mirror of
https://github.com/sredevopsorg/deepseek-kubernetes-sandbox.git
synced 2026-11-03 01:13:24 +00:00
1a929e3e24
- Replace user:token cookies with opaque server-side sessions, revocable on logout, delete, recreate and expiry; bind every credential to the path user and add cross-user regression tests. - Rate-limit /users and /login, add optional signup invite codes and form same-origin checks, and unify login failures to 401. - Require explicit ALLOW_INSECURE_COOKIES for plain HTTP, use __Host-dsh_gw_session when secure, and fix secure cookie deletion. - Strip client-supplied forwarding/SSO headers, add an optional upstream allowlist, per-user in-flight and WebSocket message caps, credential-free handshake errors, and sweep-time state pruning. - Digest-pin base images, hash-pin gateway dependencies, verify DSH_COMMIT in the build, and run the gateway image as non-root with a pinned Python base. - Update manifests, production checklist, architecture/security docs and add an SSO preflight script. BREAKING CHANGE: existing dsh_gw_session=<user>:<token> cookies are invalid; users must sign in again. Unknown users on POST /login now return 401 instead of 404, and the gateway refuses COOKIE_SECURE=false unless ALLOW_INSECURE_COOKIES=1. Co-authored-by: SREDevOpsAgents <agents@sredevops.org>
220 lines
12 KiB
YAML
220 lines
12 KiB
YAML
# The reusable DSH Web blueprint. Warm pools stamp pod env BEFORE any user
|
|
# exists, so per-user secrets cannot live in pod env; the shared provider keys
|
|
# are injected via envFrom, and claims that would bypass the warm pool are
|
|
# rejected outright (see 40-claim-rejected.yaml).
|
|
#
|
|
# A stripped-down single-tenant variant of this template (no warm pool, no
|
|
# policy enforcement) lives in examples/minimal-single-tenant/.
|
|
apiVersion: extensions.agents.x-k8s.io/v1beta1
|
|
kind: SandboxTemplate
|
|
metadata:
|
|
name: dsh-web
|
|
namespace: dsh-demo
|
|
spec:
|
|
# Claims must not inject env or volumeClaimTemplates: with Disallowed, such
|
|
# claims are REJECTED instead of silently taking the cold (non-warm-pool)
|
|
# provisioning path. Demonstrated in step 6.
|
|
envVarsInjectionPolicy: Disallowed
|
|
volumeClaimTemplatesPolicy: Disallowed
|
|
|
|
# Per-sandbox headless Service -> stable DNS (sandbox.status.serviceFQDN).
|
|
# The gateway routes each user to their DSH Web instance by this name.
|
|
service: true
|
|
|
|
# The example leaves NetworkPolicy to an optional, opt-in manifest
|
|
# (manifests/optional/network-policy/): the base walkthrough should not
|
|
# require a policy-capable CNI, and the controller's Managed secure default
|
|
# only allows the sandbox-router, which this example does not deploy. If you
|
|
# switch to Managed, define spec.networkPolicy explicitly or the gateway will
|
|
# be blocked. See docs/optional-hardening.md.
|
|
networkPolicyManagement: Unmanaged
|
|
|
|
# OPTIONAL: replace a Failed sandbox Pod instead of parking the sandbox.
|
|
# The default, Retain, leaves the Failed Pod in place and surfaces
|
|
# Finished=True on the Sandbox until a human intervenes. Recreate deletes the
|
|
# Failed Pod and starts a replacement with the same Sandbox identity and
|
|
# Sandbox-owned PVCs, backing off (5s doubling to 5m) on repeated failures.
|
|
# Requires agent-sandbox v1.0.8+; existing Sandboxes keep their own stamped
|
|
# policy, so patch them separately. See docs/optional-hardening.md.
|
|
# failedPodPolicy: Recreate
|
|
|
|
podTemplate:
|
|
spec:
|
|
# DSH Web is multi-arch (amd64 + arm64); no arch nodeSelector is needed.
|
|
#
|
|
# OPTIONAL: run the sandbox under gVisor. Requires a RuntimeClass named
|
|
# "gvisor" and nodes that can run it; gVisor breaks `kubectl port-forward`
|
|
# into the sandbox (use the gateway). Existing Sandboxes snapshot their
|
|
# pod template, so enabling it later requires patching/recreating them.
|
|
# See docs/optional-hardening.md.
|
|
# runtimeClassName: gvisor
|
|
#
|
|
# OPTIONAL: pin sandboxes to a dedicated node pool (for example a gVisor
|
|
# pool). Replace this placeholder with a label your nodes actually carry;
|
|
# add a matching toleration if the pool is tainted. Active
|
|
# cluster-specific scheduling belongs in a local patch, not here.
|
|
# nodeSelector:
|
|
# dsh.example.com/node-pool: dsh
|
|
restartPolicy: "OnFailure"
|
|
securityContext:
|
|
runAsUser: 1000 # the 'node' user in the DSH image
|
|
runAsGroup: 1000
|
|
fsGroup: 1000
|
|
runAsNonRoot: true
|
|
# DSH's credentials plugin refuses to start when .credentials.yaml has
|
|
# any group/other permission bit (it creates the file 0600). The
|
|
# default kubelet fsGroup policy ("Always") recursively ORs 0660 into
|
|
# every file each time the pod starts, so a resumed sandbox comes back
|
|
# with 0660 and crash-loops before the gateway can proxy to it.
|
|
# OnRootMismatch skips that walk once the volume root already carries
|
|
# the fsGroup ownership/mode applied on the first mount.
|
|
# Keep in sync with the minimal variant:
|
|
# examples/minimal-single-tenant/manifests/10-sandboxtemplate.yaml.
|
|
fsGroupChangePolicy: OnRootMismatch
|
|
containers:
|
|
- name: dsh-web
|
|
image: ghcr.io/sredevopsorg/deepseek-kubernetes-sandbox:dsh-v0.2.1-rc.5
|
|
imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent
|
|
ports:
|
|
- name: web
|
|
containerPort: 3080
|
|
envFrom:
|
|
- secretRef:
|
|
name: dsh-provider-keys
|
|
# Optional extra provider keys (OpenRouter, Gemini, NVIDIA, ...).
|
|
# The Secret may be absent; every key in it becomes an env var.
|
|
# Create it before the warm pool, because pod env is stamped at
|
|
# pod creation. See docs/optional-hardening.md.
|
|
- secretRef:
|
|
name: dsh-provider-keys-extra
|
|
optional: true
|
|
env:
|
|
# Point the OS home at the persisted agent workspace. DSH's
|
|
# directory picker (the folder explorer used to choose a workspace)
|
|
# has no start-path setting: when it opens it lists $HOME, and
|
|
# os.homedir() follows this variable. The image default is
|
|
# /home/node, which is not on a volume, so the picker would open on
|
|
# a throwaway directory; /workspace is the PVC-backed WORKDIR. `~`
|
|
# in agent commands resolves here too. Trade-off: tools that keep
|
|
# caches/config under $HOME (npm/pnpm, uv, git, gh, and DSH's global
|
|
# ~/.agents instructions and skills) now write dotfiles onto the PVC
|
|
# inside the agent workspace, so they are visible to the agent and
|
|
# in the file explorer. DSH_HOME is explicit (/home/node/.dsh), so
|
|
# sessions, config and credentials are unaffected. Existing
|
|
# sandboxes stamp pod env at creation and keep the old HOME until
|
|
# recreated. Keep in sync with the minimal variant:
|
|
# examples/minimal-single-tenant/manifests/10-sandboxtemplate.yaml.
|
|
- name: HOME
|
|
value: /workspace
|
|
# Empty => DSH derives links from the request Host, which the
|
|
# gateway forwards (plus X-Forwarded-*). Point this at the
|
|
# gateway base URL if you want hard-coded absolute links instead.
|
|
- name: DSH_PUBLIC_URL
|
|
value: ""
|
|
# DSH Host/Origin-fences /api. The gateway forwards the browser's
|
|
# Host, so DSH must trust the public gateway host. Empty is right
|
|
# for port-forward/localhost; for either exposure variant set this
|
|
# to the public host (e.g. dsh.example.com for
|
|
# manifests/exposure/ingress/60-ingress.yaml, or
|
|
# dsh-demo.example.com for the gateway-api-sso/ HTTPRoute).
|
|
- name: DSH_TRUSTED_HOSTS
|
|
value: ""
|
|
# DSH confines every bash command with its own file sandbox
|
|
# (bubblewrap, else Landlock). Neither backend is usable inside this
|
|
# pod: bubblewrap ships in the image but is unsetuid, so it needs an
|
|
# unprivileged user namespace that the pod's RuntimeDefault seccomp
|
|
# and dropped capabilities do not grant, and the runtime/kernel
|
|
# surface here exposes no Landlock runner. The executor therefore
|
|
# fails closed with SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE and every command fails. The
|
|
# pod is the isolation boundary in this example (one pod
|
|
# per user, non-root, capabilities dropped, seccomp RuntimeDefault,
|
|
# a private PVC), so trade DSH's inner file policy for a working
|
|
# agent. Set this to workspace-write (or read-only) on hosts where a
|
|
# backend is available; see the README troubleshooting row.
|
|
# SECURITY: the pod is the isolation boundary in this example.
|
|
# danger-full-access is set only because DSH's own command sandbox
|
|
# has no usable backend in this pod (see above), which means an
|
|
# agent command can read its own DSH_HOME (including
|
|
# .credentials.yaml) and write anywhere in the container. What
|
|
# still contains it is the pod itself: one pod per user, non-root,
|
|
# all capabilities dropped, RuntimeDefault seccomp, its own PVC and
|
|
# Service. That is NOT a hardened multi-tenant boundary on a shared
|
|
# kernel. For production/multi-tenant use, additionally run the
|
|
# sandbox under gVisor (`runtimeClassName: gvisor` above) so a
|
|
# container escape is trapped in a userspace kernel, and apply the
|
|
# sandbox NetworkPolicy (manifests/optional/network-policy/) so
|
|
# tenants cannot reach each other or cluster-internal endpoints.
|
|
# The base manifests without those two controls are a demo. Treat
|
|
# danger-full-access as a fallback, not a target: on hosts where
|
|
# DSH's command-sandbox backend works, prefer workspace-write (or
|
|
# read-only), and recreate the pod because the value is stamped at
|
|
# creation.
|
|
- name: DSH_PERMISSION_MODE
|
|
value: danger-full-access
|
|
# Probes target /favicon.svg: DSH gates / behind its launch-token
|
|
# cookie and answers 401 to an unauthenticated GET, which would
|
|
# otherwise fail readiness and then get the pod killed by liveness.
|
|
# /favicon.svg is served without auth and is the cheapest liveness
|
|
# signal that proves the HTTP server is actually serving requests.
|
|
#
|
|
# Gate liveness/readiness behind a startup probe: a cold start on a
|
|
# small node takes tens of seconds to load plugins and start serving
|
|
# (a resumed sandbox starts cold too). Without it the kubelet can kill
|
|
# DSH mid-startup, and a SIGTERM'd DSH exits 0, which the sandbox
|
|
# controller records as finished. 24 x 5s = 120s, matching the
|
|
# gateway's WAKE_TIMEOUT.
|
|
startupProbe:
|
|
httpGet:
|
|
path: /favicon.svg
|
|
port: 3080
|
|
periodSeconds: 5
|
|
failureThreshold: 24
|
|
readinessProbe:
|
|
httpGet:
|
|
path: /favicon.svg
|
|
port: 3080
|
|
initialDelaySeconds: 5
|
|
periodSeconds: 5
|
|
failureThreshold: 30
|
|
livenessProbe:
|
|
httpGet:
|
|
path: /favicon.svg
|
|
port: 3080
|
|
initialDelaySeconds: 15
|
|
periodSeconds: 15
|
|
failureThreshold: 3
|
|
# The container only needs to serve HTTP; drop every capability and
|
|
# disallow privilege escalation. DSH writes only to its PVC-backed
|
|
# directories (DSH_HOME and the agent workspace).
|
|
securityContext:
|
|
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
|
|
capabilities:
|
|
drop: ["ALL"]
|
|
seccompProfile:
|
|
type: RuntimeDefault
|
|
resources:
|
|
requests: {cpu: 250m, memory: 512Mi}
|
|
limits: {cpu: "1", memory: 1Gi}
|
|
volumeMounts:
|
|
- name: dsh-home
|
|
mountPath: /home/node/.dsh # DSH_HOME: sessions, config, state
|
|
# The agent workspace (the image's WORKDIR) is PVC-backed too, but
|
|
# under its own subPath so DSH state - including .credentials.yaml -
|
|
# never shows up as workspace data. Kubelet creates workspace/ on
|
|
# first mount with the volume's fsGroup permissions (0775, setgid
|
|
# inherited from the volume root), so UID 1000 can write; no init
|
|
# container is needed. If the kubelet is killed mid-creation the
|
|
# directory stays 0755: see Troubleshooting in the README.
|
|
- name: dsh-home
|
|
mountPath: /workspace
|
|
subPath: workspace
|
|
volumeClaimTemplates:
|
|
- metadata:
|
|
name: dsh-home
|
|
spec:
|
|
accessModes: ["ReadWriteOnce"]
|
|
resources:
|
|
requests:
|
|
storage: 5Gi
|
|
# storageClassName omitted => cluster default (kind & GKE both work)
|