mirror of
https://github.com/sredevopsorg/deepseek-kubernetes-sandbox.git
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24f23e09ae
Remove obsolete layout/migration prose and legacy gateway-alias references, reconcile the required-check policy, fix version-label/RBAC/workspace/channel drift, and de-duplicate the example and gateway docs. Rename the minimal manifest to 10-sandboxtemplate.yaml and mount the dsh-home PVC's workspace subPath at /workspace so the documented persistence is real. Enforce numbered top-level manifests in check-examples.sh. Verified with make check, yamllint, shellcheck, a Markdown link/anchor scan, and git diff --check. Co-authored-by: SREDevOpsAgents <agents@sredevops.org>
49 lines
2.4 KiB
Markdown
49 lines
2.4 KiB
Markdown
# Security policy
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## Supported versions
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Only the latest published release is supported. Image tags are immutable;
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fixes ship as a new release (see docs/versioning.md).
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## Reporting a vulnerability
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Report vulnerabilities privately through GitHub Security Advisories:
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https://github.com/sredevopsorg/deepseek-kubernetes-sandbox/security/advisories/new
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Do not open a public issue, and do not include live credentials in a report.
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You can expect an acknowledgement within a few days and a coordinated
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disclosure once a fix is available.
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## Threat notes specific to this project
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- **Launch token in pod logs.** The example gateway reads DSH's launch token
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from pod logs (pods/log). Anyone with access to those logs can impersonate a
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tenant. Keep the gateway's RBAC namespace-scoped and treat pod logs as
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sensitive. Replacing log scraping with an upstream token API is tracked in
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the [example architecture document](examples/dsh-agents-as-a-service/docs/architecture.md#upstream-feature-request-remove-log-scraping).
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- **SSO header trust boundary.** AUTH_PROXY_HEADER makes the gateway trust an
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identity header (for example X-Forwarded-User). Enable it only when the
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gateway Service is reachable exclusively through the authenticating proxy;
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otherwise any client can spoof the header. The SSO exposure variant ships a
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NetworkPolicy that restricts gateway access to oauth2-proxy pods; a custom
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exposure needs an equivalent.
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- **Shared provider keys.** The example injects DEEPSEEK_API_KEY and any keys in
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the optional dsh-provider-keys-extra Secret into every tenant sandbox (a
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warm-pool constraint). Treat tenants as mutually trusting until per-tenant
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credentials or an egress proxy exist.
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- **Optional isolation is opt-in.** gVisor, nodeSelector, the sandbox/exposure
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NetworkPolicies and extra provider keys are opt-in. Without a
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NetworkPolicy-capable CNI or a gVisor runtime, the base example is not
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tenant-isolated; see examples/dsh-agents-as-a-service/docs/optional-hardening.md.
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- **TLS is external.** Terminate TLS at an Ingress or Gateway and set
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COOKIE_SECURE=true. Plain HTTP outside localhost exposes session cookies.
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- **No secrets in the repository.** The repository only ships empty Secret
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manifests and *.yaml.example files.
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## Dependency and supply chain
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GitHub Actions are pinned by commit SHA. The CodeQL workflow scans Python and
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Actions. The release workflow publishes images with SBOM and provenance
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attestations.
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