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deepseek-kubernetes-sandbox/examples/minimal-single-tenant/manifests/sandbox-template.yaml
SREDevOps.org Agent a09d4ac340 fix: ship bubblewrap for DSH's command sandbox, keep agents usable without it (#35)
* fix(example): keep agents usable when DSH's inner sandbox has no backend

DSH confines bash commands itself (bubblewrap, else Landlock) and fails closed
with SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE when no runner is usable. In this hardened pod -
non-root, capabilities dropped, seccomp RuntimeDefault - bubblewrap cannot
start (it needs CAP_SYS_ADMIN) and the pod exposes no Landlock runner, so the
shipped workspace-write default made every command fail:

  sandbox mode "workspace-write" is requested but no sandbox backend is usable

The DSH base bundle at the pinned ref documents DSH_PERMISSION_MODE as the
explicit deployment override, so set it to danger-full-access in both sandbox
templates. The per-user pod is the isolation boundary in this example (its own
pod, PVC and Service; non-root; all capabilities dropped), so a working agent
is worth more than an inner file policy that cannot be enforced. Note that
danger-full-access also turns approval prompts off.

Trade-off documented rather than hidden: an agent command can now read its own
DSH_HOME (including .credentials.yaml) and write anywhere in the container.
Hosts where a runner works should keep workspace-write or read-only.

- main-image docs: DSH_PERMISSION_MODE row plus a note on the runners and the
  fail-closed behavior
- example README: limits bullet and a troubleshooting row with the in-pod
  backend check and how to restore a confined mode
- architecture: tenant-isolation bullet extended
- skill runbook/troubleshooting: operation guidance; never grant CAP_SYS_ADMIN
  or seccompProfile: Unconfined to "fix" this without an explicit decision

Verified: make check (14 manifests), make lint, YAML assertions on both
templates, and the override expression at the pinned dsh-v0.2.1-rc.5 base
bundle (mode: !!js process.env.DSH_PERMISSION_MODE ?? 'workspace-write').

* fix(image): install bubblewrap for DSH's command sandbox

DSH's Linux sandbox runner chain is bubblewrap, then Landlock, and it fails
closed with SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE when neither works. The image shipped neither,
so a sandboxed agent had no way to execute confined commands.

Add bubblewrap to the runtime stage. Debian ships it unsetuid (0.12.0), so it
still needs unprivileged user namespaces plus the namespace/mount syscalls: in a
hardened pod (all capabilities dropped, RuntimeDefault seccomp) it usually
cannot create one, and DSH then falls back to Landlock or, failing that, to the
DSH_PERMISSION_MODE=danger-full-access override the templates already set.
Where the host allows an unprivileged user namespace, the first-choice runner
now exists, so the confined modes can be restored.

Docs corrected to match: bubblewrap is no longer "absent"; the blocker is the
unsetuid binary's namespace requirement, not a missing CAP_SYS_ADMIN grant.

Verified: make check, make lint; the package exists in the pinned base
(node:24-trixie-slim, bubblewrap 0.12.0-1~deb13u1); a throwaway container with
the pod's flags (--user 1000 --cap-drop ALL --security-opt no-new-privileges)
still cannot create a namespace, which is why the override stays. No local image
build was run.

* ci(image): build and smoke-test the main image on PRs that touch it

The Dockerfile and the pins in versions.env could only be validated by a merge
to main or by running `make image` by hand; neither gives a PR-time signal.

Add ci-image.yaml: on pull requests that change Dockerfile, .dockerignore or
versions.env (and on manual dispatch) it builds linux/amd64 natively with the
pins sourced from versions.env - no registry login, no push - loads the image
locally and smoke-tests it:

- the packaged CLI runs and reports the pinned version
- the container is the non-root node user (1000) and owns /workspace + DSH_HOME
- the bubblewrap command-sandbox runner is present
- the OCI version label matches versions.env
- a container serves /favicon.svg (the same unauthenticated probe the shipped
  manifests use), with logs filtered so the launch token is never printed

Path-filtered like the other on-demand checks, so it is not a required status
check; the published multi-arch build stays in build-main.yaml and release.yaml.

Docs updated in the same change: AGENTS.md repository map and testing table,
docs/gitflow.md checks section, docs/main-image.md build section.

Verified: actionlint 1.7.12 and yamllint 1.38.0 (CI versions) clean over the
whole repository, plus make check and make lint.

---------

Co-authored-by: SREDevOpsAgents <agents@sredevops.org>
2026-10-30 08:36:21 -03:00

132 lines
5.9 KiB
YAML

# Minimal single-tenant SandboxTemplate for DeepSeek Harness Web.
#
# This is the "just one DSH Web" quick-start template. For the full
# multi-tenant platform (warm pool, per-user claims, gateway, idle-suspend),
# see examples/dsh-agents-as-a-service/.
#
# Claims reference this template directly (spec.sandboxTemplateRef): there is
# no warm pool and no per-user platform here. See the README for the full
# quickstart; in short the prerequisites are:
# - Namespace dsh-demo.
# - Secret dsh-provider-keys in dsh-demo with key DEEPSEEK_API_KEY
# (injected via envFrom; the pod starts without it, only model calls fail).
# - Optional: Secret dsh-provider-keys-extra with additional provider keys
# (OPENROUTER_API_KEY, GEMINI_API_KEY, NVIDIA_API_KEY, ...). It is
# referenced with `optional: true`, so it may be absent.
# The agent-sandbox controller (v1.0.8, API v1beta1) must be installed.
apiVersion: extensions.agents.x-k8s.io/v1beta1
kind: SandboxTemplate
metadata:
name: dsh-web-template
namespace: dsh-demo
spec:
service: true # headless Service per Sandbox -> stable DNS (status.serviceFQDN)
# networkPolicyManagement is omitted, so the controller uses its Managed
# secure default (ingress only from the sandbox-router, public egress). This
# quickstart reaches the sandbox through `kubectl port-forward`, which is
# local to the pod. The multi-tenant example documents opt-in policies in
# examples/dsh-agents-as-a-service/docs/optional-hardening.md.
#
# OPTIONAL: recreate a Failed sandbox Pod instead of retaining it
# (agent-sandbox v1.0.8+). Documented with the multi-tenant example.
# failedPodPolicy: Recreate
podTemplate:
spec:
# OPTIONAL: run under gVisor. gVisor breaks `kubectl port-forward`, so
# this quickstart's only access path will not work; use the multi-tenant
# gateway example or a Service/NodePort instead.
# runtimeClassName: gvisor
#
# OPTIONAL: pin to a dedicated node pool. Replace the placeholder with a
# node label; add a matching toleration if the pool is tainted.
# nodeSelector:
# dsh.example.com/node-pool: dsh
securityContext:
runAsNonRoot: true
runAsUser: 1000 # Matches the UID of the 'node' user
runAsGroup: 1000
fsGroup: 1000
# DSH's credentials plugin refuses to start when .credentials.yaml has
# any group/other permission bit (it creates the file 0600). The
# default kubelet fsGroup policy ("Always") rewrites it to 0660 on every
# pod start, so a recreated or resumed sandbox crash-loops; OnRootMismatch
# avoids that walk once the volume root already carries the ownership.
# Rationale in full at
# examples/dsh-agents-as-a-service/manifests/10-sandboxtemplate.yaml.
fsGroupChangePolicy: OnRootMismatch
containers:
- name: dsh-web
image: ghcr.io/sredevopsorg/deepseek-kubernetes-sandbox:dsh-v0.2.1-rc.5
imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent
ports:
- name: web
containerPort: 3080
envFrom:
- secretRef:
name: dsh-provider-keys # Secret with key DEEPSEEK_API_KEY
# Optional extra provider keys; an absent Secret is safe.
- secretRef:
name: dsh-provider-keys-extra
optional: true
env:
# Empty => DSH derives links from the request Host. Keep it empty
# when fronting the sandbox with a proxy/gateway.
- name: DSH_PUBLIC_URL
value: ""
# DSH Host/Origin-fences /api. Empty trusts only localhost, which
# is right for `kubectl port-forward`. Set this to the public host
# (e.g. dsh.example.com) if you front DSH with a proxy or Ingress,
# so requests forwarded with the browser's Host are accepted. The
# full example documents both exposure variants in
# examples/dsh-agents-as-a-service/manifests/exposure/README.md.
- name: DSH_TRUSTED_HOSTS
value: ""
# DSH's own bash file sandbox (bubblewrap, else Landlock) cannot be
# enforced in this hardened pod - bubblewrap is installed but is
# unsetuid and needs an unprivileged user namespace - and fails
# closed with SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE. The pod is the boundary here;
# keep the deployment override in sync with the multi-tenant example
# and see its README troubleshooting row to restore a confined mode.
- name: DSH_PERMISSION_MODE
value: danger-full-access
volumeMounts:
- name: dsh-home
mountPath: /home/node/.dsh # DSH_HOME
# / is behind DSH's launch-token cookie (401 without it); use an
# unauthenticated path for probes. The startup probe gives a cold
# start (plugin activation on a small node, or the first resume of a
# suspended sandbox) up to 120s before liveness can restart it.
startupProbe:
httpGet:
path: /favicon.svg
port: 3080
periodSeconds: 5
failureThreshold: 24
readinessProbe:
httpGet:
path: /favicon.svg
port: 3080
initialDelaySeconds: 5
periodSeconds: 5
livenessProbe:
httpGet:
path: /favicon.svg
port: 3080
initialDelaySeconds: 15
periodSeconds: 15
securityContext:
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
capabilities:
drop: ["ALL"]
seccompProfile:
type: RuntimeDefault
volumeClaimTemplates:
- metadata:
name: dsh-home
spec:
accessModes: ["ReadWriteOnce"]
resources:
requests:
storage: 5Gi
# storageClassName omitted => cluster default