user`, `token`) returns `303` to `/u/<user>/`; JSON returns `200`. Sets the session cookie. `401` on a bad token, `404` for an unknown user. |
+| `POST` | `/login` | none | Form (`user`, `token`) returns `303` to `/u/<user>/`; JSON returns `200`. Sets the session cookie. `401` on a bad token **and** for an unknown user (no username enumeration). `429` when the auth rate limit is hit. Both auth routes reject a form post whose `Origin`/`Referer` contradicts `Host` (`403`) when the browser sent one. |
-| `POST` | `/logout` | none | Clears the session cookie and `303`s to `/`. |
+| `POST` | `/logout` | none | Revokes the server-side session, clears the cookie and `303`s to `/`. |
 | `POST` | `/recreate` | trusted proxy header | **SSO only.** Deletes the authenticated user's claim (cascading sandbox + PVC, so workspace data is wiped), waits out finalizers, provisions a fresh claim and `303`s to `/u/<user>/`. `401` without a valid identity header; cookie-authenticated calls must be same-origin. |
 | `GET` | `/users/{user}` | bearer or cookie | Derived state: `Provisioning`, `Waking`, `Ready`, `Suspending`, `Suspended`. |
 | `DELETE` | `/users/{user}` | bearer or cookie | Delete the claim (sandbox + PVC cascade). Cookie-auth mutations require a same-origin `Origin`/`Referer`. |
@@ -78,19 +80,49 @@ token. A failed handshake returns `503` with `Retry-After: 10`.
 
 * `Authorization: Bearer <token>` is checked with a timing-safe SHA-256
   comparison against the `aaas.example.com/token-sha256` claim annotation.
-* The browser session cookie is
+* The browser session cookie is **opaque**: its value is a random
-  `dsh_gw_session=<user>:<token>` (HttpOnly, SameSite=Lax, Path=/, optional
+  server-side session id; the user and expiry live in gateway memory
-  Secure). A session for user A never authorizes user B.
+  (`GatewayState.sessions`). A cookie can never be edited into another user's
+  credentials, a session id is not accepted as a bearer token, and a bearer
+  token never authorizes a different user. The cookie name defaults to
+  `__Host-dsh_gw_session` when `COOKIE_SECURE=true` (HTTPS) and to
+  `dsh_gw_session` for plain HTTP; attributes are HttpOnly, SameSite=Lax,
+  Path=/ and (with `COOKIE_SECURE`) Secure.
+* Sessions are revoked on `POST /logout`, on `DELETE /users/{user}`, on
+  `POST /recreate`, and when they expire (looked up on every request; the
+  sweeper also drops expired entries). `from_env()` refuses to start without
+  `COOKIE_SECURE=true` or the explicit `ALLOW_INSECURE_COOKIES=1` opt-out for
+  local HTTP.
 * Cookie-authenticated **mutations** (`POST`, `PUT`, `PATCH`, `DELETE`) and
   cookie-authenticated **WebSocket upgrades** require the request `Origin`
   (or `Referer` fallback) to match the `Host` header. Missing or mismatched
   cross-origin metadata is rejected (`403` HTTP, close code `4401` for WS).
+  Form signup/login additionally reject a cross-origin `Origin`/`Referer`
+  when the browser sent one, before the body is read.
+* `POST /users` and `POST /login` are rate limited per client:
+  `AUTH_RATE_LIMIT` attempts per `AUTH_RATE_WINDOW` seconds (default 30/60,
+  `0` disables). The client key is the rightmost `X-Forwarded-For` entry when
+  present (the address the last trusted proxy saw, not a spoofable leftmost
+  value), else the socket peer. Over-limit requests get `429` +
+  `Retry-After` before the body is read.
+* Proxy requests strip client-supplied forwarding/identity headers in both
+  HTTP and WebSocket paths: `Forwarded`, every `X-Forwarded-*`
+  (including `X-Forwarded-User`), every `X-Auth-Request-*`, and `X-Real-IP`.
+  The gateway sets its own `X-Forwarded-For/Host/Proto/Port` values from the
+  connection. `UPSTREAM_HEADER_ALLOWLIST` optionally narrows the forwarded
+  client headers further (comma-separated, case-insensitive); unset keeps the
+  denylist behavior, and the gateway's own values are always added.
 * The gateway's bearer token, the browser `Cookie` header and any `?token=`
   query parameter are never forwarded upstream. Only the cached `dsh-auth-*`
   cookie is injected.
 * Upstream `Set-Cookie` headers are dropped. `Location` headers that are
   absolute paths are rewritten under `/u/<user>/`, and any `token` query
   parameter is stripped.
+* Concurrency is capped per user: `MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PER_USER` proxied requests
+  (default 32) before the gateway answers `503` + `Retry-After` (HTTP) or
+  closes the WebSocket with `1011`. Messages received from DSH are limited to
+  `WS_MAX_MESSAGE_BYTES` (default 16 MiB); browser-to-DSH frames are bounded by
+  uvicorn's own WebSocket size limit.
 
 ### SSO (opt-in)
 
@@ -106,7 +138,8 @@ kubectl -n dsh-demo set env deploy/dsh-gateway AUTH_PROXY_HEADER=X-Forwarded-Use
 When set, the gateway treats a request carrying that header as authenticated as
 that user, provided the value is a valid DNS-1123 label; the header is never
 trusted when the variable is unset. The landing page then auto-provisions the
-user (creates their claim idempotently, mints a rotated session token) and
+user (creates their claim idempotently, rotates the claim token when a new
+session is needed and mints an opaque session cookie) and
 redirects to `/u/<user>/`, and `POST /recreate` becomes available for a clean
 restart. The base manifests leave it unset on purpose; the
 [SSO exposure variant](../manifests/exposure/gateway-api-sso/) documents how to
@@ -133,17 +166,30 @@ oauth2-proxy's egress to the gateway, DNS and public HTTPS.
 | --- | --- |
 | Unknown user / claim | `404` |
 | Missing or invalid credentials | `401` |
-| Cross-origin cookie mutation | `403` |
+| Unknown user on `/login` | `401` (same as a bad token; no username enumeration) |
+| Cross-origin cookie mutation / cross-origin form signup or login | `403` |
+| Auth route over `AUTH_RATE_LIMIT` | `429` + `Retry-After`, before the body is read |
 | Request body over `MAX_BODY_MB` | `413` |
-| Sandbox not provisioned, wake timeout, handshake failure | `503` + `Retry-After: 10` |
+| Client aborts mid-body, before the response starts | `499` (`CLIENT_CLOSED_REQUEST`). Nothing is forwarded to DSH and nothing can be delivered; it is not an error, so no traceback is logged. Covers the body-reading control routes (`POST /users`, `POST /login`) as well as the proxy. |
+| Client aborts mid-stream (SSE, long response) | The response already started, so its upstream status stands (typically `200`); the stream simply ends. No traceback, and the in-flight slot is released as the relay unwinds. |
+| Sandbox not provisioned, wake timeout, handshake failure | `503` + `Retry-After: 10`. The handshake error body is a fixed message: it never contains the launch token, the handshake URL or pod/credential details. |
+| User over `MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PER_USER` | `503` + `Retry-After` (HTTP); the existing in-flight requests are untouched |
 | Upstream connection/protocol failure | `502` |
 | WS auth failure (unknown user, bad token, cross-origin) | accept, then close `4401` |
+| WS per-user concurrency cap | accept, then close `1011` |
 | WS upstream/handshake failure | accept, then close `1011` |
+| WS message from DSH over `WS_MAX_MESSAGE_BYTES` | the upstream/relay closes the connection (websockets' message-too-big path) |
 
 A close code can only be delivered after the WebSocket upgrade is accepted;
 Starlette would turn an early close into an HTTP 403, which is why WS auth
 failures are `101`, then close `4401`.
 
+An aborted request is deliberately silent: uvicorn runs with `--no-access-log`,
+and the `499` cannot reach a peer that has already left (uvicorn's `send()` is
+a no-op once the socket is closed). Sandbox resolution, the wake and the DSH
+handshake run before the body is read, so an aborted upload can cost a wake or
+a handshake but never reaches DSH.
+
 ## Configuration
 
 All values are read from the environment by `Settings.from_env()`; every one
@@ -158,21 +204,35 @@ can also be injected into `create_app` for tests.
 | `DSH_PORT` | `3080` | Upstream DSH port. |
 | `DSH_CONTAINER` | `dsh-web` | Container whose logs carry the launch token. |
 | `DSH_LOG_TAIL_LINES` | `2000` | How many log lines to scan for the launch token. |
-| `COOKIE_NAME` | `dsh_gw_session` | Browser session cookie name. |
+| `COOKIE_NAME` | `__Host-dsh_gw_session` when secure, else `dsh_gw_session` | Browser session cookie name. Only an opaque session id is stored in it. |
-| `COOKIE_SECURE` | `false` | Add `Secure` to the session cookie when served over TLS. |
+| `COOKIE_SECURE` | `false` | Add `Secure` to the session cookie. Required unless `ALLOW_INSECURE_COOKIES=1` is set for local HTTP. |
-| `COOKIE_MAX_AGE` | `604800` | Session cookie lifetime in seconds. |
+| `ALLOW_INSECURE_COOKIES` | `0` | Explicit opt-out for plain-HTTP demos. Without it, `Settings.from_env()` refuses to start unless `COOKIE_SECURE=true`. |
+| `COOKIE_MAX_AGE` | `604800` | Session lifetime in seconds (server-side expiry and cookie `Max-Age`). |
 | `MAX_BODY_MB` | `32` | Maximum buffered request body (and `413` threshold). |
 | `HTTP_TIMEOUT` | `300` | Upstream connect/read timeout in seconds. Proxied streams (SSE, long responses) keep the connect/write budget but have **no read timeout**, so an idle event stream is not cut every five minutes. |
-| `SWEEP_INTERVAL` | `15` | Seconds between idle sweeps. |
+| `SWEEP_INTERVAL` | `15` | Seconds between idle sweeps. Sweeps also prune expired sessions and rate buckets and orphaned per-user state. |
+| `SIGNUP_INVITE_CODE` | unset | When set, `POST /users` requires the matching `invite` form field or `X-Signup-Invite` header (timing-safe compare); the landing page then shows an invite input. Unset leaves signup open. |
+| `AUTH_RATE_LIMIT` | `30` | Attempts allowed per client per `AUTH_RATE_WINDOW` on `POST /users` and `POST /login`; `0` disables the limit. |
+| `AUTH_RATE_WINDOW` | `60` | Rate-limit window in seconds. |
+| `UPSTREAM_HEADER_ALLOWLIST` | unset | Comma-separated, case-insensitive allowlist of client headers to forward upstream. Unset keeps the denylist behavior; forwarding/identity headers are stripped in both modes. |
+| `MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PER_USER` | `32` | Concurrent proxied requests per user before `503`/WS `1011`. `0` disables the cap. |
+| `WS_MAX_MESSAGE_BYTES` | `16777216` | Largest WebSocket message (16 MiB) accepted from DSH. Browser-to-DSH frames are bounded by uvicorn's own limit. |
 | `AUTH_PROXY_HEADER` | unset | Opt-in SSO: name of the trusted identity header set by an authenticating reverse proxy (e.g. `X-Forwarded-User`). Unset disables SSO and the header is never trusted. Enable only when the Service is reachable exclusively through that proxy (see [SSO](#sso-opt-in)). |
 
+The shipped `manifests/50-gateway.yaml` sets `IDLE_TIMEOUT=360` and
+`WAKE_TIMEOUT=240` for the demo; the e2e script overrides them to 60/120 so the
+smoke test does not wait minutes for the sweeper. It also sets
+`COOKIE_SECURE=false` together with the explicit `ALLOW_INSECURE_COOKIES=1`
+acknowledgement because the demo is reached over plain HTTP (a `Secure` cookie
+would never be sent). HTTPS deployments must set `COOKIE_SECURE=true`.
+
 ### Required RBAC
 
 The gateway's ServiceAccount needs, in its namespace:
 
 * `sandboxclaims` (`extensions.agents.x-k8s.io`): get, list, create, delete
-* `sandboxes` (`agents.x-k8s.io`): get, patch
+* `sandboxes` (`agents.x-k8s.io`): get, list, patch
-* `pods`: get
+* `pods`: get, list
 * `pods/log`: get
 
 ## Running locally
@@ -185,8 +245,10 @@ python -m pip install -r requirements-dev.txt
 python -m pytest -q
 python -m ruff check .
 
-# Uvicorn factory (loads in-cluster credentials only on the first claim call)
+# Uvicorn factory (loads in-cluster credentials only on the first claim call).
-uvicorn gateway:create_app --factory --host 0.0.0.0 --port 8080
+# from_env() insists on an explicit acknowledgement for plain HTTP; behind TLS
+# set COOKIE_SECURE=true instead.
+ALLOW_INSECURE_COOKIES=1 uvicorn gateway:create_app --factory --host 0.0.0.0 --port 8080
 ```
 
 Container image, from the repository root:
@@ -214,18 +276,27 @@ uvicorn's access log so bearer tokens in URLs are not logged.
   Log rotation, a very chatty container, or DSH changing its startup message
   breaks the handshake. Prefer a first-class token/credential API when DSH
   offers one.
-* **Single replica, in-memory state.** The handshake cookie cache, idle
+* **Single replica, in-memory state.** The handshake cookie cache, the opaque
-  activity clocks and in-flight counters live in one process. Running more
+  session table, idle activity clocks, in-flight counters and rate-limit
-  than one replica would need shared state (or sticky routing), otherwise each
+  buckets live in one process. Running more than one replica would need shared
-  replica handshakes independently and the sweeper may race another replica.
+  state (or sticky routing), otherwise each replica handshakes independently,
+  the sweeper may race another replica, and a session/rate budget is only seen
+  by the replica that created it.
+* **Sessions die with the process.** An opaque session id is valid only in the
+  process that minted it and expires after `COOKIE_MAX_AGE`; a restart logs
+  every browser out (tokens are unaffected).
 * **In-memory token cache has no TTL.** It is keyed by pod UID, so pod
   restarts invalidate it naturally; otherwise entries survive until the pod or
   claim is deleted.
-* **No TLS termination.** Run behind an ingress/load balancer; set
+* **No TLS termination.** Run behind an ingress/load balancer and set
-  `COOKIE_SECURE=true` there.
+  `COOKIE_SECURE=true`. `Settings.from_env()` refuses to start without it
+  unless `ALLOW_INSECURE_COOKIES=1` explicitly acknowledges plain-HTTP
+  sessions.
 * **Origin-based CSRF protection only.** Cookie-auth mutations require a
-  same-origin `Origin`/`Referer`; there is no per-form CSRF token, rate
+  same-origin `Origin`/`Referer`, and form signup/login reject a contradicting
-  limiting or login throttling.
+  origin when the browser sends one; there is no per-form CSRF token. Auth
+  routes have per-client rate limiting and login throttling, but the budget is
+  in-process (per replica) and keyed by the rightmost `X-Forwarded-For` value.
 * **HTTP request bodies are buffered** up to `MAX_BODY_MB`; uploads are not
   streamed. Responses (including SSE) are streamed.
 * **Upstream cookies are not forwarded.** DSH cannot rotate its own

examples/dsh-agents-as-a-service/gateway/gateway.py

@@ -7,9 +7,12 @@ single teaching-friendly module with three jobs:
   (only its SHA-256 is stored, as a claim annotation), report derived state,
   and delete the claim (which cascades the sandbox and its PVC).
 * **Browser sessions** -- exchange a user token for an HttpOnly session cookie
-  so the DSH UI can be opened in a browser at ``/u/<user>/``.  Browser requests
+  whose value is an opaque, server-side session id (the user and expiry live in
-  authenticate with that cookie; automation can keep using
+  memory) so the DSH UI can be opened in a browser at ``/u/<user>/``.  Browser
-  ``Authorization: Bearer <token>``.
+  requests authenticate with that cookie; automation can keep using
+  ``Authorization: Bearer <token>``.  Sessions are revoked on logout, user
+  deletion, recreate and expiry, and a cookie is never accepted as a bearer
+  token (nor the other way around).
 * **Reverse proxy** -- HTTP (including SSE) and WebSocket proxying to the
   sandbox's DSH Web server on ``:3080``.  DSH itself is cookie-gated: the
   gateway scrapes the launch token from the pod logs, performs the ``?token=``
@@ -38,6 +41,7 @@ import contextlib
 import hashlib
 import html
 import json
+import math
 import os
 import re
 import secrets
@@ -62,7 +66,7 @@ from kubernetes import config as k8s_config
 from kubernetes.client.exceptions import ApiException
 from starlette.applications import Starlette
 from starlette.datastructures import Headers
-from starlette.requests import Request
+from starlette.requests import ClientDisconnect, Request
 from starlette.responses import (
     HTMLResponse,
     JSONResponse,
@@ -121,6 +125,19 @@ OWNED_REQUEST_HEADERS = HOP_BY_HOP | {
     "x-real-ip",
 }
 
+# Default session cookie names.  ``__Host-`` is only legal over HTTPS and pins
+# the cookie to Path=/ with no Domain attribute; the insecure default keeps the
+# example usable over plain HTTP behind a port-forward.
+DEFAULT_COOKIE_NAME = "dsh_gw_session"
+SECURE_COOKIE_NAME = "__Host-dsh_gw_session"
+
+# Header prefixes a client must never be able to smuggle upstream.  The gateway
+# derives its own X-Forwarded-* values from the connection; anything the browser
+# sends with these names is attacker-controlled and is dropped in both the HTTP
+# and WebSocket proxy paths.
+FORWARDING_HEADER_PREFIXES = ("x-forwarded-", "x-auth-request-")
+FORWARDING_HEADERS = frozenset({"forwarded"})
+
 _DSH_WEB_LINE = re.compile(r"dsh web:\s+(?P<url>https?://\S+)")
 
 
@@ -144,6 +161,11 @@ class UpstreamError(Exception):
     """The upstream DSH connection failed."""
 
 
+# nginx's "client closed request": the peer went away before it could be
+# answered, so no status is ever delivered.
+CLIENT_CLOSED_REQUEST = 499
+
+
 # --- Pure helpers (unit-testable without an app) --------------------------
 
 
@@ -244,6 +266,33 @@ def same_origin(headers) -> bool:
     return False
 
 
+def strip_forwarding_header(name: str) -> bool:
+    """True for client-supplied identity/forwarding headers we never forward.
+
+    ``X-Forwarded-User`` and ``X-Auth-Request-*`` carry identities an
+    authenticating proxy or the gateway itself owns; ``Forwarded`` /
+    ``X-Forwarded-*`` describe the hop chain.  Forwarding any of them lets a
+    browser spoof its origin or a trusted SSO user upstream.
+    """
+    lowered = name.lower()
+    return lowered in FORWARDING_HEADERS or lowered.startswith(FORWARDING_HEADER_PREFIXES)
+
+
+def client_identity(headers, client) -> str:
+    """The rate-limit bucket for a request.
+
+    The rightmost ``X-Forwarded-For`` entry is the address the last trusted
+    proxy saw (each proxy appends), so it cannot be spoofed by prepending
+    arbitrary values.  Without the header fall back to the socket peer.
+    """
+    forwarded = (headers.get("x-forwarded-for") or "").strip()
+    if forwarded:
+        parts = [part.strip() for part in forwarded.split(",") if part.strip()]
+        if parts:
+            return parts[-1]
+    return getattr(client, "host", None) or "unknown"
+
+
 def rewrite_location(location: str, user: str) -> str:
     """Prefix absolute-path redirects so the browser stays under ``/u/<user>/``."""
     if not location.startswith("/") or location.startswith("//"):
@@ -301,6 +350,14 @@ def _env_float(name: str, default: float) -> float:
         return default
 
 
+def _env_allowlist(name: str) -> frozenset[str] | None:
+    """Parse a comma-separated header allowlist; unset means "denylist mode"."""
+    raw = os.environ.get(name)
+    if raw is None:
+        return None
+    return frozenset(part.strip().lower() for part in raw.split(",") if part.strip())
+
+
 # --- Settings --------------------------------------------------------------
 
 
@@ -320,7 +377,7 @@ class Settings:
     dsh_port: int = 3080
     dsh_container: str = "dsh-web"
     dsh_log_tail_lines: int = 2000
-    cookie_name: str = "dsh_gw_session"
+    cookie_name: str = DEFAULT_COOKIE_NAME
     cookie_secure: bool = False
     cookie_max_age: int = 7 * 24 * 60 * 60
     max_body_bytes: int = 32 * 1024 * 1024
@@ -334,9 +391,36 @@ class Settings:
     # valid user in this header are treated as authenticated (SSO); unset (None)
     # disables SSO entirely and the header is never trusted.
     auth_proxy_header: str | None = None
+    # Abuse controls. AUTH_RATE_LIMIT applies to the unauthenticated auth routes
+    # (POST /users and POST /login) per client and window; 0 disables it.
+    auth_rate_limit: int = 30
+    auth_rate_window: int = 60
+    # When set, signup requires this invite code (form field ``invite`` or the
+    # ``X-Signup-Invite`` header). None keeps signup open, as in the demo.
+    signup_invite_code: str | None = None
+    # Optional allowlist of client request headers to forward upstream. None
+    # keeps the default denylist behavior; a set (possibly empty) forwards only
+    # the named headers (plus the gateway's own X-Forwarded-* values).
+    upstream_header_allowlist: frozenset[str] | None = None
+    # Concurrent proxied requests per user before 503/1011 is returned.
+    max_in_flight_per_user: int = 32
+    # Largest WebSocket message accepted from DSH, in bytes. Browser-to-DSH
+    # frames are bounded by the ASGI server's own WebSocket limit.
+    ws_max_message_bytes: int = 16 * 1024 * 1024
 
     @classmethod
     def from_env(cls) -> Settings:
+        cookie_secure = _env_bool("COOKIE_SECURE", False)
+        allow_insecure = _env_bool("ALLOW_INSECURE_COOKIES", False)
+        if not cookie_secure and not allow_insecure:
+            raise RuntimeError(
+                "refusing to start with an insecure session cookie: set "
+                "COOKIE_SECURE=true behind TLS, or ALLOW_INSECURE_COOKIES=1 "
+                "for a local plain-HTTP demo"
+            )
+        cookie_name = os.environ.get("COOKIE_NAME") or (
+            SECURE_COOKIE_NAME if cookie_secure else DEFAULT_COOKIE_NAME
+        )
         return cls(
             namespace=os.environ.get("NAMESPACE", "dsh-demo"),
             pool=os.environ.get("POOL", "dsh-pool"),
@@ -345,13 +429,19 @@ class Settings:
             dsh_port=_env_int("DSH_PORT", 3080),
             dsh_container=os.environ.get("DSH_CONTAINER", "dsh-web"),
             dsh_log_tail_lines=_env_int("DSH_LOG_TAIL_LINES", 2000),
-            cookie_name=os.environ.get("COOKIE_NAME", "dsh_gw_session"),
+            cookie_name=cookie_name,
-            cookie_secure=_env_bool("COOKIE_SECURE", False),
+            cookie_secure=cookie_secure,
             cookie_max_age=_env_int("COOKIE_MAX_AGE", 7 * 24 * 60 * 60),
             max_body_bytes=_env_int("MAX_BODY_MB", 32) * 1024 * 1024,
             http_timeout=_env_float("HTTP_TIMEOUT", 300.0),
             sweep_interval=_env_float("SWEEP_INTERVAL", 15.0),
             auth_proxy_header=os.environ.get("AUTH_PROXY_HEADER") or None,
+            auth_rate_limit=_env_int("AUTH_RATE_LIMIT", 30),
+            auth_rate_window=_env_int("AUTH_RATE_WINDOW", 60),
+            signup_invite_code=os.environ.get("SIGNUP_INVITE_CODE") or None,
+            upstream_header_allowlist=_env_allowlist("UPSTREAM_HEADER_ALLOWLIST"),
+            max_in_flight_per_user=_env_int("MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PER_USER", 32),
+            ws_max_message_bytes=_env_int("WS_MAX_MESSAGE_BYTES", 16 * 1024 * 1024),
         )
 
 
@@ -541,6 +631,19 @@ class Kubernetes:
 # --- Gateway ---------------------------------------------------------------
 
 
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class Session:
+    """A browser session stored server-side, keyed by an opaque random id.
+
+    The cookie only carries the id; the user and the expiry stay in memory, so
+    a cookie can never be edited into another user's credentials and a stolen
+    token is not recoverable from the browser.
+    """
+
+    user: str
+    expires_at: float
+
+
 @dataclass
 class GatewayState:
     """In-memory, per-process state (single replica by design)."""
@@ -550,6 +653,10 @@ class GatewayState:
     maintenance: dict[str, bool] = field(default_factory=dict)
     # (user, pod UID, browser Host) -> "dsh-auth-a=...; dsh-auth-b=..."
     handshake: dict[tuple[str, str, str], str] = field(default_factory=dict)
+    # Opaque session id -> server-side session (user + expiry).
+    sessions: dict[str, Session] = field(default_factory=dict)
+    # Auth rate limiting: client -> (window start, attempts in window).
+    auth_rate: dict[str, tuple[float, int]] = field(default_factory=dict)
     lock: asyncio.Lock = field(default_factory=asyncio.Lock)
 
 
@@ -571,17 +678,40 @@ class Gateway:
 
     # -- credentials -------------------------------------------------------
 
+    def session_for(self, sid: str | None) -> Session | None:
+        """Look up a live session, dropping it when it has expired."""
+        if not sid:
+            return None
+        session = self.state.sessions.get(sid)
+        if session is None:
+            return None
+        if session.expires_at <= time.time():
+            self.state.sessions.pop(sid, None)
+            return None
+        return session
+
+    def revoke_session(self, sid: str | None) -> None:
+        if sid:
+            self.state.sessions.pop(sid, None)
+
+    def revoke_sessions(self, user: str) -> None:
+        for sid in [key for key, session in self.state.sessions.items() if session.user == user]:
+            self.state.sessions.pop(sid, None)
+
     def credentials(self, headers, cookies) -> tuple[str | None, str | None]:
-        """Return ``(token, cookie_user)``; bearer wins over the session cookie."""
+        """Return ``(token, session_user)``; bearer wins over the session cookie.
+
+        A bearer token is never resolved from a cookie and a session id is never
+        accepted as a bearer token.  An unknown or expired session is treated as
+        anonymous (and the expired entry is dropped).
+        """
         auth = headers.get("authorization", "")
         if auth.lower().startswith("bearer "):
             return auth[7:].strip(), None
-        raw = cookies.get(self.settings.cookie_name)
+        session = self.session_for(cookies.get(self.settings.cookie_name))
-        if raw:
+        if session is None:
-            user, sep, token = raw.partition(":")
-            if sep and user and token:
-                return token, user
             return None, None
+        return None, session.user
 
     def remote_user(self, headers) -> str | None:
         """The user asserted by a trusted reverse proxy, when SSO is enabled.
@@ -600,30 +730,36 @@ class Gateway:
         self,
         claim: dict,
         token: str | None,
-        cookie_user: str | None,
+        session_user: str | None,
         user: str,
         remote: str | None = None,
     ) -> bool:
         if remote == user:
             return True  # identity asserted by the authenticating proxy
-        if cookie_user is not None and cookie_user != user:
+        if session_user is not None:
-            return False  # a session for another user never authorizes this one
+            return session_user == user  # server-side session bound to this user
         return token_matches(claim, token)
 
     async def _sso_session(self, remote: str, headers, cookies, response: Response) -> dict | None:
-        """Provision ``remote`` idempotently and mint/refresh a session token.
+        """Provision ``remote`` idempotently and mint/refresh a session.
 
         The authenticating proxy has already verified ``remote``, so it is
         trusted. A brand-new user is provisioned (claim created, token minted);
-        an existing user whose session cookie is missing or no longer matches
+        an existing user whose session cookie is missing, foreign or no longer
-        gets a rotated token so a fresh cookie can be issued. A still-valid
+        matches gets a rotated token so a fresh cookie can be issued. A still-valid
-        session is reused untouched. Provisioning is non-blocking: the sandbox
+        session for the same user is reused untouched. Provisioning is
-        is awaited by the proxy path (``_resolve_sandbox``), so the landing page
+        non-blocking: the sandbox is awaited by the proxy path
-        can report "Provisioning" instead of stalling for ``WAKE_TIMEOUT``.
+        (``_resolve_sandbox``), so the landing page can report "Provisioning"
+        instead of stalling for ``WAKE_TIMEOUT``.
         """
         claim = await self.k8s.get_claim(remote)
-        token, cookie_user = self.credentials(headers, cookies)
+        sid = cookies.get(self.settings.cookie_name)
-        if claim is not None and cookie_user == remote and token_matches(claim, token):
+        session = self.session_for(sid)
+        if session is not None:
+            if session.user != remote:
+                # A session for another identity never authorizes this user.
+                self.revoke_session(sid)
+            elif claim is not None:
                 return claim
         token = secrets.token_urlsafe(32)
         token_hash = hashlib.sha256(token.encode()).hexdigest()
@@ -640,7 +776,7 @@ class Gateway:
         else:
             await self.k8s.patch_token(remote, token_hash)
             await self._touch(remote)
-        self.set_session(response, remote, token)
+        self.set_session(response, remote)
         return await self.k8s.get_claim(remote) if is_new else claim
 
     @staticmethod
@@ -651,16 +787,73 @@ class Gateway:
             and not same_origin(headers)
         )
 
-    def set_session(self, response: Response, user: str, token: str) -> None:
+    def set_session(self, response: Response, user: str) -> str:
+        """Mint an opaque server-side session and set the browser cookie."""
+        sid = secrets.token_urlsafe(32)
+        self.state.sessions[sid] = Session(
+            user=user,
+            expires_at=time.time() + self.settings.cookie_max_age,
+        )
         response.set_cookie(
             self.settings.cookie_name,
-            f"{user}:{token}",
+            sid,
             max_age=self.settings.cookie_max_age,
             path="/",
             httponly=True,
             samesite="lax",
             secure=self.settings.cookie_secure,
         )
+        return sid
+
+    # -- abuse controls ----------------------------------------------------
+
+    def _rate_limit(self, request: Request) -> Response | None:
+        """Return a 429 response when this client is over the auth budget."""
+        limit = self.settings.auth_rate_limit
+        if limit <= 0:
+            return None
+        window = max(1, self.settings.auth_rate_window)
+        key = client_identity(request.headers, request.client)
+        now = time.time()
+        bucket = self.state.auth_rate.get(key)
+        if bucket is None or now - bucket[0] >= window:
+            self.state.auth_rate[key] = (now, 1)
+            return None
+        start, count = bucket
+        if count >= limit:
+            retry_after = max(1, math.ceil(start + window - now))
+            return self._error(
+                429,
+                "too many authentication attempts, retry shortly",
+                {"Retry-After": str(retry_after)},
+            )
+        self.state.auth_rate[key] = (start, count + 1)
+        return None
+
+    def _invite_allowed(self, request: Request, payload: dict) -> bool:
+        """Check the signup invite code, when one is configured."""
+        expected = self.settings.signup_invite_code
+        if expected is None:
+            return True
+        provided = payload.get("invite")
+        if not isinstance(provided, str) or not provided:
+            provided = request.headers.get("x-signup-invite", "")
+        if not isinstance(provided, str) or not provided:
+            return False
+        return secrets.compare_digest(provided.encode("utf-8"), expected.encode("utf-8"))
+
+    def _form_cross_origin(self, request: Request) -> bool:
+        """Reject a form signup/login whose Origin/Referer contradicts Host.
+
+        Only checked when the browser actually sent one: non-browser clients
+        (automation, tests) commonly omit both headers and must keep working.
+        """
+        if not self._wants_form(request):
+            return False
+        headers = request.headers
+        if not (headers.get("origin") or headers.get("referer")):
+            return False
+        return not same_origin(headers)
 
     # -- activity / maintenance -------------------------------------------
 
@@ -669,12 +862,21 @@ class Gateway:
             self.state.last_activity[user] = time.time()
 
     async def _acquire(self, user: str) -> bool:
-        """Reserve an in-flight slot, waiting out a concurrent suspend."""
+        """Reserve an in-flight slot, waiting out a concurrent suspend.
+
+        Returns False when the user already has ``MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PER_USER``
+        requests in flight (an abuse guard, not a transient error) or when a
+        suspend does not finish within ``WAKE_TIMEOUT``.
+        """
         deadline = time.monotonic() + self.settings.wake_timeout
+        cap = self.settings.max_in_flight_per_user
         while True:
             async with self.state.lock:
                 if not self.state.maintenance.get(user):
-                    self.state.in_flight[user] = self.state.in_flight.get(user, 0) + 1
+                    current = self.state.in_flight.get(user, 0)
+                    if cap > 0 and current >= cap:
+                        return False
+                    self.state.in_flight[user] = current + 1
                     self.state.last_activity[user] = time.time()
                     return True
             if time.monotonic() > deadline:
@@ -682,7 +884,12 @@ class Gateway:
             await asyncio.sleep(0.1)
 
     async def _release(self, user: str) -> None:
-        async with self.state.lock:
+        # Deliberately await-free: this runs from ``finally`` blocks, and the
+        # slot must be freed even when a client disconnect cancels the request
+        # mid-stream.  Awaiting the lock there can be interrupted before the
+        # decrement, stranding the slot (the user's sandbox would then never
+        # look idle again).  A plain dict update is atomic because the event
+        # loop cannot switch tasks between two synchronous statements.
         self.state.in_flight[user] = max(self.state.in_flight.get(user, 1) - 1, 0)
         self.state.last_activity[user] = time.time()
 
@@ -749,14 +956,19 @@ class Gateway:
         host: str,
         force: bool = False,
     ) -> tuple[str, tuple[str, str, str], bool]:
-        """Return ``(cookie, cache_key, was_cached)``, handshaking on a miss."""
+        """Return ``(cookie, cache_key, was_cached)``, handshaking on a miss.
+
+        Every failure raises ``HandshakeError`` with a fixed, credential-free
+        message: the exception reaches the browser in the 503 body, so it must
+        never carry the launch token, the handshake URL or pod details.
+        """
         pod_name = self._pod_name(sandbox)
         try:
             pod = await self.k8s.get_pod(pod_name)
         except ApiException as exc:
-            raise HandshakeError(f"could not read pod {pod_name}: {exc}") from exc
+            raise HandshakeError("could not read the DSH handshake pod") from exc
         if pod is None:
-            raise HandshakeError(f"pod {pod_name} not found")
+            raise HandshakeError("the DSH handshake pod is not available")
         uid = (pod.get("metadata") or {}).get("uid") or pod_name
         key = (user, uid, host)
         if not force:
@@ -770,7 +982,7 @@ class Gateway:
                 self.settings.dsh_log_tail_lines,
             )
         except ApiException as exc:
-            raise HandshakeError(f"could not read logs for {pod_name}: {exc}") from exc
+            raise HandshakeError("could not read the pod logs for the handshake") from exc
         launch_token = parse_dsh_launch_token(logs)
         if not launch_token:
             raise HandshakeError("DSH launch token not found in pod logs")
@@ -788,12 +1000,12 @@ class Gateway:
                 timeout=self.settings.http_timeout,
             )
         except httpx.HTTPError as exc:
-            raise HandshakeError(f"DSH handshake failed: {exc}") from exc
+            raise HandshakeError("the DSH handshake request failed") from exc
         if response.status_code >= 400:
-            raise HandshakeError(f"DSH handshake returned {response.status_code}")
+            raise HandshakeError("the DSH handshake returned an error status")
         cookie = extract_dsh_cookies(response.headers.get_list("set-cookie"))
         if not cookie:
-            raise HandshakeError("DSH handshake set no dsh-auth cookie")
+            raise HandshakeError("the DSH handshake set no auth cookie")
         self.state.handshake[key] = cookie
         return cookie, key, False
 
@@ -869,9 +1081,9 @@ class Gateway:
             if "set-cookie" in response.headers:
                 page.headers["set-cookie"] = response.headers["set-cookie"]
             return page
-        token, user = self.credentials(request.headers, request.cookies)
+        _token, user = self.credentials(request.headers, request.cookies)
         session = ""
-        if user and token:
+        if user:
             safe_user = html.escape(user)
             session = (
                 f'<p class="session">Signed in as <strong>{safe_user}</strong>. '
@@ -879,6 +1091,11 @@ class Gateway:
                 '<form method="post" action="/logout">'
                 '<button type="submit">Sign out</button></form>'
             )
+        invite_input = (
+            '<input name="invite" type="password" placeholder="invite code" required>'
+            if self.settings.signup_invite_code is not None
+            else ""
+        )
         body = f"""<!doctype html>
 <html lang="en">
 <head>
@@ -901,6 +1118,7 @@ class Gateway:
 <h2>Create a sandbox</h2>
 <form method="post" action="/users">
   <input name="user" placeholder="username (dns-1123 label)" required>
+  {invite_input}
   <button type="submit">Create</button>
 </form>
 </section>
@@ -960,11 +1178,18 @@ against the JSON API. The browser session is an HttpOnly cookie.</p>
     # -- users -------------------------------------------------------------
 
     async def signup(self, request: Request) -> Response:
+        limited = self._rate_limit(request)
+        if limited is not None:
+            return limited
+        if self._form_cross_origin(request):
+            return self._error(403, "cross-origin request rejected")
         wants_form = self._wants_form(request)
         try:
             payload = await self._read_payload(request)
         except BodyTooLarge:
             return self._error(413, "request body too large")
+        if not self._invite_allowed(request, payload):
+            return self._error(403, "invalid or missing invite code")
         user = payload.get("user", "")
         if not valid_user(user):
             return self._error(400, "body must be {'user': '<dns-1123 label>'}")
@@ -982,16 +1207,21 @@ against the JSON API. The browser session is an HttpOnly cookie.</p>
         sandbox_name = (sandbox or {}).get("metadata", {}).get("name")
         if wants_form:
             response = RedirectResponse(f"/u/{user}/", status_code=303)
-            self.set_session(response, user, token)
+            self.set_session(response, user)
             return response
         response = JSONResponse(
             {"user": user, "token": token, "state": state, "sandbox": sandbox_name},
             status_code=201 if state == "Ready" else 202,
         )
-        self.set_session(response, user, token)
+        self.set_session(response, user)
         return response
 
     async def login(self, request: Request) -> Response:
+        limited = self._rate_limit(request)
+        if limited is not None:
+            return limited
+        if self._form_cross_origin(request):
+            return self._error(403, "cross-origin request rejected")
         wants_form = self._wants_form(request)
         try:
             payload = await self._read_payload(request)
@@ -1002,21 +1232,29 @@ against the JSON API. The browser session is an HttpOnly cookie.</p>
         if not isinstance(user, str) or not isinstance(token, str):
             return self._error(400, "user and token are required")
         claim = await self.k8s.get_claim(user)
-        if claim is None:
+        # An unknown user is indistinguishable from a bad token to the client:
-            return self._error(404, "not found")
+        # never reveal which usernames exist.
-        if not token_matches(claim, token):
+        if claim is None or not token_matches(claim, token):
             return self._error(401, "unauthorized")
         await self._touch(user)
         if wants_form:
             response = RedirectResponse(f"/u/{user}/", status_code=303)
         else:
             response = JSONResponse({"user": user, "state": "ok"})
-        self.set_session(response, user, token)
+        self.set_session(response, user)
         return response
 
     async def logout(self, request: Request) -> Response:
+        self.revoke_session(request.cookies.get(self.settings.cookie_name))
         response = RedirectResponse("/", status_code=303)
-        response.delete_cookie(self.settings.cookie_name, path="/")
+        # Match the attributes the cookie was set with: a __Host- cookie
+        # deletion that lacks Secure is rejected by browsers, leaving a stale
+        # (though already revoked) cookie behind.
+        response.delete_cookie(
+            self.settings.cookie_name,
+            path="/",
+            secure=self.settings.cookie_secure,
+        )
         return response
 
     async def get_user(self, request: Request) -> Response:
@@ -1051,6 +1289,7 @@ against the JSON API. The browser session is an HttpOnly cookie.</p>
         if self._mutation_from_cookie(request.headers, "DELETE", cookie_user):
             return self._error(403, "cross-origin request rejected")
         await self.k8s.delete_claim(user)
+        self.revoke_sessions(user)
         self._clear_handshake(user)
         async with self.state.lock:
             self.state.last_activity.pop(user, None)
@@ -1074,6 +1313,7 @@ against the JSON API. The browser session is an HttpOnly cookie.</p>
         if self._mutation_from_cookie(request.headers, "POST", cookie_user):
             return self._error(403, "cross-origin request rejected")
         await self.k8s.delete_claim(remote)
+        self.revoke_sessions(remote)
         self._clear_handshake(remote)
         async with self.state.lock:
             self.state.last_activity.pop(remote, None)
@@ -1101,7 +1341,7 @@ against the JSON API. The browser session is an HttpOnly cookie.</p>
                 return RedirectResponse("/", status_code=303)
             return self._error(404, "unknown user")
         token, cookie_user = self.credentials(request.headers, request.cookies)
-        if remote == user and not (cookie_user == user and token_matches(claim, token)):
+        if remote == user and cookie_user != user:
             # SSO user without a valid session cookie: bootstrap, then continue.
             return RedirectResponse("/", status_code=303)
         if not self._authorized(claim, token, cookie_user, user, remote):
@@ -1161,11 +1401,17 @@ against the JSON API. The browser session is an HttpOnly cookie.</p>
         if query:
             url = f"{url}?{query}"
 
-        headers = {
+        headers = {}
-            key: value
+        allowlist = self.settings.upstream_header_allowlist
-            for key, value in request.headers.items()
+        for key, value in request.headers.items():
-            if key.lower() not in OWNED_REQUEST_HEADERS and key.lower() != "content-length"
+            lowered = key.lower()
-        }
+            if lowered in OWNED_REQUEST_HEADERS or lowered == "content-length":
+                continue
+            if strip_forwarding_header(lowered):
+                continue  # client-supplied identity/hop-chain headers are spoofable
+            if allowlist is not None and lowered not in allowlist:
+                continue
+            headers[key] = value
         host = request.headers.get("host", "")
         headers["host"] = host
         headers["cookie"] = cookie  # only the cached DSH auth cookie
@@ -1238,8 +1484,16 @@ against the JSON API. The browser session is an HttpOnly cookie.</p>
                 print(f"stream for {user} ended early: {exc!r}", flush=True)
                 return
         finally:
+            # The slot must be freed even when this ``finally`` runs inside a
+            # cancelled task: on a client disconnect Starlette cancels the
+            # streaming task through an anyio cancel scope, and CancelledError
+            # is a BaseException, so ``suppress(Exception)`` would let a close
+            # that awaits abort the whole block before ``_release`` ran.  A
+            # stranded slot keeps the user's sandbox looking busy forever.
+            try:
                 with contextlib.suppress(Exception):
                     await upstream.aclose()
+            finally:
                 await self._release(user)
 
     # -- WebSocket proxy ---------------------------------------------------
@@ -1291,13 +1545,19 @@ against the JSON API. The browser session is an HttpOnly cookie.</p>
                 query = filtered_query(websocket.url.query)
                 if query:
                     url = f"{url}?{query}"
-                headers = {
+                headers = {}
-                    key: value
+                allowlist = self.settings.upstream_header_allowlist
-                    for key, value in websocket.headers.items()
+                for key, value in websocket.headers.items():
-                    if key.lower() not in OWNED_REQUEST_HEADERS
+                    lowered = key.lower()
-                    and key.lower() != "origin"
+                    if lowered in OWNED_REQUEST_HEADERS or lowered == "origin":
-                    and not key.lower().startswith("sec-websocket-")
+                        continue
-                }
+                    if lowered.startswith("sec-websocket-"):
+                        continue
+                    if strip_forwarding_header(lowered):
+                        continue  # client-supplied identity/hop-chain headers
+                    if allowlist is not None and lowered not in allowlist:
+                        continue
+                    headers[key] = value
                 headers["cookie"] = cookie
                 headers["x-forwarded-host"] = host
                 headers["x-forwarded-proto"] = websocket.url.scheme
@@ -1313,7 +1573,7 @@ against the JSON API. The browser session is an HttpOnly cookie.</p>
                     additional_headers=headers,
                     subprotocols=subprotocols or None,
                     open_timeout=self.settings.wake_timeout,
-                    max_size=None,
+                    max_size=self.settings.ws_max_message_bytes,
                     proxy=None,
                 )
                 upstream = await upstream_cm.__aenter__()
@@ -1373,8 +1633,41 @@ against the JSON API. The browser session is an HttpOnly cookie.</p>
 
     # -- idle sweeper ------------------------------------------------------
 
+    def _prune_state(self, claims: list[dict]) -> None:
+        """Drop state that can no longer be reached.
+
+        Sessions and activity clocks for a user whose claim is gone, expired
+        sessions and expired rate-limit buckets would otherwise accumulate for
+        the lifetime of the process.  In-flight counters are only pruned at
+        zero, and a user with work in flight is always preserved.
+        """
+        now = time.time()
+        present = set()
+        for claim in claims:
+            name = (claim.get("metadata") or {}).get("name") or ""
+            if name.startswith("dsh-"):
+                present.add(name[len("dsh-") :])
+        for user in [user for user in self.state.last_activity if user not in present]:
+            self.state.last_activity.pop(user, None)
+        for user, count in list(self.state.in_flight.items()):
+            if user not in present and count == 0:
+                self.state.in_flight.pop(user, None)
+        for user, flag in list(self.state.maintenance.items()):
+            if user not in present and not flag:
+                self.state.maintenance.pop(user, None)
+        for key in [key for key in self.state.handshake if key[0] not in present]:
+            self.state.handshake.pop(key, None)
+        for sid, session in list(self.state.sessions.items()):
+            if session.user not in present or session.expires_at <= now:
+                self.state.sessions.pop(sid, None)
+        window = max(1, self.settings.auth_rate_window)
+        for key, (start, _count) in list(self.state.auth_rate.items()):
+            if now - start >= window:
+                self.state.auth_rate.pop(key, None)
+
     async def sweep_once(self) -> None:
         claims = await self.k8s.list_claims()
+        self._prune_state(claims)
         for claim in claims:
             # Only suspend claims this gateway created.  Everything else in
             # the namespace (resource-layer claims from the README walkthrough,
@@ -1439,6 +1732,20 @@ def _lifespan(gateway: Gateway, close_http_client: httpx.AsyncClient | None = No
     return lifespan
 
 
+async def client_gone(request: Request, exc: ClientDisconnect) -> Response:
+    """Answer a client that vanished mid-request instead of logging a traceback.
+
+    Reading a request body raises ``ClientDisconnect`` when a browser reload, a
+    back navigation or an ingress timeout aborts the upload.  The request never
+    reached DSH, and nothing can be delivered to the peer that left, so the
+    honest outcome is 499 (nginx's "client closed request").  Letting it escape
+    would make Starlette's ``ServerErrorMiddleware`` log one ERROR traceback per
+    aborted request, which buries real faults.  It also covers the control
+    routes that read a body (signup and login), not just the proxy.
+    """
+    return Response(status_code=CLIENT_CLOSED_REQUEST)
+
+
 def create_app(
     settings: Settings | None = None,
     k8s=None,
@@ -1471,6 +1778,7 @@ def create_app(
     ]
     app = Starlette(
         routes=routes,
+        exception_handlers={ClientDisconnect: client_gone},
         lifespan=_lifespan(gateway, http_client if owns_http_client else None),
     )
     app.state.gateway = gateway

examples/dsh-agents-as-a-service/manifests/10-sandboxtemplate.yaml

@@ -29,6 +29,15 @@ spec:
   # be blocked. See docs/optional-hardening.md.
   networkPolicyManagement: Unmanaged
 
+  # OPTIONAL: replace a Failed sandbox Pod instead of parking the sandbox.
+  # The default, Retain, leaves the Failed Pod in place and surfaces
+  # Finished=True on the Sandbox until a human intervenes. Recreate deletes the
+  # Failed Pod and starts a replacement with the same Sandbox identity and
+  # Sandbox-owned PVCs, backing off (5s doubling to 5m) on repeated failures.
+  # Requires agent-sandbox v1.0.8+; existing Sandboxes keep their own stamped
+  # policy, so patch them separately. See docs/optional-hardening.md.
+  # failedPodPolicy: Recreate
+
   podTemplate:
     spec:
       # DSH Web is multi-arch (amd64 + arm64); no arch nodeSelector is needed.
@@ -60,11 +69,11 @@ spec:
         # OnRootMismatch skips that walk once the volume root already carries
         # the fsGroup ownership/mode applied on the first mount.
         # Keep in sync with the minimal variant:
-        # examples/minimal-single-tenant/manifests/sandbox-template.yaml.
+        # examples/minimal-single-tenant/manifests/10-sandboxtemplate.yaml.
         fsGroupChangePolicy: OnRootMismatch
       containers:
         - name: dsh-web
-          image: ghcr.io/sredevopsorg/deepseek-kubernetes-sandbox:dsh-v0.2.1-rc.3-r4
+          image: ghcr.io/sredevopsorg/deepseek-kubernetes-sandbox:dsh-v0.2.1-rc.5-r6
           imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent
           ports:
             - name: web
@@ -80,6 +89,23 @@ spec:
                 name: dsh-provider-keys-extra
                 optional: true
           env:
+            # Point the OS home at the persisted agent workspace. DSH's
+            # directory picker (the folder explorer used to choose a workspace)
+            # has no start-path setting: when it opens it lists $HOME, and
+            # os.homedir() follows this variable. The image default is
+            # /home/node, which is not on a volume, so the picker would open on
+            # a throwaway directory; /workspace is the PVC-backed WORKDIR. `~`
+            # in agent commands resolves here too. Trade-off: tools that keep
+            # caches/config under $HOME (npm/pnpm, uv, git, gh, and DSH's global
+            # ~/.agents instructions and skills) now write dotfiles onto the PVC
+            # inside the agent workspace, so they are visible to the agent and
+            # in the file explorer. DSH_HOME is explicit (/home/node/.dsh), so
+            # sessions, config and credentials are unaffected. Existing
+            # sandboxes stamp pod env at creation and keep the old HOME until
+            # recreated. Keep in sync with the minimal variant:
+            # examples/minimal-single-tenant/manifests/10-sandboxtemplate.yaml.
+            - name: HOME
+              value: /workspace
             # Empty => DSH derives links from the request Host, which the
             # gateway forwards (plus X-Forwarded-*). Point this at the
             # gateway base URL if you want hard-coded absolute links instead.
@@ -93,6 +119,38 @@ spec:
             # dsh-demo.example.com for the gateway-api-sso/ HTTPRoute).
             - name: DSH_TRUSTED_HOSTS
               value: ""
+            # DSH confines every bash command with its own file sandbox
+            # (bubblewrap, else Landlock). Neither backend is usable inside this
+            # pod: bubblewrap ships in the image but is unsetuid, so it needs an
+            # unprivileged user namespace that the pod's RuntimeDefault seccomp
+            # and dropped capabilities do not grant, and the runtime/kernel
+            # surface here exposes no Landlock runner. The executor therefore
+            # fails closed with SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE and every command fails. The
+            # pod is the isolation boundary in this example (one pod
+            # per user, non-root, capabilities dropped, seccomp RuntimeDefault,
+            # a private PVC), so trade DSH's inner file policy for a working
+            # agent. Set this to workspace-write (or read-only) on hosts where a
+            # backend is available; see the README troubleshooting row.
+            # SECURITY: the pod is the isolation boundary in this example.
+            # danger-full-access is set only because DSH's own command sandbox
+            # has no usable backend in this pod (see above), which means an
+            # agent command can read its own DSH_HOME (including
+            # .credentials.yaml) and write anywhere in the container. What
+            # still contains it is the pod itself: one pod per user, non-root,
+            # all capabilities dropped, RuntimeDefault seccomp, its own PVC and
+            # Service. That is NOT a hardened multi-tenant boundary on a shared
+            # kernel. For production/multi-tenant use, additionally run the
+            # sandbox under gVisor (`runtimeClassName: gvisor` above) so a
+            # container escape is trapped in a userspace kernel, and apply the
+            # sandbox NetworkPolicy (manifests/optional/network-policy/) so
+            # tenants cannot reach each other or cluster-internal endpoints.
+            # The base manifests without those two controls are a demo. Treat
+            # danger-full-access as a fallback, not a target: on hosts where
+            # DSH's command-sandbox backend works, prefer workspace-write (or
+            # read-only), and recreate the pod because the value is stamped at
+            # creation.
+            - name: DSH_PERMISSION_MODE
+              value: danger-full-access
           # Probes target /favicon.svg: DSH gates / behind its launch-token
           # cookie and answers 401 to an unauthenticated GET, which would
           # otherwise fail readiness and then get the pod killed by liveness.
@@ -126,7 +184,8 @@ spec:
             periodSeconds: 15
             failureThreshold: 3
           # The container only needs to serve HTTP; drop every capability and
-          # disallow privilege escalation. DSH writes only to DSH_HOME (PVC).
+          # disallow privilege escalation. DSH writes only to its PVC-backed
+          # directories (DSH_HOME and the agent workspace).
           securityContext:
             allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
             capabilities:
@@ -139,6 +198,16 @@ spec:
           volumeMounts:
             - name: dsh-home
               mountPath: /home/node/.dsh # DSH_HOME: sessions, config, state
+            # The agent workspace (the image's WORKDIR) is PVC-backed too, but
+            # under its own subPath so DSH state - including .credentials.yaml -
+            # never shows up as workspace data. Kubelet creates workspace/ on
+            # first mount with the volume's fsGroup permissions (0775, setgid
+            # inherited from the volume root), so UID 1000 can write; no init
+            # container is needed. If the kubelet is killed mid-creation the
+            # directory stays 0755: see Troubleshooting in the README.
+            - name: dsh-home
+              mountPath: /workspace
+              subPath: workspace
   volumeClaimTemplates:
     - metadata:
         name: dsh-home

examples/dsh-agents-as-a-service/manifests/50-gateway.yaml

@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ spec:
           type: RuntimeDefault
       containers:
         - name: gateway
-          image: ghcr.io/sredevopsorg/deepseek-kubernetes-sandbox/dsh-agents-as-a-service/gateway:dsh-v0.2.1-rc.3-r4
+          image: ghcr.io/sredevopsorg/deepseek-kubernetes-sandbox/dsh-agents-as-a-service/gateway:dsh-v0.2.1-rc.5-r6
           imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent
           securityContext:
             allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
@@ -134,14 +134,30 @@ spec:
             # the DSH launch token.
             - name: DSH_CONTAINER
               value: dsh-web
-            # Cookie dsh_gw_session is HttpOnly + SameSite=Lax. "false" keeps
+            # Browser session cookie: HttpOnly + SameSite=Lax, holds only an
-            # the plain-HTTP demo usable through port-forward: a Secure cookie
+            # opaque, server-side session id (sid) - never the user's DSH
-            # is never sent over HTTP, so login would silently fail.
+            # token. Sessions can be revoked server-side: POST /logout, user
-            # HTTPS deployments (the ingress/ variant with TLS, or
+            # delete, POST /recreate and expiry (COOKIE_MAX_AGE, default
-            # gateway-api-sso/, which terminates TLS at the Gateway) MUST set
+            # 7 days) all invalidate them. The session table is in process
-            # this to "true".
+            # memory, so restarting this Deployment logs every browser out.
+            # With COOKIE_SECURE=true the cookie is named
+            # __Host-dsh_gw_session; COOKIE_NAME overrides the name.
+            #
+            # "false" keeps the plain-HTTP demo usable through port-forward: a
+            # Secure cookie is never sent over HTTP, so login would silently
+            # fail. The gateway REFUSES TO START with COOKIE_SECURE=false
+            # unless ALLOW_INSECURE_COOKIES=1 acknowledges that the session
+            # travels in clear text, so the base demo sets both. HTTPS
+            # deployments (the ingress/ variant with TLS, or gateway-api-sso/,
+            # which terminates TLS at the Gateway) MUST set this to "true".
             - name: COOKIE_SECURE
               value: "false"
+            # Explicit acknowledgement that this base demo serves plain HTTP.
+            # Required when COOKIE_SECURE=false (the gateway exits at startup
+            # otherwise); ignored once COOKIE_SECURE=true, so HTTPS installs
+            # should drop it. Never set this on an internet-facing deployment.
+            - name: ALLOW_INSECURE_COOKIES
+              value: "1"
             # SSO IS OPT-IN AND DISABLED HERE. With AUTH_PROXY_HEADER unset the
             # gateway trusts only its own bearer/session auth and ignores every
             # identity header. Enable it ONLY behind
@@ -152,9 +168,49 @@ spec:
             # reach :8080 can impersonate any user by sending that header.
             # - name: AUTH_PROXY_HEADER
             #   value: X-Forwarded-User
+            # Brute-force / abuse throttle for the unauthenticated auth
+            # endpoints (/users and /login): at most N attempts per client per
+            # AUTH_RATE_WINDOW seconds (default 60). A client is the rightmost
+            # X-Forwarded-For entry (the one added by the trusted proxy) when
+            # present, otherwise the TCP peer. Over the limit the gateway
+            # answers 429 + Retry-After BEFORE reading the body or touching the
+            # cluster; 0 disables the limiter. This is a per-process bucket, so
+            # it is not a substitute for an ingress rate limit.
+            - name: AUTH_RATE_LIMIT
+              value: "30"
+            # Window in seconds for AUTH_RATE_LIMIT (default 60).
+            # - name: AUTH_RATE_WINDOW
+            #   value: "60"
+            # Optional signup gate. When set, POST /users requires the invite
+            # code - form field "invite" or header X-Signup-Invite - compared in
+            # constant time. A missing/wrong code is rejected with 403 before
+            # the user is looked up, so it also stops unauthenticated claim
+            # creation. The landing page shows the invite input only when this
+            # is set. Keep the value in a Secret, create it before rollout and
+            # restart the gateway to pick up a rotation:
+            #   kubectl -n dsh-demo create secret generic dsh-signup-invite \
+            #     --from-literal=code="$(openssl rand -hex 16)"
+            # - name: SIGNUP_INVITE_CODE
+            #   valueFrom:
+            #     secretKeyRef:
+            #       name: dsh-signup-invite
+            #       key: code
             # Reject proxied request bodies larger than this (413).
             - name: MAX_BODY_MB
               value: "32"
+            # Per-user concurrency guard (default 32): at most this many
+            # proxied HTTP requests and WebSocket connections per user.
+            # Excess HTTP requests get 503 + Retry-After and excess WebSocket
+            # upgrades close with 1011, so one tenant cannot exhaust the
+            # single-replica gateway for everyone else.
+            # - name: MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PER_USER
+            #   value: "32"
+            # Largest WebSocket message received from DSH, in bytes (default
+            # 16 MiB); oversized frames close the connection. Browser-to-DSH
+            # frames are bounded by uvicorn's own limit. HTTP/SSE responses are
+            # streamed without this cap.
+            # - name: WS_MAX_MESSAGE_BYTES
+            #   value: "16777216"
           # /healthz is unauthenticated and returns 200 without touching the
           # cluster, so it is safe for both readiness and liveness.
           readinessProbe:

examples/dsh-agents-as-a-service/manifests/exposure/README.md

@@ -16,6 +16,16 @@ Applying both gives the gateway two entry points, and the SSO variant is only
 safe when the gateway is reachable **exclusively** through oauth2-proxy. Do not
 mix them.
 
+> **Production requirement.** Each variant's NetworkPolicy is part of the
+> variant, and applying the variant without it is demo-only. The sandbox
+> NetworkPolicy and the gateway egress policy (the API server is cluster-specific)
+> are separate and equally required; see the
+> [production checklist](../../docs/optional-hardening.md#6-production-checklist)
+> and the
+> [gateway egress recipe](../../docs/optional-hardening.md#gateway-egress-required-for-production).
+> For SSO, run [`scripts/preflight-sso.sh`](../../scripts/preflight-sso.sh)
+> after applying the variant and before sending real traffic.
+
 Each variant also ships a NetworkPolicy, applied by the same directory apply:
 
 - `ingress/61-networkpolicy.yaml` allows only Traefik pods to reach the gateway
@@ -27,7 +37,8 @@ Each variant also ships a NetworkPolicy, applied by the same directory apply:
 The policies assume Traefik's `app.kubernetes.io/name: traefik` pod label.
 Adjust the selector for another implementation or a `hostNetwork` install; see
 [optional hardening](../../docs/optional-hardening.md) for the probe caveat and
-verification commands.
+verification commands. Keep the policies: an exposure without its NetworkPolicy
+is demo-only.
 
 ## Applying a variant
 
@@ -69,10 +80,13 @@ Secrets imperatively (commands below) before applying the directory.
 2. Set `DSH_TRUSTED_HOSTS` in the SandboxTemplate to the same public host:
    the gateway forwards the browser's `Host`, and DSH rejects unknown hosts on
    `/api` (see `../10-sandboxtemplate.yaml`).
-3. Set `COOKIE_SECURE=true` on the gateway once the Ingress serves HTTPS:
+3. Set `COOKIE_SECURE=true` and remove the plain-HTTP acknowledgement once the
-   `kubectl -n dsh-demo set env deploy/dsh-gateway COOKIE_SECURE=true`. The
+   Ingress serves HTTPS:
-   base manifest keeps `false` so the plain-HTTP port-forward demo works; a
+   `kubectl -n dsh-demo set env deploy/dsh-gateway COOKIE_SECURE=true ALLOW_INSECURE_COOKIES-`.
-   `Secure` cookie is never sent over HTTP, which silently breaks login.
+   The base manifest keeps `false` + `ALLOW_INSECURE_COOKIES=1` so the
+   plain-HTTP port-forward demo works; a `Secure` cookie is never sent over HTTP,
+   which silently breaks login, while the acknowledgement must not survive into
+   production.
 4. Do not attach buffering or compression middlewares to this router: they
    break WebSocket upgrades and streaming.
 5. `61-networkpolicy.yaml` is part of this variant: it allows only Traefik pods
@@ -116,14 +130,23 @@ kubectl -n dsh-demo create secret tls dsh-demo-tls --cert=tls.crt --key=tls.key
 
 # 3. Enable SSO on the gateway and trust the public host in the template.
 kubectl -n dsh-demo set env deploy/dsh-gateway \
-  AUTH_PROXY_HEADER=X-Forwarded-User COOKIE_SECURE=true
+  AUTH_PROXY_HEADER=X-Forwarded-User COOKIE_SECURE=true ALLOW_INSECURE_COOKIES-
 # then set DSH_TRUSTED_HOSTS=dsh-demo.example.com in the SandboxTemplate
 # (see ../10-sandboxtemplate.yaml) and re-apply it.
 
 # 4. Apply the variant.
 kubectl apply -f manifests/exposure/gateway-api-sso/
+
+# 5. Preflight: fails loudly on missing Secrets, a bad oauth2-proxy cookie
+#    secret, missing gateway SSO env, a dangling TLS reference, leftover
+#    placeholders, or a second path to the gateway.
+./scripts/preflight-sso.sh
 ```
 
+The preflight is read-only and exits non-zero on any failure, naming the exact
+fix. Run it again after rotating a Secret or changing the public host; it also
+verifies that the oauth2-proxy cookie secret decodes to 16, 24 or 32 bytes.
+
 ### SSO trust boundary
 
 `AUTH_PROXY_HEADER` is opt-in and deliberately unset in the base gateway
@@ -141,8 +164,14 @@ takes all of these:
    impersonate any user.
 3. Keep `75-networkpolicies.yaml` with the variant. It enforces the boundary in
    the network layer (gateway ← oauth2-proxy ← Traefik, and limited oauth2-proxy
-   egress). A custom exposure without an equivalent policy has no network
+   egress). This is required, not optional: an exposure without the policy is
+   demo-only, and a custom exposure without an equivalent policy has no network
    enforcement.
+4. Apply the gateway egress policy too: the gateway talks to the Kubernetes API
+   and to sandbox pods, and `75-networkpolicies.yaml` intentionally leaves that
+   direction unrestricted because the API-server endpoint is cluster-specific.
+   See
+   [gateway egress](../../docs/optional-hardening.md#gateway-egress-required-for-production).
 
 Also terminate TLS in front of the gateway (the Gateway listener does) and
 leave `COOKIE_SECURE=true` so the session cookie never travels in clear text.

examples/dsh-agents-as-a-service/manifests/exposure/gateway-api-sso/72-oauth2-proxy.yaml

@@ -25,8 +25,9 @@
 # TLS terminates at the Gateway listener (70-gateway.yaml); keep
 # --cookie-secure=true and COOKIE_SECURE=true on the gateway.
 #
-# The image is pinned to quay.io/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy:v7.15.5
+# The image is digest-pinned: quay.io/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy:v7.15.5@sha256:...
-# (versions.env: OAUTH2_PROXY_IMAGE). Credentials come from the
+# (versions.env: OAUTH2_PROXY_IMAGE). The digest is the immutable multi-arch
+# index, so the tag can never be moved under us. Credentials come from the
 # "oauth2-proxy" Secret (see 73-oauth2-proxy-secret.yaml.example); this
 # manifest never carries secrets.
 apiVersion: apps/v1
@@ -61,7 +62,7 @@ spec:
           type: RuntimeDefault
       containers:
         - name: oauth2-proxy
-          image: quay.io/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy:v7.15.5
+          image: quay.io/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy:v7.15.5@sha256:8498b0d0ef0a7b29686414000a08aee467f02d0299c9ed1e006a8f33fc017916
           imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent
           securityContext:
             allowPrivilegeEscalation: false

examples/dsh-agents-as-a-service/manifests/exposure/gateway-api-sso/75-networkpolicies.yaml

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
-# OPTIONAL with the SSO exposure variant: enforce the trust boundary at the
+# REQUIRED with the SSO exposure variant: enforce the trust boundary at the
-# network layer.
+# network layer. Applying the SSO variant without this file is demo-only.
 #
 # The chain is Traefik (Gateway API) -> oauth2-proxy -> dsh-gateway. These
 # policies make it the ONLY chain:
@@ -8,8 +8,9 @@
 #   - oauth2-proxy egress is limited to DNS, public HTTPS (GitHub) and the
 #     gateway.
 # The gateway's own egress (Kubernetes API, sandbox pods) is intentionally not
-# restricted here: the API-server endpoint is cluster-specific. See
+# restricted here: the API-server endpoint is cluster-specific. Add it for
-# ../../../docs/optional-hardening.md for that recipe.
+# production. See
+# ../../../docs/optional-hardening.md#gateway-egress-required-for-production.
 #
 # This manifest assumes Traefik, matching gatewayClassName: traefik in
 # 70-gateway.yaml. Adjust the app.kubernetes.io/name selector for another

examples/dsh-agents-as-a-service/manifests/exposure/ingress/60-ingress.yaml

@@ -14,8 +14,13 @@
 #      DSH_TRUSTED_HOSTS to this host so DSH accepts the forwarded Host/Origin
 #      on /api.
 #   2. Gateway Deployment (manifests/50-gateway.yaml): set COOKIE_SECURE to
-#      "true" once this Ingress serves HTTPS, so the session cookie is Secure.
+#      "true" and remove ALLOW_INSECURE_COOKIES once this Ingress serves HTTPS,
-#      The base manifest sets "false" for the plain-HTTP port-forward demo.
+#      so the session cookie is Secure:
+#        kubectl -n dsh-demo set env deploy/dsh-gateway \
+#          COOKIE_SECURE=true ALLOW_INSECURE_COOKIES-
+#      The base manifest sets "false" + ALLOW_INSECURE_COOKIES=1 for the
+#      plain-HTTP port-forward demo; without the acknowledgement the gateway
+#      refuses to start.
 #
 # WebSocket support is REQUIRED: the browser talks to /u/<user>/... and DSH
 # uses WebSockets for live session traffic. Traefik upgrades WS/SSE
@@ -24,9 +29,11 @@
 # and upgrades. `path: /` Prefix covers the landing page and every per-user
 # proxy path, so no per-sandbox Ingress is needed.
 #
-# 61-networkpolicy.yaml is part of this variant: it restricts the gateway's
+# 61-networkpolicy.yaml is part of this variant and required for production:
-# ingress to Traefik pods. Adjust its selector if your ingress controller uses
+# it restricts the gateway's ingress to Traefik pods. Adjust its selector if
-# a different label or hostNetwork.
+# your ingress controller uses a different label or hostNetwork. The sandbox
+# and gateway-egress NetworkPolicies are separate requirements; see
+# ../../../docs/optional-hardening.md#6-production-checklist.
 apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
 kind: Ingress
 metadata:

examples/dsh-agents-as-a-service/manifests/exposure/ingress/61-networkpolicy.yaml

@@ -1,11 +1,16 @@
-# OPTIONAL with the Ingress exposure variant: restrict the gateway's ingress
+# REQUIRED with the Ingress exposure variant for production: restrict the
-# to the ingress controller.
+# gateway's ingress to the ingress controller. Applying the variant without
+# this policy is demo-only.
 #
 # This manifest assumes Traefik, matching this variant's
 # `ingressClassName: traefik`. Traefik's Helm chart labels its pods
 # app.kubernetes.io/name=traefik; adjust the selector for another controller or
 # for a hostNetwork install (where the source is the node IP, not a pod IP).
 #
+# The sandbox NetworkPolicy and the gateway egress policy are separate and also
+# required for production; see
+# ../../../docs/optional-hardening.md#6-production-checklist.
+#
 # NetworkPolicy enforcement of kubelet probe traffic is CNI-dependent. If the
 # gateway starts failing its /healthz probes, allow the node CIDR on port 8080
 # or remove this policy. See ../../../docs/optional-hardening.md.

examples/dsh-agents-as-a-service/manifests/optional/README.md

@@ -23,6 +23,12 @@ It requires a CNI that enforces `NetworkPolicy`. The selector uses the
 agent-sandbox controller's pod tracking label, so the policy applies to
 existing warm-pool and claimed sandboxes without recreation.
 
+**This is opt-in for the demo but required for production.** Without it every
+tenant can reach every other tenant and cluster-internal endpoints. Production
+also needs the gateway egress policy (cluster-specific API-server endpoint) and
+the exposure variant's policy; see the
+[production checklist](../../docs/optional-hardening.md#6-production-checklist).
+
 ## gVisor, nodeSelector and provider keys
 
 These are configured in the main manifests or with an extra Secret:
@@ -30,6 +36,9 @@ These are configured in the main manifests or with an extra Secret:
 - **gVisor:** uncomment `runtimeClassName: gvisor` in the SandboxTemplate and
   the Deployments before applying, or patch an existing install.
 - **nodeSelector:** uncomment the field and replace the placeholder node label.
+- **Failed-Pod recovery:** uncomment `failedPodPolicy: Recreate` in the
+  SandboxTemplate (agent-sandbox v1.0.8+) so a Failed Pod is replaced instead
+  of parked.
 - **Provider keys:** create the optional `dsh-provider-keys-extra` Secret; the
   base `dsh-provider-keys` Secret remains the one required key.
 

examples/dsh-agents-as-a-service/manifests/optional/network-policy/10-sandbox-networkpolicy.yaml

@@ -1,9 +1,15 @@
-# OPTIONAL, opt-in tenant network policy for the DSH sandboxes.
+# OPTIONAL for the base walkthrough, REQUIRED for production. Opt-in tenant
+# network policy for the DSH sandboxes: without it every tenant can reach every
+# other tenant and cluster-internal endpoints.
 #
 # It is NOT part of the top-level walkthrough. Apply and delete it explicitly:
 #   kubectl apply  -f manifests/optional/network-policy/
 #   kubectl delete -f manifests/optional/network-policy/
 #
+# Production also needs the gateway egress policy (cluster-specific API-server
+# endpoint) and the exposure variant's policy, plus gVisor
+# (docs/optional-hardening.md#6-production-checklist).
+#
 # The selector uses the agent-sandbox controller's pod tracking label, which is
 # present on every Sandbox pod (including warm-pool spares), so the policy
 # applies to existing sandboxes without recreating them. The SandboxTemplate

examples/dsh-agents-as-a-service/scripts/e2e-kind.sh

@@ -72,8 +72,23 @@ pass "claim Ready in ${ELAPSED}s, adopted $SB"
 
 echo "=== 3. write state on the PVC"
 POD="$SB"
+# HOME must point at the PVC-backed workspace: DSH's directory picker lists
+# $HOME when it opens and has no start-path setting, so this is what makes the
+# folder explorer start on the persisted tree instead of the ephemeral image
+# home. It also makes ~ resolve to /workspace inside agent commands.
+HOME_VALUE=$(kubectl -n "$NS" exec "$POD" -- printenv HOME)
+[ "$HOME_VALUE" = "/workspace" ] || fail "HOME is '$HOME_VALUE', expected /workspace"
+TILDE=$(kubectl -n "$NS" exec "$POD" -- sh -c 'cd ~ && pwd')
+[ "$TILDE" = "/workspace" ] || fail "~ resolves to '$TILDE', expected /workspace"
+pass "HOME=$HOME_VALUE and ~ resolve to the workspace"
 kubectl -n "$NS" exec "$POD" -- sh -c 'echo "remember me" > /home/node/.dsh/marker.txt'
-pass "marker written in $POD"
+pass "state marker written in $POD"
+# The agent workspace must be the dsh-home PVC's workspace/ subPath, writable
+# as UID 1000 without an init container.
+SUBPATH=$(kubectl -n "$NS" get pod "$POD" -o jsonpath='{range .spec.containers[0].volumeMounts[?(@.mountPath=="/workspace")]}{.subPath}{end}')
+[ "$SUBPATH" = "workspace" ] || fail "/workspace is not mounted from the dsh-home PVC subPath"
+kubectl -n "$NS" exec "$POD" -- sh -c 'echo "remember me too" > /workspace/marker.txt'
+pass "workspace marker written in $POD (subPath=$SUBPATH)"
 
 echo "=== 4. suspend (pod deleted, PVC + Service retained)"
 kubectl -n "$NS" patch sandbox "$SB" --type merge -p '{"spec":{"operatingMode":"Suspended"}}'
@@ -87,8 +102,11 @@ kubectl -n "$NS" patch sandbox "$SB" --type merge -p '{"spec":{"operatingMode":"
 kubectl -n "$NS" wait sandbox "$SB" --for=condition=Ready --timeout=180s
 POD="$SB"
 MARKER=$(kubectl -n "$NS" exec "$POD" -- cat /home/node/.dsh/marker.txt)
-[ "$MARKER" = "remember me" ] || fail "marker did not survive suspend/resume"
+[ "$MARKER" = "remember me" ] || fail "state marker did not survive suspend/resume"
-pass "resumed: state survived on the reattached PVC"
+pass "resumed: DSH state survived on the reattached PVC"
+WS_MARKER=$(kubectl -n "$NS" exec "$POD" -- cat /workspace/marker.txt)
+[ "$WS_MARKER" = "remember me too" ] || fail "workspace marker did not survive suspend/resume"
+pass "resumed: agent workspace survived on the PVC subPath"
 
 echo "=== 6. injection policy rejects env-carrying claims"
 kubectl apply -f manifests/40-claim-rejected.yaml

examples/dsh-agents-as-a-service/scripts/preflight-sso.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,234 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# Preflight for the gateway-api-sso exposure variant.
+#
+# Run this AFTER creating the oauth2-proxy/TLS Secrets, setting the gateway
+# env and applying manifests/exposure/gateway-api-sso/, and BEFORE sending real
+# traffic. It checks the configuration that is easy to get wrong and whose
+# failure is either silent (login appears to work but the gateway still asks
+# for its own token) or dangerous (a spoofable identity header, a placeholder
+# host, a TLS Secret that does not exist).
+#
+# Checks:
+#   1. kubectl reaches the cluster and the SSO objects exist;
+#   2. the oauth2-proxy Secret has client-id, client-secret and a cookie-secret
+#      that decodes to 16, 24 or 32 bytes; the TLS Secret exists;
+#   3. deploy/dsh-gateway has AUTH_PROXY_HEADER=X-Forwarded-User and
+#      COOKIE_SECURE=true (both are opt-in and both are required for SSO over
+#      TLS);
+#   4. the Gateway's TLS certificate reference resolves to an existing Secret;
+#   5. no your-github-org / dsh-demo.example.com placeholder is left in the
+#      applied oauth2-proxy args, Gateway listeners or HTTPRoute hostnames;
+#   6. (warning) no Ingress in the namespace creates a second path to
+#      dsh-gateway. With SSO enabled the Service must be reachable only through
+#      oauth2-proxy.
+#
+# Exit status: 0 when every check passes (warnings allowed), 1 on any failure.
+# Every failure prints the fix. This script only reads cluster state.
+#
+# Usage:
+#   examples/dsh-agents-as-a-service/scripts/preflight-sso.sh
+#
+# Environment overrides:
+#   NAMESPACE        namespace (default: dsh-demo)
+#   GATEWAY_DEPLOY   gateway Deployment name (default: dsh-gateway)
+#   OAUTH_DEPLOY     oauth2-proxy Deployment name (default: oauth2-proxy)
+#   OAUTH_SECRET     oauth2-proxy Secret name (default: oauth2-proxy)
+#   TLS_SECRET       TLS Secret name the Gateway should reference (default:
+#                    dsh-demo-tls)
+set -euo pipefail
+cd "$(dirname "$0")/.."
+
+NS="${NAMESPACE:-dsh-demo}"
+GATEWAY_DEPLOY="${GATEWAY_DEPLOY:-dsh-gateway}"
+OAUTH_DEPLOY="${OAUTH_DEPLOY:-oauth2-proxy}"
+OAUTH_SECRET="${OAUTH_SECRET:-oauth2-proxy}"
+TLS_SECRET="${TLS_SECRET:-dsh-demo-tls}"
+
+FAILED=0
+pass() { printf 'PASS  %s\n' "$*"; }
+warn() { printf 'WARN  %s\n' "$*" >&2; }
+fail() { printf 'FAIL  %s\n' "$*" >&2; FAILED=1; }
+
+if ! command -v kubectl >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+  echo "FAIL  kubectl is not installed; install it and select the target context" >&2
+  exit 1
+fi
+
+if ! kubectl -n "$NS" get deployment "$GATEWAY_DEPLOY" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+  echo "FAIL  deploy/$GATEWAY_DEPLOY not found in namespace $NS." >&2
+  echo "      Apply the base manifests first: kubectl apply -f manifests/" >&2
+  echo "      Then apply the variant: kubectl apply -f manifests/exposure/gateway-api-sso/" >&2
+  exit 1
+fi
+
+echo "== Secrets"
+# check_secret_key <secret> <key> <hint>
+check_secret_key() {
+  local secret=$1 key=$2 hint=$3 value escaped
+  # Kubernetes JSONPath treats "." as a path separator; escape it in keys such
+  # as tls.crt.
+  escaped=${key//./\\.}
+  value=$(kubectl -n "$NS" get secret "$secret" -o jsonpath="{.data.${escaped}}" 2>/dev/null || true)
+  if [ -n "$value" ]; then
+    pass "Secret $secret has non-empty key '$key'"
+  else
+    fail "Secret $secret is missing a non-empty '$key' key. $hint"
+  fi
+}
+
+check_secret_key "$OAUTH_SECRET" client-id \
+  "Create it from manifests/exposure/gateway-api-sso/73-oauth2-proxy-secret.yaml.example."
+check_secret_key "$OAUTH_SECRET" client-secret \
+  "Create it from manifests/exposure/gateway-api-sso/73-oauth2-proxy-secret.yaml.example."
+check_secret_key "$OAUTH_SECRET" cookie-secret \
+  "Create it from manifests/exposure/gateway-api-sso/73-oauth2-proxy-secret.yaml.example."
+
+# The cookie secret must be URL-safe unpadded base64 of 16, 24 or 32 bytes;
+# oauth2-proxy refuses anything else (the classic error is "44 bytes").
+if COOKIE_B64=$(kubectl -n "$NS" get secret "$OAUTH_SECRET" \
+  -o jsonpath='{.data.cookie-secret}' 2>/dev/null); then
+  if [ -n "$COOKIE_B64" ]; then
+    if ! COOKIE_LEN=$(printf '%s' "$COOKIE_B64" | base64 -d 2>/dev/null | wc -c); then
+      fail "Secret $OAUTH_SECRET key 'cookie-secret' is not valid base64. Generate it with: python3 -c 'import secrets; print(secrets.token_urlsafe(32))'"
+    else
+      case "$COOKIE_LEN" in
+        16 | 24 | 32) pass "oauth2-proxy cookie-secret decodes to $COOKIE_LEN bytes" ;;
+        *)
+          fail "oauth2-proxy cookie-secret decodes to $COOKIE_LEN bytes; it must be 16, 24 or 32. Generate a URL-safe unpadded value with: python3 -c 'import secrets; print(secrets.token_urlsafe(32))'"
+          ;;
+      esac
+    fi
+  fi
+fi
+
+check_secret_key "$TLS_SECRET" tls.crt \
+  "Create the TLS Secret with: kubectl -n $NS create secret tls $TLS_SECRET --cert=tls.crt --key=tls.key"
+check_secret_key "$TLS_SECRET" tls.key \
+  "Create the TLS Secret with: kubectl -n $NS create secret tls $TLS_SECRET --cert=tls.crt --key=tls.key"
+
+echo
+echo "== Gateway SSO configuration (deploy/$GATEWAY_DEPLOY)"
+GATEWAY_ENV=$(kubectl -n "$NS" get deployment "$GATEWAY_DEPLOY" \
+  -o jsonpath='{range .spec.template.spec.containers[*].env[*]}{.name}={.value}{"\n"}{end}')
+
+# env_value <NAME>: print the literal env value, or nothing when unset.
+env_value() {
+  printf '%s\n' "$GATEWAY_ENV" | awk -F= -v key="$1" '$1 == key { sub(/^[^=]*=/, ""); print }'
+}
+env_is_set() {
+  printf '%s\n' "$GATEWAY_ENV" | awk -F= -v key="$1" '$1 == key { found = 1 } END { exit found ? 0 : 1 }'
+}
+
+if ! env_is_set AUTH_PROXY_HEADER; then
+  fail "AUTH_PROXY_HEADER is not set on deploy/$GATEWAY_DEPLOY, so the gateway ignores oauth2-proxy's identity header and users are still asked for the gateway token. Fix: kubectl -n $NS set env deploy/$GATEWAY_DEPLOY AUTH_PROXY_HEADER=X-Forwarded-User"
+elif [ "$(env_value AUTH_PROXY_HEADER)" != "X-Forwarded-User" ]; then
+  fail "AUTH_PROXY_HEADER is '$(env_value AUTH_PROXY_HEADER)', expected 'X-Forwarded-User'. Fix: kubectl -n $NS set env deploy/$GATEWAY_DEPLOY AUTH_PROXY_HEADER=X-Forwarded-User"
+else
+  pass "AUTH_PROXY_HEADER=X-Forwarded-User"
+fi
+
+if ! env_is_set COOKIE_SECURE; then
+  fail "COOKIE_SECURE is not set on deploy/$GATEWAY_DEPLOY; the session cookie must be Secure behind TLS. Fix: kubectl -n $NS set env deploy/$GATEWAY_DEPLOY COOKIE_SECURE=true"
+elif [ "$(env_value COOKIE_SECURE | tr '[:upper:]' '[:lower:]')" != "true" ]; then
+  fail "COOKIE_SECURE is '$(env_value COOKIE_SECURE)', expected 'true' behind TLS. Fix: kubectl -n $NS set env deploy/$GATEWAY_DEPLOY COOKIE_SECURE=true"
+else
+  pass "COOKIE_SECURE=true"
+fi
+
+if env_is_set ALLOW_INSECURE_COOKIES; then
+  warn "ALLOW_INSECURE_COOKIES is still set on deploy/$GATEWAY_DEPLOY. It is ignored while COOKIE_SECURE=true but is a footgun: remove it with 'kubectl -n $NS set env deploy/$GATEWAY_DEPLOY ALLOW_INSECURE_COOKIES-'."
+fi
+
+echo
+echo "== SSO objects and placeholders"
+if kubectl -n "$NS" get deployment "$OAUTH_DEPLOY" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+  pass "deploy/$OAUTH_DEPLOY exists"
+  OAUTH_ARGS=$(kubectl -n "$NS" get deployment "$OAUTH_DEPLOY" \
+    -o jsonpath='{range .spec.template.spec.containers[*].args[*]}{@}{"\n"}{end}')
+else
+  OAUTH_ARGS=""
+  fail "deploy/$OAUTH_DEPLOY not found. Apply the variant: kubectl apply -f manifests/exposure/gateway-api-sso/"
+fi
+
+# GitHub org restriction is the only authorization in the shipped variant.
+# --email-domain=* is acceptable only because --github-org narrows membership;
+# a missing or empty org value would accept any GitHub account.
+if [ -n "$OAUTH_ARGS" ]; then
+  if printf '%s\n' "$OAUTH_ARGS" | grep -q '^--provider=github$'; then
+    pass "oauth2-proxy uses --provider=github"
+  else
+    fail "oauth2-proxy is not configured with --provider=github. Fix: add --provider=github to deploy/$OAUTH_DEPLOY."
+  fi
+  if printf '%s\n' "$OAUTH_ARGS" | grep -Eq '^--github-org=.+$'; then
+    pass "oauth2-proxy restricts membership with --github-org"
+  else
+    fail "oauth2-proxy has no non-empty --github-org. Fix: set --github-org=<your-org> in deploy/$OAUTH_DEPLOY; otherwise --email-domain=* accepts any GitHub account."
+  fi
+fi
+
+if kubectl -n "$NS" get httproute dsh-gateway >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+  pass "HTTPRoute dsh-gateway exists"
+  ROUTE_STATE=$(kubectl -n "$NS" get httproute dsh-gateway \
+    -o jsonpath='{.spec.hostnames[*]}' 2>/dev/null || true)
+else
+  ROUTE_STATE=""
+  fail "HTTPRoute dsh-gateway not found. Apply the variant: kubectl apply -f manifests/exposure/gateway-api-sso/"
+fi
+
+if kubectl -n "$NS" get gateway dsh-gateway >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+  pass "Gateway dsh-gateway exists"
+  GATEWAY_STATE=$(kubectl -n "$NS" get gateway dsh-gateway \
+    -o jsonpath='{range .spec.listeners[*]}{.hostname}{"\n"}{end}' 2>/dev/null || true)
+  CERT_REFS=$(kubectl -n "$NS" get gateway dsh-gateway \
+    -o jsonpath='{range .spec.listeners[*].tls.certificateRefs[*]}{.namespace}{"/"}{.name}{"\n"}{end}' 2>/dev/null || true)
+else
+  GATEWAY_STATE=""
+  CERT_REFS=""
+  fail "Gateway dsh-gateway not found. Apply the variant: kubectl apply -f manifests/exposure/gateway-api-sso/"
+fi
+
+# Placeholders are the default values in the committed manifests. They reach
+# the cluster if the variant is applied before editing them.
+PLACEHOLDER_RE='your-github-org|dsh-demo\.example\.com'
+PLACEHOLDER_STATE=$(printf '%s\n%s\n%s\n' "$OAUTH_ARGS" "$ROUTE_STATE" "$GATEWAY_STATE")
+if printf '%s\n' "$PLACEHOLDER_STATE" | grep -En "$PLACEHOLDER_RE" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+  fail "the applied SSO objects still contain a placeholder (your-github-org or dsh-demo.example.com):"
+  printf '%s\n' "$PLACEHOLDER_STATE" | grep -En "$PLACEHOLDER_RE" | sed 's/^/      /' >&2
+  echo "      Replace --github-org, --redirect-url, the Gateway listener host and the HTTPRoute hostname with the real public FQDN and organization, then re-apply and restart the proxy." >&2
+else
+  pass "no your-github-org / dsh-demo.example.com placeholder in the applied SSO objects"
+fi
+
+# The Gateway must reference an existing TLS Secret; the default name is
+# dsh-demo-tls, but 70-gateway.yaml can be edited to another name.
+if [ -n "$CERT_REFS" ]; then
+  while IFS= read -r ref; do
+    [ -n "$ref" ] || continue
+    ref_ns=${ref%%/*}
+    ref_name=${ref#*/}
+    ref_ns=${ref_ns:-$NS}
+    if kubectl -n "$ref_ns" get secret "$ref_name" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+      pass "Gateway TLS certificate reference ${ref_ns}/${ref_name} exists"
+    else
+      fail "Gateway references TLS Secret ${ref_ns}/${ref_name} but it does not exist. Create it (see manifests/exposure/gateway-api-sso/74-tls-secret.yaml.example)."
+    fi
+  done <<<"$CERT_REFS"
+else
+  warn "the Gateway has no TLS certificateRefs; SSO over plain HTTP would expose the session cookie. Terminate TLS at the Gateway listener."
+fi
+
+# A second path to the gateway defeats SSO: anyone who can reach
+# dsh-gateway:8080 can spoof X-Forwarded-User. This is a best-effort check.
+if kubectl -n "$NS" get ingress >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+  INGRESS_STATE=$(kubectl -n "$NS" get ingress -o json 2>/dev/null || true)
+  if printf '%s' "$INGRESS_STATE" | grep -q '"name":"dsh-gateway"'; then
+    fail "an Ingress in namespace $NS also routes to dsh-gateway. With SSO enabled the gateway must be reachable only through oauth2-proxy: delete the Ingress variant (kubectl delete -f manifests/exposure/ingress/)."
+  fi
+fi
+
+echo
+if [ "$FAILED" -ne 0 ]; then
+  echo "preflight-sso: FAILED - fix the items above before exposing the gateway." >&2
+  exit 1
+fi
+echo "preflight-sso: ok - the SSO variant looks correctly configured."

examples/minimal-single-tenant/README.md

@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ kubectl -n dsh-demo create secret generic dsh-provider-keys-extra \
   --from-literal=NVIDIA_API_KEY="nvapi-..."
 
 # 2. The template itself (image pinned in the manifest).
-kubectl apply -f manifests/sandbox-template.yaml
+kubectl apply -f manifests/10-sandboxtemplate.yaml
 
 # 3. A template only describes pods; a warm pool turns it into running
 #    Sandboxes and a claim adopts one. One replica is enough here.
@@ -101,6 +101,28 @@ kubectl -n dsh-demo port-forward "pod/$SB" 18081:3080
 > example or a reachable Service instead; see
 > [optional hardening](../dsh-agents-as-a-service/docs/optional-hardening.md).
 
+## Folder picker and the workspace
+
+The template mounts the `dsh-home` PVC's `workspace/` subPath at
+`/workspace` and sets `HOME=/workspace`. DSH's directory picker (the folder
+explorer used to choose a workspace) has no start-path setting: it lists `$HOME`
+when it opens, so with the image default (`/home/node`) it would start on a
+directory that is not persisted. Pointing `HOME` at the PVC-backed workspace makes
+the picker open there (labelled *Home* in its breadcrumbs) and makes `~` in agent
+commands resolve to `/workspace`. The trade-off is that `$HOME`-relative tool
+caches and config (`.cache`, `.config`, `.local`, `.npm`, `.agents`) are written
+into the workspace on the PVC. DSH state is unaffected: `DSH_HOME` stays
+`/home/node/.dsh`. The rationale and the list of affected paths are in
+[`10-sandboxtemplate.yaml`](../dsh-agents-as-a-service/manifests/10-sandboxtemplate.yaml).
+Pod specs are stamped at creation, so an existing sandbox keeps its old mounts and
+`HOME` until it is recreated; the PVC retains DSH state and workspace data.
+
+Verify inside a running sandbox:
+
+```bash
+kubectl -n dsh-demo exec "$SB" -- printenv HOME   # /workspace
+```
+
 ## Network policy and optional hardening
 
 The template omits `networkPolicyManagement`, so the agent-sandbox controller
@@ -114,7 +136,7 @@ NetworkPolicy are documented in
 
 ## Probes and trusted hosts
 
-Two settings in `manifests/sandbox-template.yaml` are easy to get wrong:
+Two settings in `manifests/10-sandboxtemplate.yaml` are easy to get wrong:
 
 - **Probe path.** `/` returns `401` without the launch-token cookie, so a probe
   there crash-loops the pod. The template probes `/favicon.svg` (served

examples/minimal-single-tenant/manifests/10-sandboxtemplate.yaml

@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
 #   - Optional: Secret dsh-provider-keys-extra with additional provider keys
 #     (OPENROUTER_API_KEY, GEMINI_API_KEY, NVIDIA_API_KEY, ...). It is
 #     referenced with `optional: true`, so it may be absent.
-# The agent-sandbox controller (v1.0.7, API v1beta1) must be installed.
+# The agent-sandbox controller (v1.0.8, API v1beta1) must be installed.
 apiVersion: extensions.agents.x-k8s.io/v1beta1
 kind: SandboxTemplate
 metadata:
@@ -26,6 +26,10 @@ spec:
   # quickstart reaches the sandbox through `kubectl port-forward`, which is
   # local to the pod. The multi-tenant example documents opt-in policies in
   # examples/dsh-agents-as-a-service/docs/optional-hardening.md.
+  #
+  # OPTIONAL: recreate a Failed sandbox Pod instead of retaining it
+  # (agent-sandbox v1.0.8+). Documented with the multi-tenant example.
+  # failedPodPolicy: Recreate
   podTemplate:
     spec:
       # OPTIONAL: run under gVisor. gVisor breaks `kubectl port-forward`, so
@@ -52,7 +56,7 @@ spec:
         fsGroupChangePolicy: OnRootMismatch
       containers:
         - name: dsh-web
-          image: ghcr.io/sredevopsorg/deepseek-kubernetes-sandbox:dsh-v0.2.1-rc.3-r4
+          image: ghcr.io/sredevopsorg/deepseek-kubernetes-sandbox:dsh-v0.2.1-rc.5-r6
           imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent
           ports:
             - name: web
@@ -65,6 +69,21 @@ spec:
                 name: dsh-provider-keys-extra
                 optional: true
           env:
+            # Point the OS home at the persisted agent workspace. DSH's
+            # directory picker (the folder explorer used to choose a workspace)
+            # lists $HOME when it opens and has no start-path setting, so with
+            # the image default (/home/node, not on a volume) it would open on a
+            # throwaway directory. /workspace is the PVC-backed WORKDIR, so the
+            # picker opens on the tree that survives suspend/resume, and `~` in
+            # agent commands resolves there. Trade-off: tools that keep caches
+            # or config under $HOME (npm/pnpm, uv, git, gh, DSH's global
+            # ~/.agents instructions and skills) write dotfiles onto the PVC
+            # inside the agent workspace. DSH_HOME is explicit
+            # (/home/node/.dsh), so sessions, config and credentials are
+            # unaffected. Rationale in full at
+            # examples/dsh-agents-as-a-service/manifests/10-sandboxtemplate.yaml.
+            - name: HOME
+              value: /workspace
             # Empty => DSH derives links from the request Host. Keep it empty
             # when fronting the sandbox with a proxy/gateway.
             - name: DSH_PUBLIC_URL
@@ -77,9 +96,25 @@ spec:
             # examples/dsh-agents-as-a-service/manifests/exposure/README.md.
             - name: DSH_TRUSTED_HOSTS
               value: ""
+            # DSH's own bash file sandbox (bubblewrap, else Landlock) cannot be
+            # enforced in this hardened pod - bubblewrap is installed but is
+            # unsetuid and needs an unprivileged user namespace - and fails
+            # closed with SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE. The pod is the boundary here;
+            # keep the deployment override in sync with the multi-tenant example
+            # and see its README troubleshooting row to restore a confined mode.
+            - name: DSH_PERMISSION_MODE
+              value: danger-full-access
           volumeMounts:
             - name: dsh-home
               mountPath: /home/node/.dsh # DSH_HOME
+            # The agent workspace (the image's WORKDIR) is the same PVC under
+            # its own subPath, so DSH state - including .credentials.yaml -
+            # never shows up as workspace data. Kubelet creates workspace/ on
+            # first mount with the volume's fsGroup permissions; no init
+            # container is needed. See the multi-tenant template for details.
+            - name: dsh-home
+              mountPath: /workspace
+              subPath: workspace
           # / is behind DSH's launch-token cookie (401 without it); use an
           # unauthenticated path for probes. The startup probe gives a cold
           # start (plugin activation on a small node, or the first resume of a

scripts/check-examples.sh

@@ -20,6 +20,13 @@ for dir in examples/*/; do
   if [ -d "${dir}manifests" ]; then
     count=$(find "${dir}manifests" -maxdepth 1 -type f -name '*.yaml' | wc -l | tr -d ' ')
     [ "$count" -gt 0 ] || err "$name: manifests/ has no top-level *.yaml files"
+    for manifest in "${dir}"manifests/*.yaml; do
+      [ -e "$manifest" ] || continue
+      case "$(basename "$manifest")" in
+        [0-9][0-9]-*.yaml) ;;
+        *) err "$name: top-level manifest $(basename "$manifest") must be named NN-*.yaml" ;;
+      esac
+    done
   fi
 
   stray=$(find "$dir" -maxdepth 1 -type f -name '*.yaml' | wc -l | tr -d ' ')

scripts/check-versions.sh

@@ -22,22 +22,60 @@ expect() { # <file> <literal>
 
 # Main Dockerfile build args
 expect Dockerfile "ARG DSH_VERSION=$DSH_VERSION"
+expect Dockerfile "ARG DSH_COMMIT=$DSH_COMMIT"
 expect Dockerfile "ARG PNPM_VERSION=$PNPM_VERSION"
 expect Dockerfile "ARG RELEASE_REVISION=$RELEASE_REVISION"
+expect Dockerfile "ARG NODE_BUILD_IMAGE=$NODE_BUILD_IMAGE"
+expect Dockerfile "ARG NODE_RUNTIME_IMAGE=$NODE_RUNTIME_IMAGE"
+# The build stage must fail closed when the tag no longer resolves to DSH_COMMIT.
+expect Dockerfile "git -C /src rev-parse HEAD"
+
+# Example gateway build base image
+expect examples/dsh-agents-as-a-service/gateway/Dockerfile \
+  "ARG GATEWAY_PYTHON_IMAGE=$GATEWAY_PYTHON_IMAGE"
 
 # Local configuration mirrored for humans
 expect .env.sample "DSH_VERSION=$DSH_VERSION"
+expect .env.sample "DSH_COMMIT=$DSH_COMMIT"
 expect .env.sample "PNPM_VERSION=$PNPM_VERSION"
 expect .env.sample "RELEASE_REVISION=$RELEASE_REVISION"
 
+# Human-facing docs embed the resolved commit in the build example and table.
+expect docs/main-image.md "$DSH_COMMIT"
+expect docs/versioning.md "$DSH_COMMIT"
+
+# Every container image is pinned to an immutable multi-arch index digest, not
+# a mutable tag. This is a supply-chain invariant: don't "fix" a failing check
+# by dropping the digest.
+for image_var in NODE_BUILD_IMAGE NODE_RUNTIME_IMAGE GATEWAY_PYTHON_IMAGE OAUTH2_PROXY_IMAGE; do
+  image_value="${!image_var:-}"
+  if ! printf '%s' "$image_value" | grep -qE '@sha256:[0-9a-f]{64}$'; then
+    err "versions.env: $image_var must be digest-pinned (name:tag@sha256:<64 hex>), got: ${image_value:-<unset>}"
+  fi
+done
+
+if ! printf '%s' "${DSH_COMMIT:-}" | grep -qE '^[0-9a-f]{40}$'; then
+  err "versions.env: DSH_COMMIT must be a full 40-character commit SHA, got: ${DSH_COMMIT:-<unset>}"
+fi
+
+# Build entrypoints must pass DSH_COMMIT rather than trusting the tag alone.
+expect Makefile "--build-arg DSH_COMMIT=\$(DSH_COMMIT)"
+for wf in build-main.yaml release.yaml ci-image.yaml; do
+  expect ".github/workflows/$wf" "DSH_COMMIT="
+done
+
 # Image references in the example manifests
 for f in \
   examples/dsh-agents-as-a-service/manifests/10-sandboxtemplate.yaml \
-  examples/minimal-single-tenant/manifests/sandbox-template.yaml; do
+  examples/minimal-single-tenant/manifests/10-sandboxtemplate.yaml; do
   expect "$f" "image: $GHCR_IMAGE:$IDENTITY"
 done
 expect examples/dsh-agents-as-a-service/manifests/50-gateway.yaml "image: $GATEWAY_IMAGE:$IDENTITY"
 
+# The oauth2-proxy exposure variant pins the digest, not the mutable tag.
+expect examples/dsh-agents-as-a-service/manifests/exposure/gateway-api-sso/72-oauth2-proxy.yaml \
+  "image: $OAUTH2_PROXY_IMAGE"
+
 # The gateway image must live below the repository image (one package per
 # example component, no unrelated top-level packages).
 case "$GATEWAY_IMAGE" in

scripts/set-version.sh

@@ -3,7 +3,12 @@
 # "make check".
 #
 #   ./scripts/set-version.sh dsh-v0.2.2-rc.1        # new DSH ref, no revision
-#   ./scripts/set-version.sh dsh-v0.2.1-rc.3 r3    # same ref, new repo revision
+#   ./scripts/set-version.sh dsh-v0.2.1-rc.5-r6 r3    # same ref, new repo revision
+#
+# For a new DSH ref the script resolves the tag's commit with "git ls-remote"
+# (peeled ^{} commit first, tag ref as fallback) and rewrites DSH_COMMIT in
+# versions.env, the Dockerfile ARG default and .env.sample. A revision-only bump
+# at the same ref keeps the existing commit and needs no network access.
 set -euo pipefail
 cd "$(dirname "$0")/.."
 
@@ -23,9 +28,11 @@ if [ -n "$new_revision" ]; then
 fi
 
 # shellcheck source=/dev/null
-old_version="$(. ./versions.env; printf '%s' "$DSH_VERSION")"
+. ./versions.env
-# shellcheck source=/dev/null
+
-old_revision="$(. ./versions.env; printf '%s' "${RELEASE_REVISION:-}")"
+old_version="$DSH_VERSION"
+old_revision="${RELEASE_REVISION:-}"
+old_commit="${DSH_COMMIT:-}"
 
 old_identity="$old_version"
 [ -z "$old_revision" ] || old_identity="$old_version-$old_revision"
@@ -37,6 +44,29 @@ if [ "$old_identity" = "$new_identity" ]; then
   exit 0
 fi
 
+# Resolve the commit the new upstream tag points at. Annotated tags expose a
+# peeled ^{} line (the commit) and a tag-object line; prefer the peeled commit
+# and fall back to the tag ref for lightweight tags. A repository-only revision
+# bump keeps the already pinned commit, so it needs no network.
+new_commit="$old_commit"
+if [ "$new_version" != "$old_version" ] || [ -z "$new_commit" ]; then
+  if ! refs="$(git ls-remote --tags --exit-code "$DSH_REPO" \
+        "refs/tags/$new_version^{}" "refs/tags/$new_version")"; then
+    echo "set-version: upstream tag '$new_version' not found in $DSH_REPO" >&2
+    exit 1
+  fi
+  new_commit="$(printf '%s\n' "$refs" \
+    | awk -v t="refs/tags/$new_version^{}" '$2 == t {print $1}' | head -n1)"
+  if [ -z "$new_commit" ]; then
+    new_commit="$(printf '%s\n' "$refs" \
+      | awk -v t="refs/tags/$new_version" '$2 == t {print $1}' | head -n1)"
+  fi
+  if ! printf '%s' "$new_commit" | grep -qE '^[0-9a-f]{40}$'; then
+    echo "set-version: could not resolve a commit for '$new_version' in $DSH_REPO" >&2
+    exit 1
+  fi
+fi
+
 # Replace the identity first (it contains the base version), then the base
 # version itself. CHANGELOG.md is generated from tags, so it is left alone.
 while IFS= read -r file; do
@@ -48,17 +78,30 @@ while IFS= read -r file; do
   sed -i "s/$old_identity/$new_identity/g; s/$old_version/$new_version/g" "$file"
 done < <(git ls-files)
 
-# versions.env is authoritative: write both keys explicitly so an empty
+# versions.env is authoritative: write these keys explicitly so an empty
 # revision is stored as an empty value.
 sed -i "s/^DSH_VERSION=.*/DSH_VERSION=$new_version/" versions.env
 sed -i "s/^RELEASE_REVISION=.*/RELEASE_REVISION=$new_revision/" versions.env
+sed -i "s/^DSH_COMMIT=.*/DSH_COMMIT=$new_commit/" versions.env
 
 # Values stored separately from the full identity: Dockerfile ARG defaults and
 # the human-facing sample cannot be reached by the identity replacement above.
 sed -i "s/^ARG DSH_VERSION=.*/ARG DSH_VERSION=$new_version/" Dockerfile
 sed -i "s/^ARG RELEASE_REVISION=.*/ARG RELEASE_REVISION=$new_revision/" Dockerfile
+sed -i "s/^ARG DSH_COMMIT=.*/ARG DSH_COMMIT=$new_commit/" Dockerfile
 sed -i "s/^DSH_VERSION=.*/DSH_VERSION=$new_version/" .env.sample
 sed -i "s/^RELEASE_REVISION=.*/RELEASE_REVISION=$new_revision/" .env.sample
+sed -i "s/^DSH_COMMIT=.*/DSH_COMMIT=$new_commit/" .env.sample
+
+# The human-facing build examples embed the full SHA, which the version
+# replacement above cannot see. Keep them in step; check-versions.sh verifies.
+if [ -n "$old_commit" ] && [ "$old_commit" != "$new_commit" ]; then
+  for doc in docs/main-image.md docs/versioning.md; do
+    [ -f "$doc" ] || continue
+    sed -i "s/$old_commit/$new_commit/g" "$doc"
+  done
+fi
 
 echo "set-version: $old_identity -> $new_identity"
+echo "set-version: DSH_COMMIT=$new_commit"
 echo "set-version: run 'make check' and review the diff"

versions.env

@@ -2,23 +2,48 @@
 # repository. Consumed by the Makefile, build.sh, scripts/*.sh and the GitHub
 # Actions workflows. Never hard-code these values elsewhere: run "make check"
 # (scripts/check-versions.sh) to verify every pin.
+#
+# Every container image below is pinned to an immutable multi-arch index digest
+# (name:tag@sha256:...), not just a mutable tag. Bump the tag and the digest
+# together; scripts/check-versions.sh requires the digest form.
 
 # Upstream DeepSeek Harness source, and the ref this repository packages.
+# DSH_COMMIT is the full commit SHA that DSH_VERSION resolves to upstream; the
+# Dockerfile verifies the clone's HEAD against it and fails the build on drift.
 DSH_REPO=https://github.com/deepseek-ai/deepseek-harness.git
-DSH_VERSION=dsh-v0.2.1-rc.3
+DSH_VERSION=dsh-v0.2.1-rc.5
+DSH_COMMIT=b830ec950faba0a46dda564be3e2d854afed94f1
 PNPM_VERSION=11.28.5
 
 # Release identity = DSH_VERSION plus an optional repository revision.
 # An empty RELEASE_REVISION is the first release at this DSH ref; rN (N >= 2)
-# marks a repository-only re-release at the same DSH ref. The dsh-v0.2.1-rc.3
+# marks a repository-only re-release at the same DSH ref. This is the first
-# image tag is already published on GHCR and tags are immutable, so the current
+# release at dsh-v0.2.1-rc.5-r6, so the identity is the plain tag; a later
-# scheme started at -r2; the current identity is dsh-v0.2.1-rc.3-r4.
+# repository-only change at the same ref becomes -r2.
-RELEASE_REVISION=r4
+RELEASE_REVISION=r6
+
+# Base images for the main DSH Web image (root Dockerfile), pinned by digest.
+NODE_BUILD_IMAGE=docker.io/node:24-trixie@sha256:8c761eca2bf7eec965f946cf47b8090143cb41f45f2f8699af0cc0298d2d2d19
+NODE_RUNTIME_IMAGE=docker.io/node:24-trixie-slim@sha256:54f84b4cf8432b21aaffd5d3ce8d41e12cea0d10d33c09d2f3c9879d49d6b446
+
+# Base image for the example gateway (examples/dsh-agents-as-a-service/gateway).
+GATEWAY_PYTHON_IMAGE=docker.io/python:3.12-slim@sha256:aa943ce411423c7582288f18707ff66eddcbaeb510502d747a72aeb34f30d159
+
+# Base images for the main DSH Web image (root Dockerfile), pinned by digest.
+NODE_BUILD_IMAGE=docker.io/node:24-trixie@sha256:8c761eca2bf7eec965f946cf47b8090143cb41f45f2f8699af0cc0298d2d2d19
+NODE_RUNTIME_IMAGE=docker.io/node:24-trixie-slim@sha256:54f84b4cf8432b21aaffd5d3ce8d41e12cea0d10d33c09d2f3c9879d49d6b446
+
+# Base image for the example gateway (examples/dsh-agents-as-a-service/gateway).
+GATEWAY_PYTHON_IMAGE=docker.io/python:3.12-slim@sha256:aa943ce411423c7582288f18707ff66eddcbaeb510502d747a72aeb34f30d159
 
 # Control-plane versions used by the examples and their manifests.
-AGENT_SANDBOX_VERSION=v1.0.7
+# The matching SHA-256s pin the release manifests that CI downloads and
+# applies; update both the version and the digest when bumping either pin.
+AGENT_SANDBOX_VERSION=v1.0.9
+AGENT_SANDBOX_MANIFEST_SHA256=4bf9ee5558e9a663f91cfa5963e96f2591bfaa1dcf79f03bfab65bc5d65cc699
 GATEWAY_API_VERSION=v1.2.1
-OAUTH2_PROXY_IMAGE=quay.io/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy:v7.15.5
+GATEWAY_API_MANIFEST_SHA256=97598bf6ab3b33b9b5c5432bdd24de091e4e9c3aa0575ebb0710a2a19cd64d64
+OAUTH2_PROXY_IMAGE=quay.io/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy:v7.15.5@sha256:8498b0d0ef0a7b29686414000a08aee467f02d0299c9ed1e006a8f33fc017916
 
 # Registry layout: the main image is the repository itself, and every example
 # component is a nested package below it (<registry>/<owner>/<repo>/<example>/<component>).