# Security policy ## Supported versions Only the latest published release is supported. Image tags are immutable; fixes ship as a new release (see docs/versioning.md). ## Reporting a vulnerability Report vulnerabilities privately through GitHub Security Advisories: https://github.com/sredevopsorg/deepseek-kubernetes-sandbox/security/advisories/new Do not open a public issue, and do not include live credentials in a report. You can expect an acknowledgement within a few days and a coordinated disclosure once a fix is available. ## Threat notes specific to this project - **Launch token in pod logs.** The example gateway reads DSH's launch token from pod logs (pods/log). Anyone with access to those logs can impersonate a tenant. Keep the gateway's RBAC namespace-scoped and treat pod logs as sensitive. Replacing log scraping with an upstream token API is tracked in the example architecture document. - **SSO header trust boundary.** AUTH_PROXY_HEADER makes the gateway trust an identity header (for example X-Forwarded-User). Enable it only when the gateway Service is reachable exclusively through the authenticating proxy; otherwise any client can spoof the header. The SSO exposure variant ships a NetworkPolicy that restricts gateway access to oauth2-proxy pods; a custom exposure needs an equivalent. - **Shared provider keys.** The example injects DEEPSEEK_API_KEY and any keys in the optional dsh-provider-keys-extra Secret into every tenant sandbox (a warm-pool constraint). Treat tenants as mutually trusting until per-tenant credentials or an egress proxy exist. - **Optional isolation is opt-in.** gVisor, nodeSelector, the sandbox/exposure NetworkPolicies and extra provider keys are opt-in. Without a NetworkPolicy-capable CNI or a gVisor runtime, the base example is not tenant-isolated; see examples/dsh-agents-as-a-service/docs/optional-hardening.md. - **TLS is external.** Terminate TLS at an Ingress or Gateway and set COOKIE_SECURE=true. Plain HTTP outside localhost exposes session cookies. - **No secrets in the repository.** The repository only ships empty Secret manifests and *.yaml.example files. ## Dependency and supply chain GitHub Actions are pinned by commit SHA. The CodeQL workflow scans Python and Actions. The release workflow publishes images with SBOM and provenance attestations.