mirror of
https://github.com/sredevopsorg/deepseek-kubernetes-sandbox.git
synced 2026-11-03 01:13:24 +00:00
ae8aba8241
- Replace user:token cookies with opaque server-side sessions, revocable on logout, delete, recreate and expiry; bind every credential to the path user and add cross-user regression tests. - Rate-limit /users and /login, add optional signup invite codes and form same-origin checks, and unify login failures to 401. - Require explicit ALLOW_INSECURE_COOKIES for plain HTTP, use __Host-dsh_gw_session when secure, and fix secure cookie deletion. - Strip client-supplied forwarding/SSO headers, add an optional upstream allowlist, per-user in-flight and WebSocket message caps, credential-free handshake errors, and sweep-time state pruning. - Digest-pin base images, hash-pin gateway dependencies, verify DSH_COMMIT in the build, and run the gateway image as non-root with a pinned Python base. - Update manifests, production checklist, architecture/security docs and add an SSO preflight script. BREAKING CHANGE: existing dsh_gw_session=<user>:<token> cookies are invalid; users must sign in again. Unknown users on POST /login now return 401 instead of 404, and the gateway refuses COOKIE_SECURE=false unless ALLOW_INSECURE_COOKIES=1.
3.7 KiB
3.7 KiB
Security policy
Supported versions
Only the latest published release is supported. Image tags are immutable; fixes ship as a new release (see docs/versioning.md).
Reporting a vulnerability
Report vulnerabilities privately through GitHub Security Advisories:
https://github.com/sredevopsorg/deepseek-kubernetes-sandbox/security/advisories/new
Do not open a public issue, and do not include live credentials in a report. You can expect an acknowledgement within a few days and a coordinated disclosure once a fix is available.
Threat notes specific to this project
- Launch token in pod logs. The example gateway reads DSH's launch token from pod logs (pods/log). Anyone with access to those logs can impersonate a tenant. Keep the gateway's RBAC namespace-scoped and treat pod logs as sensitive. Replacing log scraping with an upstream token API is tracked in the example architecture document.
- Browser sessions are server-side. The gateway session cookie holds an
opaque session id, not a user name or token; it is not accepted as a bearer
token. Sessions are revoked on logout, user delete,
/recreateand expiry, but they live in gateway memory, so a gateway restart logs every browser out and scaling beyond one replica requires a shared store. Do not treat the cookie as durable or cross-replica state. - SSO header trust boundary. AUTH_PROXY_HEADER makes the gateway trust an
identity header (for example X-Forwarded-User). Enable it only when the
gateway Service is reachable exclusively through the authenticating proxy
and its NetworkPolicy; otherwise any client can spoof the header. The SSO
exposure variant's policy is required, not optional: an exposure without it
is demo-only. Run
examples/dsh-agents-as-a-service/scripts/preflight-sso.shafter applying the variant; it checks the Secrets, gateway env, TLS reference, leftover placeholders and accidental second paths. - Insecure-cookie guard. TLS terminates outside the gateway. Set COOKIE_SECURE=true for HTTPS and remove ALLOW_INSECURE_COOKIES; the gateway refuses to start with COOKIE_SECURE=false unless ALLOW_INSECURE_COOKIES=1 is explicitly set, which exists only for the plain-HTTP local demo. Never expose that combination outside localhost.
- Abuse controls are in-process. AUTH_RATE_LIMIT/AUTH_RATE_WINDOW, SIGNUP_INVITE_CODE, MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PER_USER and WS_MAX_MESSAGE_BYTES bound casual abuse and resource exhaustion on the single gateway replica. They reset on restart and are not an ingress rate limiter, WAF, quota system or audit log; add those for an internet-facing deployment.
- Shared provider keys. The example injects DEEPSEEK_API_KEY and any keys in the optional dsh-provider-keys-extra Secret into every tenant sandbox (a warm-pool constraint). Treat tenants as mutually trusting until per-tenant credentials or an egress proxy exist.
- The base example is demo-only, not hardened. gVisor, nodeSelector, the sandbox/exposure NetworkPolicies, the gateway egress policy and extra provider keys are opt-in. Without gVisor and the network policies there is no tenant-to-tenant isolation; the sandboxes share the host kernel and can reach cluster-internal endpoints. Production requirements are enumerated in the production checklist.
- No secrets in the repository. The repository only ships empty Secret manifests and *.yaml.example files.
Dependency and supply chain
GitHub Actions are pinned by commit SHA. The CodeQL workflow scans Python and Actions. The release workflow publishes images with SBOM and provenance attestations.